Burning Man
EXCERPT:
WHAT IS BURNING MAN?
Trying to explain what Burning Man is to someone who has never been to the event is a bit like trying to explain what a particular color looks like to someone who is blind. In this section you will find the peripheral definitions of what the event is as a whole, but to truly understand this event, one must participate. This site serves to try to paint a picture of the Burning Man experience to those who are new to the project, as well as to give those participants looking to keep the fire burning in their daily lives an environment in which to connect to their fellow community members. For a brief yet eloquent overview of the entire event from the time of arrival to the time of exodus, please read "What is Burning Man?", an essay written by participant and one-time web team member, Molly Steenson. Please see archived sections for each year to read more about the art themes, art installations and theme camps for each year.
This is the accident my 3 g'kids were in about a month ago.
Monday, August 30, 2010
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Disaster Capitalism headed to Haiti
EXCERPT:
Heritage is an imperial tool advocating predation, exploitation, and Haitian redevelopment for profit, not for desperate people to repair their lives. It disdains democratic freedoms, social justice, and envisions a global economy "where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish" solely for the privileged, the chosen few, not the disadvantaged or greater majority.
It's for free market plunder, regulatory freedom, tax cuts for the rich, exploiting the majority, corporate handouts, and militarized control for enforcement. It supports the Bilderberg idea of a global classless society - a New World Order with rulers and serfs, no middle class, no unions, no democracy, no equity or justice, just empowered oligarchs, freed to do as they please under a universal legal system benefitting them.
EXCERPT:
Heritage is an imperial tool advocating predation, exploitation, and Haitian redevelopment for profit, not for desperate people to repair their lives. It disdains democratic freedoms, social justice, and envisions a global economy "where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish" solely for the privileged, the chosen few, not the disadvantaged or greater majority.
It's for free market plunder, regulatory freedom, tax cuts for the rich, exploiting the majority, corporate handouts, and militarized control for enforcement. It supports the Bilderberg idea of a global classless society - a New World Order with rulers and serfs, no middle class, no unions, no democracy, no equity or justice, just empowered oligarchs, freed to do as they please under a universal legal system benefitting them.
Saturday, August 28, 2010
Legal challenge to Iraqi oil contracts
EXCERPT:
The Supreme Court of Iraq is currently considering the legality of the Rumaila oilfield contract awarded by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to BP and China National Oil Petroleum Co (SINOPEC) in the first bidding round for oil and gas field development contracts in 2009.
The lawsuit has been filed by a former Iraqi MP, who argues that the BP contract violates the Iraqi constitution. The outcome of this case is likely to have significant implications concerning the legality of the contracts that were awarded to international oil companies (IOCs) by the Ministry of Oil in 2008-09.
US labor against war
Published August 2, 2010
CONTINGENCY OPERATING BASE BASRA, IRAQ - Oil executives buzz in and out of this American base, the former British base connected to the Basra airport, some for meetings with officials, some staying the night – or longer.
The American mission in Basra, Iraq’s oil capital, is perhaps unlike that of any U.S. outpost in the world: to ensure the world’s largest oil companies have as few problems as possible as they start work on Iraqi oil contracts that could see the country become the largest producer ever.
Blood and oil how the west will profit from Iraq's most precious commodity
EXCERPT:
Now, unnoticed by most amid the furore over civil war in Iraq and the hanging of Saddam Hussein, the new oil law has quietly been going through several drafts, and is now on the point of being presented to the cabinet and then the parliament in Baghdad. Its provisions are a radical departure from the norm for developing countries: under a system known as "production-sharing agreements", or PSAs, oil majors such as BP and Shell in Britain, and Exxon and Chevron in the US, would be able to sign deals of up to 30 years to extract Iraq's oil.
PSAs allow a country to retain legal ownership of its oil, but gives a share of profits to the international companies that invest in infrastructure and operation of the wells, pipelines and refineries. Their introduction would be a first for a major Middle Eastern oil producer. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the world's number one and two oil exporters, both tightly control their industries through state-owned companies with no appreciable foreign collaboration, as do most members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Opec.
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 1 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 2 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 3 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 4 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 5 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 6 of 6 youtube
Shock Doctrine Rise Disaster Capitalism amazon
Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine advances a truly unnerving argument: historically, while people were reeling from natural disasters, wars and economic upheavals, savvy politicians and industry leaders nefariously implemented policies that would never have passed during less muddled times. As Klein demonstrates, this reprehensible game of bait-and-switch isn't just some relic from the bad old days. It's alive and well in contemporary society, and coming soon to a disaster area near you.
"At the most chaotic juncture in Iraq'' civil war, a new law is unveiled that will allow Shell and BP to claim the country's vast oil reserves… Immediately following September 11, the Bush Administration quietly outsources the running of the 'War on Terror' to Halliburton and Blackwater… After a tsunami wipes out the coasts of Southeast Asia, the pristine beaches are auctioned off to tourist resorts… New Orleans residents, scattered from Hurricane Katrina, discover that their public housing, hospitals and schools will never be re-opened." Klein not only kicks butt, she names names, notably economist Milton Friedman and his radical Chicago School of the 1950s and 60s which she notes "produced many of the leading neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinkers whose influence is still profound in Washington today." Stand up and take a bow, Donald Rumsfeld.
There's little doubt Klein's book--which arrived to enormous attention and fanfare thanks to her previous missive, the best-selling No Logo, will stir the ire of the right and corporate America. It's also true that Klein's assertions are coherent, comprehensively researched and footnoted, and she makes a very credible case. Even if the world isn't going to hell in a hand-basket just yet, it's nice to know a sharp customer like Klein is bearing witness to the backroom machinations of government and industry in times of turmoil. --Kim Hughes
From Publishers Weekly
The neo-liberal economic policies—privatization, free trade, slashed social spending—that the Chicago School and the economist Milton Friedman have foisted on the world are catastrophic in two senses, argues this vigorous polemic. Because their results are disastrous—depressions, mass poverty, private corporations looting public wealth, by the author's accounting—their means must be cataclysmic, dependent on political upheavals and natural disasters as coercive pretexts for free-market reforms the public would normally reject. Journalist Klein (No Logo) chronicles decades of such disasters, including the Chicago School makeovers launched by South American coups; the corrupt sale of Russia's state economy to oligarchs following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the privatization of New Orleans's public schools after Katrina; and the seizure of wrecked fishing villages by resort developers after the Asian tsunami. Klein's economic and political analyses are not always meticulous. Likening free-market shock therapies to electroshock torture, she conflates every misdeed of right-wing dictatorships with their economic programs and paints a too simplistic picture of the Iraq conflict as a struggle over American-imposed neo-liberalism. Still, much of her critique hits home, as she demonstrates how free-market ideologues welcome, and provoke, the collapse of other people's economies. The result is a powerful populist indictment of economic orthodoxy. (Sept.)
EXCERPT:
The Supreme Court of Iraq is currently considering the legality of the Rumaila oilfield contract awarded by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to BP and China National Oil Petroleum Co (SINOPEC) in the first bidding round for oil and gas field development contracts in 2009.
The lawsuit has been filed by a former Iraqi MP, who argues that the BP contract violates the Iraqi constitution. The outcome of this case is likely to have significant implications concerning the legality of the contracts that were awarded to international oil companies (IOCs) by the Ministry of Oil in 2008-09.
US labor against war
Published August 2, 2010
CONTINGENCY OPERATING BASE BASRA, IRAQ - Oil executives buzz in and out of this American base, the former British base connected to the Basra airport, some for meetings with officials, some staying the night – or longer.
The American mission in Basra, Iraq’s oil capital, is perhaps unlike that of any U.S. outpost in the world: to ensure the world’s largest oil companies have as few problems as possible as they start work on Iraqi oil contracts that could see the country become the largest producer ever.
Blood and oil how the west will profit from Iraq's most precious commodity
EXCERPT:
Now, unnoticed by most amid the furore over civil war in Iraq and the hanging of Saddam Hussein, the new oil law has quietly been going through several drafts, and is now on the point of being presented to the cabinet and then the parliament in Baghdad. Its provisions are a radical departure from the norm for developing countries: under a system known as "production-sharing agreements", or PSAs, oil majors such as BP and Shell in Britain, and Exxon and Chevron in the US, would be able to sign deals of up to 30 years to extract Iraq's oil.
PSAs allow a country to retain legal ownership of its oil, but gives a share of profits to the international companies that invest in infrastructure and operation of the wells, pipelines and refineries. Their introduction would be a first for a major Middle Eastern oil producer. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the world's number one and two oil exporters, both tightly control their industries through state-owned companies with no appreciable foreign collaboration, as do most members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Opec.
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 1 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 2 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 3 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 4 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 5 of 6 youtube
Naomi Klein - The Shock Doctrine - Part 6 of 6 youtube
Shock Doctrine Rise Disaster Capitalism amazon
Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine advances a truly unnerving argument: historically, while people were reeling from natural disasters, wars and economic upheavals, savvy politicians and industry leaders nefariously implemented policies that would never have passed during less muddled times. As Klein demonstrates, this reprehensible game of bait-and-switch isn't just some relic from the bad old days. It's alive and well in contemporary society, and coming soon to a disaster area near you.
"At the most chaotic juncture in Iraq'' civil war, a new law is unveiled that will allow Shell and BP to claim the country's vast oil reserves… Immediately following September 11, the Bush Administration quietly outsources the running of the 'War on Terror' to Halliburton and Blackwater… After a tsunami wipes out the coasts of Southeast Asia, the pristine beaches are auctioned off to tourist resorts… New Orleans residents, scattered from Hurricane Katrina, discover that their public housing, hospitals and schools will never be re-opened." Klein not only kicks butt, she names names, notably economist Milton Friedman and his radical Chicago School of the 1950s and 60s which she notes "produced many of the leading neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinkers whose influence is still profound in Washington today." Stand up and take a bow, Donald Rumsfeld.
There's little doubt Klein's book--which arrived to enormous attention and fanfare thanks to her previous missive, the best-selling No Logo, will stir the ire of the right and corporate America. It's also true that Klein's assertions are coherent, comprehensively researched and footnoted, and she makes a very credible case. Even if the world isn't going to hell in a hand-basket just yet, it's nice to know a sharp customer like Klein is bearing witness to the backroom machinations of government and industry in times of turmoil. --Kim Hughes
From Publishers Weekly
The neo-liberal economic policies—privatization, free trade, slashed social spending—that the Chicago School and the economist Milton Friedman have foisted on the world are catastrophic in two senses, argues this vigorous polemic. Because their results are disastrous—depressions, mass poverty, private corporations looting public wealth, by the author's accounting—their means must be cataclysmic, dependent on political upheavals and natural disasters as coercive pretexts for free-market reforms the public would normally reject. Journalist Klein (No Logo) chronicles decades of such disasters, including the Chicago School makeovers launched by South American coups; the corrupt sale of Russia's state economy to oligarchs following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the privatization of New Orleans's public schools after Katrina; and the seizure of wrecked fishing villages by resort developers after the Asian tsunami. Klein's economic and political analyses are not always meticulous. Likening free-market shock therapies to electroshock torture, she conflates every misdeed of right-wing dictatorships with their economic programs and paints a too simplistic picture of the Iraq conflict as a struggle over American-imposed neo-liberalism. Still, much of her critique hits home, as she demonstrates how free-market ideologues welcome, and provoke, the collapse of other people's economies. The result is a powerful populist indictment of economic orthodoxy. (Sept.)
Seabed rise under Macondo Well buckling streets in New Orleans
EXCERPT:
The Tonka ReportReal News In A Changing World
Seabed Rise Under Macondo Well Buckling Streets In New Orleans?
with 10 comments
August 3, 2010: Steven John Hibbs / The Tonka Report (TTR) – August 3, 2010
I received a rather frantic email from my contact in New Orleans yesterday, August 2, 2010, reporting that streets all over New Orleans are mysteriously cracking and buckling upwards to 15-30 inches from their original setting.
She said the local news media is claiming it’s from the “extreme” heat. She then said that the heat has not been unusual for this time of year and that in all the years she has lived in New Orleans, has never seen anything like this happen before.
Extreme Heat Buckles Dozens Of Kenner Streets
When she asked me what could possibly be causing this, I told her that there have been numerous reports of the Gulf seabed rising up to 30 feet in places. I have posted articles and commented ad nauseum concerning the methane reserve below the Gulf seabed and the possible dangers that could ensue if the seabed is in fact completely compromised…
Extreme heat buckles dozens of Kenner streets
by Scott Satchfield / Eyewitness News
wwltv.com
Posted on August 2, 2010 at 10:26 PM
KENNER, La. -- It's a common sight across the metro area these days -- busted, broken concrete rising off the ground, as streets are buckling under the searing summer heat.
Charles Walton heard a loud boom when Driftwood Boulevard buckled in front of his house in Kenner.
When he ran out to see what happened, it got worse.
"I was standing about two or three feet away, and the thing exploded a second time, and it literally shook the ground -- almost felt like an earthquake," Walton said. "It was pretty wild, it really was. It was scary. I jumped back. I kind of ran back a few feet when it happened."
Over the weekend, streets buckled across Jefferson Parish as heat indices soared well into the triple digits.
"This is the worst year I've ever seen it, since I've been with the public works department," said Jerry Dillenkoffer, director of Streets and Drainage in Kenner.
Dillenkoffer said concrete roadways, not asphalt, are most vulnerable.
Standing on a freshly buckled section of Texas Avenue, he explained how it happens.
"These panels try to expand and when they can't expand any further, they just buckle straight up in the air like I mentioned to you before. This buckle is probably 18 inches to 20 inches above the ground," Dillenkoffer said.
Back on Driftwood Boulevard, neighbors gathered to see the damage on their block. It was the fourth of five streets to buckle in Kenner on Monday, adding to dozens already this summer.
12 streets have broken apart since Friday – bringing the number to 35 for the summer.
As they keep piling up, the problem is getting costly. At a repair cost of around $20,000 for each event, Dillenkoffer estimates the damage adds up to more than a $500,000, putting a strain on Kenner's finances.
"With the revenues not there, we don't have very much money to get these street buckles done," he said.
And allowing two weeks for repairs, it can become a headache for neighbors.
"What a mess,” said Peggy Schoemann, who lives near the broken section of Texas Avenue. “I'm glad it's not in front of my house. I'm glad I have two trees to shade the street in front of my house."
EXCERPT:
The Tonka ReportReal News In A Changing World
Seabed Rise Under Macondo Well Buckling Streets In New Orleans?
with 10 comments
August 3, 2010: Steven John Hibbs / The Tonka Report (TTR) – August 3, 2010
I received a rather frantic email from my contact in New Orleans yesterday, August 2, 2010, reporting that streets all over New Orleans are mysteriously cracking and buckling upwards to 15-30 inches from their original setting.
She said the local news media is claiming it’s from the “extreme” heat. She then said that the heat has not been unusual for this time of year and that in all the years she has lived in New Orleans, has never seen anything like this happen before.
Extreme Heat Buckles Dozens Of Kenner Streets
When she asked me what could possibly be causing this, I told her that there have been numerous reports of the Gulf seabed rising up to 30 feet in places. I have posted articles and commented ad nauseum concerning the methane reserve below the Gulf seabed and the possible dangers that could ensue if the seabed is in fact completely compromised…
Extreme heat buckles dozens of Kenner streets
by Scott Satchfield / Eyewitness News
wwltv.com
Posted on August 2, 2010 at 10:26 PM
KENNER, La. -- It's a common sight across the metro area these days -- busted, broken concrete rising off the ground, as streets are buckling under the searing summer heat.
Charles Walton heard a loud boom when Driftwood Boulevard buckled in front of his house in Kenner.
When he ran out to see what happened, it got worse.
"I was standing about two or three feet away, and the thing exploded a second time, and it literally shook the ground -- almost felt like an earthquake," Walton said. "It was pretty wild, it really was. It was scary. I jumped back. I kind of ran back a few feet when it happened."
Over the weekend, streets buckled across Jefferson Parish as heat indices soared well into the triple digits.
"This is the worst year I've ever seen it, since I've been with the public works department," said Jerry Dillenkoffer, director of Streets and Drainage in Kenner.
Dillenkoffer said concrete roadways, not asphalt, are most vulnerable.
Standing on a freshly buckled section of Texas Avenue, he explained how it happens.
"These panels try to expand and when they can't expand any further, they just buckle straight up in the air like I mentioned to you before. This buckle is probably 18 inches to 20 inches above the ground," Dillenkoffer said.
Back on Driftwood Boulevard, neighbors gathered to see the damage on their block. It was the fourth of five streets to buckle in Kenner on Monday, adding to dozens already this summer.
12 streets have broken apart since Friday – bringing the number to 35 for the summer.
As they keep piling up, the problem is getting costly. At a repair cost of around $20,000 for each event, Dillenkoffer estimates the damage adds up to more than a $500,000, putting a strain on Kenner's finances.
"With the revenues not there, we don't have very much money to get these street buckles done," he said.
And allowing two weeks for repairs, it can become a headache for neighbors.
"What a mess,” said Peggy Schoemann, who lives near the broken section of Texas Avenue. “I'm glad it's not in front of my house. I'm glad I have two trees to shade the street in front of my house."
EXCERPT from Where the Hell is Matt: Matt thinks Americans need to travel abroad more.
British oil company Cairn Energys Arctic fuels hope new reserves
EXCERPTs:
1) Green groups say a blow out like that at BP's Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico could cause even more damage in Greenland as cold conditions would mean limited evaporation of the oil.
2) Sir Bill's interest in oil was sparked during university summers spent with the Bushes in Texas When George W Bush became president, his first words to Mr Blair were: ‘I believe you know my old friend Bill Gammell.’
Greenland is self-governing but barring a severing of ties with Denmark, a major oil find will put the Danes in the unlikely position of becoming an oil-rich nation on a par with the likes of Saudi Arabia.
Investors squeezed in Vedanta's Cairn India deal
EXCERPT:
Tue Aug 17, 2010 9:19am IST
-- The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are her own --
By Una Galani
LONDON (Reuters Breakingviews) - Investors are being squeezed in Vedanta's deal to buy a controlling stake in Cairn India. The miner controlled by ambitious Indian billionaire Anil Agarwal will spend as much as $9.6 billion -- more than Vedanta's own market capitalisation -- to purchase up to 60 percent of the Indian oil producer. Yet the London-listed miner's complicated leap into the oil industry serves mainly as a reminder of the risks faced by minority investors in public companies.
To avoid diluting its controlling family's 61 percent shareholding, Vedanta is conducting part of the acquisition through its Indian-listed iron ore subsidiary Sesa Goa. The unit, 57 percent owned by Vedanta, will make a public tender offer for 20 percent of Cairn India shares at 355 rupees per share and fund the $2.9 billion cost from its existing cash reserves.
Why Vedanta must be stopped
EXCERPT:
For me, trying to help the international campaign against Vedanta Resources plc is blindingly complicated and dazzlingly simple at the same time. It is complicated because Vedanta’s patrons include the United Kingdom, much of the west and the Indian moneyed classes. Most of us in this island kingdom are inextricably wired into this global economy, this gilded cobweb. Our banks, pension funds, supermarkets, employers invest in Vedanta plc. Our local councils, churches, even our universities invest in Vedanta plc. Most of us are all investing in Vedanta plc, directly or indirectly (which one makes us feel better?) and moreover we are charging hefty interest since Vedanta offers high returns for the “risks investors (we) have undertaken”. What risks have we undertaken? We risk that the aluminium mining multinational company will not be granted full clearance to begin mining in the Niyamgiri hills in the eastern Indian state of Orissa. More importantly we risk that Vedanta will actually decide to respect the fact that they
Cairn moves to allay India fears over sale to Vedanta
Afp, New DelhiBritish oil explorer Cairn Energy moved Friday to allay India's worries about its proposed sale of a majority stake in its Indian energy unit to mining giant Vedanta Resources.
Vedanta announced earlier this month it would buy 51 to 60 percent of Cairn India for up to 9.6 billion dollars, adding to its assets that already include aluminium, copper, iron ore and zinc mines.
The transaction requires the Indian government's blessing because it has oil production-sharing contracts with Cairn India.
Cairn Energy said the proposed sale "will not adversely affect the performance or obligations under the various production sharing contracts (signed by Cairn India) nor be contrary to the interests of India."
Where the hell is Matt? dancing youtube
Where the hell is Matt?
About Matt
Matt is a 33-year-old deadbeat from Connecticut who used to think that all he ever wanted to do in life was make and play videogames. Matt achieved this goal pretty early and enjoyed it for a while, but eventually realized there might be other stuff he was missing out on. In February of 2003, he quit his job in Brisbane, Australia and used the money he'd saved to wander around Asia until it ran out. He made this site so he could keep his family and friends updated about where he is.
A few months into his trip, a travel buddy gave Matt an idea. They were standing around taking pictures in Hanoi, and his friend said "Hey, why don't you stand over there and do that dance. I'll record it." He was referring to a particular dance Matt does. It's actually the only dance Matt does. He does it badly. Anyway, this turned out to be a very good idea.
A couple years later, someone found the video online and passed it to someone else, who passed it to someone else, and so on. Now Matt is quasi-famous as "That guy who dances on the internet. No, not that guy. The other one. No, not him either. I'll send you the link. It's funny."
The response to the first video brought Matt to the attention of the nice people at Stride gum. They asked Matt if he'd be interested in taking another trip around the world to make a new video. Matt asked if they'd be paying for it. They said yes. Matt thought this sounded like another very good idea.
In 2006, Matt took a 6 month trip through 39 countries on all 7 continents. In that time, he danced a great deal.
The second video made Matt even more quasi-famous. In fact, for a brief period in July, he was semi-famous.
Things settled down again, and then in 2007 Matt went back to Stride with another idea. He realized his bad dancing wasn't actually all that interesting, and that other people were much better at being bad at it. He showed them his inbox, which, as a result of his semi-famousness, was overflowing with emails from all over the planet. He told them he wanted to travel around the world one more time and invite the people who'd written him to come out and dance too.
The Stride people thought that sounded like yet another very good idea, so they let him do it. And he did. And now it's done. And he hopes you like it.
Matt lives in Seattle, Washington with his girlfriend, Melissa, and dog, Sydney. He hasn't had a real job since Stride called him up. Matt doesn't mind working, but he doesn't much care for having to show up at the same place every day.
Matt is not rich. Matt also doesn't have some magical secret for traveling cheaply. He does it pretty much the same way everybody else does.
Matt thinks Americans need to travel abroad more.
Matt was a very poor student and never went to college. When he got older, he was pleased to discover that no one actually cares. Matt doesn't want to imply that college is bad or anything. He's just saying is all. There's other ways to fill your head.
Matt is left-handed.
When Matt was younger, he could hang seven spoons on his face at once. Sadly, puberty made Matt's face less conducive to spoon-hanging.
Matt's Xbox Live screen name is BadDancer. He plays a lot of Rock Band.
Matt has a little piece of extra cartilage sticking out on the rim of one ear and a little hole in the same place on the other ear. Since saying so on this page, he's been informed that the extra piece of cartilage is called a Darwinian Tubercle. Matt thinks this is pretty much the greatest name for anything ever.
Matt has never lost a staring contest.
British oil company Cairn Energys Arctic fuels hope new reserves
EXCERPTs:
1) Green groups say a blow out like that at BP's Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico could cause even more damage in Greenland as cold conditions would mean limited evaporation of the oil.
2) Sir Bill's interest in oil was sparked during university summers spent with the Bushes in Texas When George W Bush became president, his first words to Mr Blair were: ‘I believe you know my old friend Bill Gammell.’
Greenland is self-governing but barring a severing of ties with Denmark, a major oil find will put the Danes in the unlikely position of becoming an oil-rich nation on a par with the likes of Saudi Arabia.
Investors squeezed in Vedanta's Cairn India deal
EXCERPT:
Tue Aug 17, 2010 9:19am IST
-- The author is a Reuters Breakingviews columnist. The opinions expressed are her own --
By Una Galani
LONDON (Reuters Breakingviews) - Investors are being squeezed in Vedanta's deal to buy a controlling stake in Cairn India. The miner controlled by ambitious Indian billionaire Anil Agarwal will spend as much as $9.6 billion -- more than Vedanta's own market capitalisation -- to purchase up to 60 percent of the Indian oil producer. Yet the London-listed miner's complicated leap into the oil industry serves mainly as a reminder of the risks faced by minority investors in public companies.
To avoid diluting its controlling family's 61 percent shareholding, Vedanta is conducting part of the acquisition through its Indian-listed iron ore subsidiary Sesa Goa. The unit, 57 percent owned by Vedanta, will make a public tender offer for 20 percent of Cairn India shares at 355 rupees per share and fund the $2.9 billion cost from its existing cash reserves.
Why Vedanta must be stopped
EXCERPT:
For me, trying to help the international campaign against Vedanta Resources plc is blindingly complicated and dazzlingly simple at the same time. It is complicated because Vedanta’s patrons include the United Kingdom, much of the west and the Indian moneyed classes. Most of us in this island kingdom are inextricably wired into this global economy, this gilded cobweb. Our banks, pension funds, supermarkets, employers invest in Vedanta plc. Our local councils, churches, even our universities invest in Vedanta plc. Most of us are all investing in Vedanta plc, directly or indirectly (which one makes us feel better?) and moreover we are charging hefty interest since Vedanta offers high returns for the “risks investors (we) have undertaken”. What risks have we undertaken? We risk that the aluminium mining multinational company will not be granted full clearance to begin mining in the Niyamgiri hills in the eastern Indian state of Orissa. More importantly we risk that Vedanta will actually decide to respect the fact that they
Cairn moves to allay India fears over sale to Vedanta
Afp, New DelhiBritish oil explorer Cairn Energy moved Friday to allay India's worries about its proposed sale of a majority stake in its Indian energy unit to mining giant Vedanta Resources.
Vedanta announced earlier this month it would buy 51 to 60 percent of Cairn India for up to 9.6 billion dollars, adding to its assets that already include aluminium, copper, iron ore and zinc mines.
The transaction requires the Indian government's blessing because it has oil production-sharing contracts with Cairn India.
Cairn Energy said the proposed sale "will not adversely affect the performance or obligations under the various production sharing contracts (signed by Cairn India) nor be contrary to the interests of India."
Where the hell is Matt? dancing youtube
Where the hell is Matt?
About Matt
Matt is a 33-year-old deadbeat from Connecticut who used to think that all he ever wanted to do in life was make and play videogames. Matt achieved this goal pretty early and enjoyed it for a while, but eventually realized there might be other stuff he was missing out on. In February of 2003, he quit his job in Brisbane, Australia and used the money he'd saved to wander around Asia until it ran out. He made this site so he could keep his family and friends updated about where he is.
A few months into his trip, a travel buddy gave Matt an idea. They were standing around taking pictures in Hanoi, and his friend said "Hey, why don't you stand over there and do that dance. I'll record it." He was referring to a particular dance Matt does. It's actually the only dance Matt does. He does it badly. Anyway, this turned out to be a very good idea.
A couple years later, someone found the video online and passed it to someone else, who passed it to someone else, and so on. Now Matt is quasi-famous as "That guy who dances on the internet. No, not that guy. The other one. No, not him either. I'll send you the link. It's funny."
The response to the first video brought Matt to the attention of the nice people at Stride gum. They asked Matt if he'd be interested in taking another trip around the world to make a new video. Matt asked if they'd be paying for it. They said yes. Matt thought this sounded like another very good idea.
In 2006, Matt took a 6 month trip through 39 countries on all 7 continents. In that time, he danced a great deal.
The second video made Matt even more quasi-famous. In fact, for a brief period in July, he was semi-famous.
Things settled down again, and then in 2007 Matt went back to Stride with another idea. He realized his bad dancing wasn't actually all that interesting, and that other people were much better at being bad at it. He showed them his inbox, which, as a result of his semi-famousness, was overflowing with emails from all over the planet. He told them he wanted to travel around the world one more time and invite the people who'd written him to come out and dance too.
The Stride people thought that sounded like yet another very good idea, so they let him do it. And he did. And now it's done. And he hopes you like it.
Matt lives in Seattle, Washington with his girlfriend, Melissa, and dog, Sydney. He hasn't had a real job since Stride called him up. Matt doesn't mind working, but he doesn't much care for having to show up at the same place every day.
Matt is not rich. Matt also doesn't have some magical secret for traveling cheaply. He does it pretty much the same way everybody else does.
Matt thinks Americans need to travel abroad more.
Matt was a very poor student and never went to college. When he got older, he was pleased to discover that no one actually cares. Matt doesn't want to imply that college is bad or anything. He's just saying is all. There's other ways to fill your head.
Matt is left-handed.
When Matt was younger, he could hang seven spoons on his face at once. Sadly, puberty made Matt's face less conducive to spoon-hanging.
Matt's Xbox Live screen name is BadDancer. He plays a lot of Rock Band.
Matt has a little piece of extra cartilage sticking out on the rim of one ear and a little hole in the same place on the other ear. Since saying so on this page, he's been informed that the extra piece of cartilage is called a Darwinian Tubercle. Matt thinks this is pretty much the greatest name for anything ever.
Matt has never lost a staring contest.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
UNICEF: Executive Board: Ann M. Veneman reflects on her term as Executive Director youtube
Ann M. Veneman sourcewatch
EXCERPTs:
1) Agribusiness Connections
The Center for Responsive Politics includes the biotech and agribusiness firms Calgene, Monsanto and Pharmacia among Veneman's corporate connections. Their opensecrets.org website details a history of movement between government and industry:
Between her tenure at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (under George Bush Sr.) and being named head of California's Department of Food and Agriculture in 1995, Ann Veneman served on the board of directors for Calgene Inc. In 1994, Calgene became the first company to bring genetically-engineered food, the Flavr Savr tomato, to supermarket shelves. Calgene was bought out by Monsanto, the nation's leading biotech company, in 1997. Monsanto, in turn, became part of pharmaceutical company Pharmacia in 2000. Monsanto, which donated more than $12,000 to George Bush's presidential bid, wants two things this year: no mandatory labeling of biotech foods and better access to international markets. Veneman also served on the International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food and Trade, a group funded by Cargill, Nestle, Kraft, and Archer Daniels Midland. [4]
2) Smaller Ranchers, Farmers Wanted Her Out
Bill Bullard, chief executive of the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of America (also known as R-CALF USA), called Veneman's tenure "disappointing." R-CALF was very critical of the Secretary's response to mad cow disease, and after "exhaust[ing] all of our administrative remedies," filed suit against USDA to prevent them from easing restrictions on the import of live Canadian cattle and beef products. [12]
According to Agriculture Online, Veneman was not popular with ordinary farmers, either. While "69% of visitors to Agriculture Online who responded to a pre-election poll favored Bush ... the exact same percentage wanted Veneman out in the days after the election." When asked why Veneman was so unpopular, Arkansas farmer Tom Burnham replied, "Because she is a corporate lackey." [13]
Particular USDA policy stances opposed by farmers included Veneman's supporting the Pork Checkoff program after farmers voted against it; her fighting against "country of origin labeling on behalf of meat packers"; noting actively helping to draft the 2002 Farm Bill; and delays with implementing parts of the 2002 Farm Bill and with setting rules for the Conservation Security Program. [14]
Ann M. Veneman sourcewatch
EXCERPTs:
1) Agribusiness Connections
The Center for Responsive Politics includes the biotech and agribusiness firms Calgene, Monsanto and Pharmacia among Veneman's corporate connections. Their opensecrets.org website details a history of movement between government and industry:
Between her tenure at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (under George Bush Sr.) and being named head of California's Department of Food and Agriculture in 1995, Ann Veneman served on the board of directors for Calgene Inc. In 1994, Calgene became the first company to bring genetically-engineered food, the Flavr Savr tomato, to supermarket shelves. Calgene was bought out by Monsanto, the nation's leading biotech company, in 1997. Monsanto, in turn, became part of pharmaceutical company Pharmacia in 2000. Monsanto, which donated more than $12,000 to George Bush's presidential bid, wants two things this year: no mandatory labeling of biotech foods and better access to international markets. Veneman also served on the International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food and Trade, a group funded by Cargill, Nestle, Kraft, and Archer Daniels Midland. [4]
2) Smaller Ranchers, Farmers Wanted Her Out
Bill Bullard, chief executive of the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of America (also known as R-CALF USA), called Veneman's tenure "disappointing." R-CALF was very critical of the Secretary's response to mad cow disease, and after "exhaust[ing] all of our administrative remedies," filed suit against USDA to prevent them from easing restrictions on the import of live Canadian cattle and beef products. [12]
According to Agriculture Online, Veneman was not popular with ordinary farmers, either. While "69% of visitors to Agriculture Online who responded to a pre-election poll favored Bush ... the exact same percentage wanted Veneman out in the days after the election." When asked why Veneman was so unpopular, Arkansas farmer Tom Burnham replied, "Because she is a corporate lackey." [13]
Particular USDA policy stances opposed by farmers included Veneman's supporting the Pork Checkoff program after farmers voted against it; her fighting against "country of origin labeling on behalf of meat packers"; noting actively helping to draft the 2002 Farm Bill; and delays with implementing parts of the 2002 Farm Bill and with setting rules for the Conservation Security Program. [14]
June 28, 2007
In New Expose, Ken Silverstein of Harper’s Magazine Goes Undercover to Find Out What US Lobbyists Do for Dictators
EXCERPT:
AMY GOODMAN: Ken Silverstein, you also write about the companies that you didn’t get represented by or offers of representation. For example, you talk about Patton Boggs and Cameroon.
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, that was a—I mean, I talked about Patton Boggs as just being another lobbying firm around town. I didn’t approach Patton Boggs. I did approach several other firms. But Patton Boggs had in the past done some work for the government of Cameroon, where they sent a team of former members of Congress over to Cameroon, allegedly independent observers, to be there for a presidential election in which the longstanding ruler of Cameroon won 80% of the vote. So Patton Boggs—and its team incidentally was led by a former member of Congress, as well—goes over there, sets up the agenda for a group of members of Congress, former members, who go over and issue sort of uplifting statements about the election being democratic and a step forward, all the usual sort of boilerplate language that they could use to sell this sham election as legitimate. And I was able to discover that, in fact, the whole thing had been set up by Patton Boggs, and it was paid—you know, the expenses of the delegation were paid for by the government of Cameroon.
Afghan lobby scam
EXCERPT:
At the heart of the scandal is the Defense Department's $2.2 billion Host Nation Trucking contract, a military logistics operation launched with six major contractors, a number that has since risen to eight. One of the contractors under investigation is NCL Holdings, a US firm headed by Hamed Wardak, the Afghan-American son of Afghanistan's defense minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak. (NCL denies ever having made payments, directly or indirectly, to the Taliban.)
But it seems Hamed Wardak was more than just a defense contractor with a budding business. Parallel to his business ventures, he's been running an aggressive foreign policy campaign in Washington to keep the US heavily vested in Afghanistan. A confidential lobbying memo obtained by The Nation shows that Wardak commissioned a blue-chip lobbying firm to push for an extended US presence in Afghanistan--a potentially lucrative outcome for NCL.
Patton Boggs LLP
Patton Boggs Runs Pro-War Front Group for Hamed Wardak and NCL Holdings
Afghanistanastroturffront groupslobbying
Source: The Nation, December 22, 2009
The Campaign for a U.S.-Afghanistan Partnership is being exposed as an insidious pro-war front group. Aram Roston reports in the The Nation magazine that "As President Obama prepares a massive military buildup in Afghanistan, a House subcommittee has launched an investigation into whether Defense Department contractors are paying off the Taliban to protect American supply lines. ... One of the contractors under investigation is NCL Holdings, a U.S. firm headed by Hamed Wardak, the Afghan-American son of Afghanistan's defense minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak. ... Parallel to his business ventures, he's been running an aggressive foreign policy campaign in Washington to keep the U.S. heavily vested in Afghanistan. A confidential lobbying memo obtained by The Nation shows that Wardak commissioned a blue-chip lobbying firm to push for an extended U.S. presence in Afghanistan -- a potentially lucrative outcome for NCL. Earlier this year Patton Boggs LLP, Washington's most monied lobbying firm, established a nonprofit front group (Campaign for a U.S. - Afghanistan Partnership) on Wardak's behalf to act as the 'face' of a campaign for increased US engagement in Afghanistan, according to confidential legal records." Blogger Steve Hynd first reported critically on this front group in a posting on October 29, 2009.
Patton Boggs buys lobbying firm of former Sens Lott and Breaux
EXCERPT:
Patton Boggs acquires lobbying firm of former Sens. Lott, Breaux
By Silla Brush - 07/01/10 04:21 PM ET
K Street’s biggest firm on Thursday acquired one of Washington’s fastest-growing lobbying shops.
Patton Boggs, the perennial lobbying powerhouse, acquired Breaux-Lott Leadership Group, the firm started in 2008 by former Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) and ex-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.).
Halliburton hires Patton Boggs for BP fiasco
EXCERPT:
Transocean Ltd., which owned and leased to BP the Deepwater Horizon rig, which exploded and sank, recruited Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. Halliburton Co. has hired Patton Boggs
Patton Boggs LLP pdf
There has never been a time in modern history when the distance between the activities in businesses,
the economy, and the financial markets have been more closely linked to the policies, decisions, and
deliberations in Washington. Now more than ever companies, industries, borrowers, and investors
throughout the US and the world need a clear and experienced voice in Washington to ensure informed
and practical decisions. Similarly, policymakers in Washington need a clear understanding of business
and economic conditions and useful information about how the financial markets work.
Patton Boggs LLP has always been at the crossroads where Main Street, Wall Street, and Pennsylvania Avenue
meet. This is a place where Patton Boggs, with its unparalleled presence in the public policy arena and its deep
understanding of business and financial markets through a broad array of business law and litigation practices,
calls home.
Widely-recognized as the nation’s number one public policy firm, Patton Boggs is at the intersection of
government and business. Our professionals are known for their skill in assessing how actions on Capitol Hill will
affect companies on Main Street and Wall Street. Our experience extends to the legislative and regulatory issues
that affect financial services businesses throughout the United States and the world—insight and “capitol
intelligence” that is critical in today’s tumultuous global marketplace. Our knowledge and experience working both
with (and within) various government agencies, as well as with other branches of government, enables us to seek
an array of policy solutions, particularly when the client requires more than conventional resolution strategies.
Our insight and depth of expertise are particularly valuable to clients affected by the economic crisis and resulting
government intervention. Our deep roster of professionals includes the former President and Co-CEO of the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (who also served as President and CEO of the Bond
Market Association), the former National Finance Director for Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the former Executive
Director of the Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (and a veteran of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York), the former Chief Counsel to the Senate Finance Committee, senior staff to the House
Financial Services Committee, and women and men who served in senior legal and policy positions at the
Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal bank regulatory agencies,
and the US Congress.
Over 􀃎
PATTON BOGGS LLP:
AT THE INTERSECTION OF WALL STREET AND PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
DECADES OF EXPERIENCE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
In addition to a renowned public policy practice, Patton Boggs has been nationally recognized as a
premier provider of legal representation to financial sector businesses across the country. We have
advised commercial banks, savings institutions, bank and thrift holding companies, mortgage companies,
real estate investment trusts (REITs), specialty finance companies, hedge funds, and private equity and
mezzanine funds for years. Our attorneys regularly advise clients on the full range of issues in dealings
with, and applications pending before, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and state
agencies that regulate financial services firms.
A LEADING GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS TEAM
Companies and their executives now find themselves in an unprecedented atmosphere of corporate
investigations, prosecutions, Congressional and regulatory oversight, and individual criminal liability.
Patton Boggs has a long history of successfully representing clients in high-profile financial scandals such
as BCCI and the savings & loan crisis and others involving SEC, Federal Reserve, Congressional, and
federal and state grand jury investigations, as well as civil litigation
Our Government Investigations Practice boasts one of the most experienced groups of white-collar
litigators in the country. This group includes more than 100 attorneys who have served in senior
government positions at the White House, Congressional investigative committees, the U.S. Department
of Justice, the criminal and civil divisions of the U.S. Attorneys’ offices, federal agencies, and state
Attorneys’ General offices. As a result, we are able to combine an extensive knowledge of the relevant
legal standards and procedures with deep insight and an experienced understanding and involvement
with the Congressional and regulatory oversight powers, procedures, and practices.
THE PREMIER PUBLIC POLICY PRACTICE
Clients turn to Patton Boggs for reliable and timely intelligence and a seasoned perspective on potential
policy decisions and actions by the U.S. Congress, the Executive Branch, and various independent
regulatory agencies. Our work with financial services companies and our understanding of the inner
workings of government set us apart and make us well suited to guide companies through the fastmoving
political environment. With a distinct combination of public policy expertise and financial services
experience, combined with litigation skills that cover the scope of government and Congressional
investigations, Patton Boggs is uniquely qualified to help companies navigate Washington in a way that
achieves their business goals and protects their bottom lines in the changing business climate. Managing
the risk of public policy in any business decision or transaction has now become as essential as
managing any other business risk or exposure.
For More Information on the Firm’s Capabilities, Please Contact:
MICAH S. GREEN
Partner and Co-Chair of Tax and Financial Services Practice
Patton Boggs LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: 202.457.5258 | E-mail: msgreen@pattonboggs.com
In New Expose, Ken Silverstein of Harper’s Magazine Goes Undercover to Find Out What US Lobbyists Do for Dictators
EXCERPT:
AMY GOODMAN: Ken Silverstein, you also write about the companies that you didn’t get represented by or offers of representation. For example, you talk about Patton Boggs and Cameroon.
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, that was a—I mean, I talked about Patton Boggs as just being another lobbying firm around town. I didn’t approach Patton Boggs. I did approach several other firms. But Patton Boggs had in the past done some work for the government of Cameroon, where they sent a team of former members of Congress over to Cameroon, allegedly independent observers, to be there for a presidential election in which the longstanding ruler of Cameroon won 80% of the vote. So Patton Boggs—and its team incidentally was led by a former member of Congress, as well—goes over there, sets up the agenda for a group of members of Congress, former members, who go over and issue sort of uplifting statements about the election being democratic and a step forward, all the usual sort of boilerplate language that they could use to sell this sham election as legitimate. And I was able to discover that, in fact, the whole thing had been set up by Patton Boggs, and it was paid—you know, the expenses of the delegation were paid for by the government of Cameroon.
Afghan lobby scam
EXCERPT:
At the heart of the scandal is the Defense Department's $2.2 billion Host Nation Trucking contract, a military logistics operation launched with six major contractors, a number that has since risen to eight. One of the contractors under investigation is NCL Holdings, a US firm headed by Hamed Wardak, the Afghan-American son of Afghanistan's defense minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak. (NCL denies ever having made payments, directly or indirectly, to the Taliban.)
But it seems Hamed Wardak was more than just a defense contractor with a budding business. Parallel to his business ventures, he's been running an aggressive foreign policy campaign in Washington to keep the US heavily vested in Afghanistan. A confidential lobbying memo obtained by The Nation shows that Wardak commissioned a blue-chip lobbying firm to push for an extended US presence in Afghanistan--a potentially lucrative outcome for NCL.
Patton Boggs LLP
Patton Boggs Runs Pro-War Front Group for Hamed Wardak and NCL Holdings
Afghanistanastroturffront groupslobbying
Source: The Nation, December 22, 2009
The Campaign for a U.S.-Afghanistan Partnership is being exposed as an insidious pro-war front group. Aram Roston reports in the The Nation magazine that "As President Obama prepares a massive military buildup in Afghanistan, a House subcommittee has launched an investigation into whether Defense Department contractors are paying off the Taliban to protect American supply lines. ... One of the contractors under investigation is NCL Holdings, a U.S. firm headed by Hamed Wardak, the Afghan-American son of Afghanistan's defense minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak. ... Parallel to his business ventures, he's been running an aggressive foreign policy campaign in Washington to keep the U.S. heavily vested in Afghanistan. A confidential lobbying memo obtained by The Nation shows that Wardak commissioned a blue-chip lobbying firm to push for an extended U.S. presence in Afghanistan -- a potentially lucrative outcome for NCL. Earlier this year Patton Boggs LLP, Washington's most monied lobbying firm, established a nonprofit front group (Campaign for a U.S. - Afghanistan Partnership) on Wardak's behalf to act as the 'face' of a campaign for increased US engagement in Afghanistan, according to confidential legal records." Blogger Steve Hynd first reported critically on this front group in a posting on October 29, 2009.
Patton Boggs buys lobbying firm of former Sens Lott and Breaux
EXCERPT:
Patton Boggs acquires lobbying firm of former Sens. Lott, Breaux
By Silla Brush - 07/01/10 04:21 PM ET
K Street’s biggest firm on Thursday acquired one of Washington’s fastest-growing lobbying shops.
Patton Boggs, the perennial lobbying powerhouse, acquired Breaux-Lott Leadership Group, the firm started in 2008 by former Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) and ex-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.).
Halliburton hires Patton Boggs for BP fiasco
EXCERPT:
Transocean Ltd., which owned and leased to BP the Deepwater Horizon rig, which exploded and sank, recruited Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. Halliburton Co. has hired Patton Boggs
Patton Boggs LLP pdf
There has never been a time in modern history when the distance between the activities in businesses,
the economy, and the financial markets have been more closely linked to the policies, decisions, and
deliberations in Washington. Now more than ever companies, industries, borrowers, and investors
throughout the US and the world need a clear and experienced voice in Washington to ensure informed
and practical decisions. Similarly, policymakers in Washington need a clear understanding of business
and economic conditions and useful information about how the financial markets work.
Patton Boggs LLP has always been at the crossroads where Main Street, Wall Street, and Pennsylvania Avenue
meet. This is a place where Patton Boggs, with its unparalleled presence in the public policy arena and its deep
understanding of business and financial markets through a broad array of business law and litigation practices,
calls home.
Widely-recognized as the nation’s number one public policy firm, Patton Boggs is at the intersection of
government and business. Our professionals are known for their skill in assessing how actions on Capitol Hill will
affect companies on Main Street and Wall Street. Our experience extends to the legislative and regulatory issues
that affect financial services businesses throughout the United States and the world—insight and “capitol
intelligence” that is critical in today’s tumultuous global marketplace. Our knowledge and experience working both
with (and within) various government agencies, as well as with other branches of government, enables us to seek
an array of policy solutions, particularly when the client requires more than conventional resolution strategies.
Our insight and depth of expertise are particularly valuable to clients affected by the economic crisis and resulting
government intervention. Our deep roster of professionals includes the former President and Co-CEO of the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (who also served as President and CEO of the Bond
Market Association), the former National Finance Director for Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the former Executive
Director of the Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (and a veteran of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York), the former Chief Counsel to the Senate Finance Committee, senior staff to the House
Financial Services Committee, and women and men who served in senior legal and policy positions at the
Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal bank regulatory agencies,
and the US Congress.
Over 􀃎
PATTON BOGGS LLP:
AT THE INTERSECTION OF WALL STREET AND PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
DECADES OF EXPERIENCE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
In addition to a renowned public policy practice, Patton Boggs has been nationally recognized as a
premier provider of legal representation to financial sector businesses across the country. We have
advised commercial banks, savings institutions, bank and thrift holding companies, mortgage companies,
real estate investment trusts (REITs), specialty finance companies, hedge funds, and private equity and
mezzanine funds for years. Our attorneys regularly advise clients on the full range of issues in dealings
with, and applications pending before, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and state
agencies that regulate financial services firms.
A LEADING GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS TEAM
Companies and their executives now find themselves in an unprecedented atmosphere of corporate
investigations, prosecutions, Congressional and regulatory oversight, and individual criminal liability.
Patton Boggs has a long history of successfully representing clients in high-profile financial scandals such
as BCCI and the savings & loan crisis and others involving SEC, Federal Reserve, Congressional, and
federal and state grand jury investigations, as well as civil litigation
Our Government Investigations Practice boasts one of the most experienced groups of white-collar
litigators in the country. This group includes more than 100 attorneys who have served in senior
government positions at the White House, Congressional investigative committees, the U.S. Department
of Justice, the criminal and civil divisions of the U.S. Attorneys’ offices, federal agencies, and state
Attorneys’ General offices. As a result, we are able to combine an extensive knowledge of the relevant
legal standards and procedures with deep insight and an experienced understanding and involvement
with the Congressional and regulatory oversight powers, procedures, and practices.
THE PREMIER PUBLIC POLICY PRACTICE
Clients turn to Patton Boggs for reliable and timely intelligence and a seasoned perspective on potential
policy decisions and actions by the U.S. Congress, the Executive Branch, and various independent
regulatory agencies. Our work with financial services companies and our understanding of the inner
workings of government set us apart and make us well suited to guide companies through the fastmoving
political environment. With a distinct combination of public policy expertise and financial services
experience, combined with litigation skills that cover the scope of government and Congressional
investigations, Patton Boggs is uniquely qualified to help companies navigate Washington in a way that
achieves their business goals and protects their bottom lines in the changing business climate. Managing
the risk of public policy in any business decision or transaction has now become as essential as
managing any other business risk or exposure.
For More Information on the Firm’s Capabilities, Please Contact:
MICAH S. GREEN
Partner and Co-Chair of Tax and Financial Services Practice
Patton Boggs LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: 202.457.5258 | E-mail: msgreen@pattonboggs.com
Karzai's mercenaries
EXCERPT:
Written by research analyst Carl Forsberg the study "Politics and Power in Kandahar" reported some astonishing things regarding the provision of security in Afghanistan. While this is not a secret in Afghanistan it is hardly ever talked about in the U.S. media
He writes that since 2006, the Karzai family has established its own major private security firms and private militias, which give them even greater influence over the commanders who have become their dependents.
Several of these firms have major interests across Afghanistan, not just in Kandahar. The largest Karzai family-controlled firm in southern Afghanistan is the Asia Security Group (ASG), run by Hashmat Karzai, the cousin of President Karzai.
Stanley McChrystal and Karzai's brother
EXCERPT:
Karzai's younger half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the head of the Kandahar provincial council, gave McChrystal a ringing endorsement, telling reporters in Kandahar that McChrystal's leadership would be sorely missed.
"If he is fired, it will disrupt the operation," Ahmad Wali Karzai said. "It definitely will affect it. He (McChrystal) started all this, and he has a good relationship with the people. The people trust him and we trust him. If we lose this important person, I don't think that this operation will work in a positive way."
Karzai Brother: Drug Lord, CIA Darling?
EXCERPT:
WASHINGTON, Oct. 28, 2009
Karzai Brother: Drug Lord, CIA Darling?
Alleged Reliance on Corrupt Brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai More Bad News for U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan
Ahmed Wali Karzai wikipedia
EXCERPT:
Ahmad Wali Karzai has survived a number of assassination attempts by Taliban militants[5] and at least two attacks against his office in Kandahar: one in November 2008[6] and the other in April 2009.[7] According to him, a total of nine suicide bombers lost their lives trying to kill him.
In August 2009, shortly before the presidential election took place, Wali Karzai and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, former governor of the Helmand Province a member of the Upper House of the Afghan parliament, were are accused of vote rigging, as well as drug smuggling [8].
Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team
EXCERPT:
by Wayne Madsen
January 2002
Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), globalresearch.ca, 23 January 2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Afghan, Iranian, and Turkish government sources, Hamid Karzai, the interim Prime Minister of Afghanistan, was a top adviser to the El Segundo, California-based UNOCAL Corporation which was negotiating with the Taliban to construct a Central Asia Gas (CentGas) pipeline from Turkmenistan through western Afghanistan to Pakistan.
UNOCAL courts the Taliban
EXCERPT:
It's also exciting to the Bush Administration. According to the authors of Bin Laden, the Hidden Truth, one of the FBI's leading counter terrorism agents, John O'Neill, resigned last year in protest over the Bush Administration's alleged obstruction of his investigation into bin Laden. (A similar complaint has been filed on behalf of another unidentified FBI Agent by the conservative Judicial Watch public interest group.) Supposedly the Bush Administration had been meeting since January 2001 with the Taliban, and was also reluctant to offend Saudi Arabians who O'Neill had linked to bin Laden. Mr. O'Neill, after leaving the FBI, assumed the position of security director at the World Trade Center, where he was killed in the 911 attacks.
UNOCAL Corporation wikipedia
EXCERPT:
Controversy
In March 2005, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) tried to acquire Unocal with a bid that valued Unocal at between $16 billion and $18 billion. Following a vote in the United States House of Representatives, the bid was referred to President George W. Bush, on the grounds that its implications for national security needed to be reviewed [7]. CNOOC withdrew its bid. Soon after, Unocal merged with Chevron.
The merger was seen as U.S. protectionism in the involvement of political interests where CNOOC was made aware of a "harsh political reaction" to a take over of American companies.[8] American congressment cites "national security" as a reason for being alarmed by the takeover option.[9]
Rashid Popal is cousin to Karzai
EXCERPT:
Watan’s president, Rashid Popal, strongly denied any suggestion that his men either colluded with insurgents or orchestrated attacks to emphasize the need for their services. Executives with Compass Security did not respond to questions.
But the episode, and others like it, has raised the suspicions of investigators here and in Washington, who are trying to track the tens of millions in taxpayer dollars paid to private security companies to move supplies to American and other NATO bases.
Karzai Krime Family
EXCERPT:
While the US pours marrow and money into the battle for drugs and rocks, the Karzai Krime Family become richer; is this the "credible partner" the Pentagon needs to "succeed"?
Watan Risk Management is run by President Karzai's cousins, Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the president runs the Asia Security Group and one security firm is controlled by the parliamentary speaker's son.
Watan Risk, the firm run by Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashid Popal, Karzai family relatives and former drug dealers. Watan controls one key stretch of road that all the truckers use: the strategic route to Kandahar. Watan Risk has a monopoly on this vital route.
NCL Hamid Wardak
EXCERPT:
Executive Management
Mr. Hamed Rahim Wardak
Founder and CEO
Hamed Wardak, 34, is an Afghan-American and founder and CEO of NCL Holdings, LLC, a global professional services company that has been instrumental in projects generating local employment in Afghanistan. He is also a philanthropist and advocate for the future of Afghanistan.
EXCERPT:
Written by research analyst Carl Forsberg the study "Politics and Power in Kandahar" reported some astonishing things regarding the provision of security in Afghanistan. While this is not a secret in Afghanistan it is hardly ever talked about in the U.S. media
He writes that since 2006, the Karzai family has established its own major private security firms and private militias, which give them even greater influence over the commanders who have become their dependents.
Several of these firms have major interests across Afghanistan, not just in Kandahar. The largest Karzai family-controlled firm in southern Afghanistan is the Asia Security Group (ASG), run by Hashmat Karzai, the cousin of President Karzai.
Stanley McChrystal and Karzai's brother
EXCERPT:
Karzai's younger half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the head of the Kandahar provincial council, gave McChrystal a ringing endorsement, telling reporters in Kandahar that McChrystal's leadership would be sorely missed.
"If he is fired, it will disrupt the operation," Ahmad Wali Karzai said. "It definitely will affect it. He (McChrystal) started all this, and he has a good relationship with the people. The people trust him and we trust him. If we lose this important person, I don't think that this operation will work in a positive way."
Karzai Brother: Drug Lord, CIA Darling?
EXCERPT:
WASHINGTON, Oct. 28, 2009
Karzai Brother: Drug Lord, CIA Darling?
Alleged Reliance on Corrupt Brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai More Bad News for U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan
Ahmed Wali Karzai wikipedia
EXCERPT:
Ahmad Wali Karzai has survived a number of assassination attempts by Taliban militants[5] and at least two attacks against his office in Kandahar: one in November 2008[6] and the other in April 2009.[7] According to him, a total of nine suicide bombers lost their lives trying to kill him.
In August 2009, shortly before the presidential election took place, Wali Karzai and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, former governor of the Helmand Province a member of the Upper House of the Afghan parliament, were are accused of vote rigging, as well as drug smuggling [8].
Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team
EXCERPT:
by Wayne Madsen
January 2002
Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), globalresearch.ca, 23 January 2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Afghan, Iranian, and Turkish government sources, Hamid Karzai, the interim Prime Minister of Afghanistan, was a top adviser to the El Segundo, California-based UNOCAL Corporation which was negotiating with the Taliban to construct a Central Asia Gas (CentGas) pipeline from Turkmenistan through western Afghanistan to Pakistan.
UNOCAL courts the Taliban
EXCERPT:
It's also exciting to the Bush Administration. According to the authors of Bin Laden, the Hidden Truth, one of the FBI's leading counter terrorism agents, John O'Neill, resigned last year in protest over the Bush Administration's alleged obstruction of his investigation into bin Laden. (A similar complaint has been filed on behalf of another unidentified FBI Agent by the conservative Judicial Watch public interest group.) Supposedly the Bush Administration had been meeting since January 2001 with the Taliban, and was also reluctant to offend Saudi Arabians who O'Neill had linked to bin Laden. Mr. O'Neill, after leaving the FBI, assumed the position of security director at the World Trade Center, where he was killed in the 911 attacks.
UNOCAL Corporation wikipedia
EXCERPT:
Controversy
In March 2005, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) tried to acquire Unocal with a bid that valued Unocal at between $16 billion and $18 billion. Following a vote in the United States House of Representatives, the bid was referred to President George W. Bush, on the grounds that its implications for national security needed to be reviewed [7]. CNOOC withdrew its bid. Soon after, Unocal merged with Chevron.
The merger was seen as U.S. protectionism in the involvement of political interests where CNOOC was made aware of a "harsh political reaction" to a take over of American companies.[8] American congressment cites "national security" as a reason for being alarmed by the takeover option.[9]
Rashid Popal is cousin to Karzai
EXCERPT:
Watan’s president, Rashid Popal, strongly denied any suggestion that his men either colluded with insurgents or orchestrated attacks to emphasize the need for their services. Executives with Compass Security did not respond to questions.
But the episode, and others like it, has raised the suspicions of investigators here and in Washington, who are trying to track the tens of millions in taxpayer dollars paid to private security companies to move supplies to American and other NATO bases.
Karzai Krime Family
EXCERPT:
While the US pours marrow and money into the battle for drugs and rocks, the Karzai Krime Family become richer; is this the "credible partner" the Pentagon needs to "succeed"?
Watan Risk Management is run by President Karzai's cousins, Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the president runs the Asia Security Group and one security firm is controlled by the parliamentary speaker's son.
Watan Risk, the firm run by Ahmad Rateb Popal and Rashid Popal, Karzai family relatives and former drug dealers. Watan controls one key stretch of road that all the truckers use: the strategic route to Kandahar. Watan Risk has a monopoly on this vital route.
NCL Hamid Wardak
EXCERPT:
Executive Management
Mr. Hamed Rahim Wardak
Founder and CEO
Hamed Wardak, 34, is an Afghan-American and founder and CEO of NCL Holdings, LLC, a global professional services company that has been instrumental in projects generating local employment in Afghanistan. He is also a philanthropist and advocate for the future of Afghanistan.
Naked Truth, Fluoride Poison, 9/11 Responders Strike Back - Sunday Update youtube
Biosafety Level wikipedia
EXCERPT:
A biosafety level is the level of the biocontainment precautions required to isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed facility. The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1 to the highest at level 4. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified these levels.[1] In the European Union, the same biosafety levels are defined in a directive.[2]
China and it's reaction to American Brand recalls
EXCERPT:
Many still remember some of the most severe cases. Last year DuPont faced the "Teflon-coated pan case," as a result of which, some large Chinese department stores removed non-stick pans that used DuPont's Teflon coating from their shelves (for relevant report see Beijing Review Issue No. 34, 2004). Then Proctor & Gamble was sued by a consumer who believed that its SK-II de-wrinkle cream contained caustic substance. Some U.S. brands, including Heinz and KFC, were stricken as their products were said to contain carcinogenic "Sudan 1." Later, Johnson & Johnson, Lipton, Colgate and Haagen-Dazs were involved in successive negative incidents.
Chinese consumers have always trusted foreign brands, which they believe adhere to strict production standards and thus have credible quality. But these negative incidents are damaging the trustworthiness of foreign brands.
KFC and Sudan 1 scandal
EXCERPT:
KFC diners seek advice over fear of Sudan I
Latest Updated by 2005-03-22 10:49:51
A rising number of KFC customers have begun seeking legal advice after the US fast food chain's Beijing restaurants suspended three more items from their menus over fears they may contain the carcinogenic food colouring Sudan I.
Last Saturday, 10 days after the restaurants' New Orleans range was discontinued because of Sudan 1 contamination, the illegal dye was found again in popcorn chicken, spicy chicken wings and hamburgers in one of the company's Beijing outlets.
Sudan 1 scandal
EXCERPT:
Unfortunately, this one crisis is unlikely to change the behaviour of either consumers or producers. There are too many barriers at present preventing this kind of systemic learning which has to happen at multiple levels. But as I wrote in Getting into the Dirt (which alludes to some of the multifaceted causes why the current system is so unsustainable) these kinds of food shocks and disruptions will increase in frequency and be those "inevitable surprises" we should have seen coming. Yes, a prediction of sorts because the pattern is becoming clear: like BSE, foot and mouth disease, and SARS (which was caused because of poor livestock practices in dense urban areas), this latest Sudan 1 crisis is the thunder signaling a much larger storm on the near horizon unless we make some big course corrections within our global food system.
There is poison in the tap water
WACYorkPA squads up and travels directly south of York to a forcibly poisoned town called Red Lion (Pop.15,000) with bright yellow “Poison in the Tap” Posters.
Join us for a full day of Truth Action on the Eleventh Day of Every Month at http://WeAreChangeYorkPA.com and please consider donating at http://wearechangeyorkpa.chipin.com/6…
Is YOUR Water Fluoridated (Poisoned) in Pennsylvania?
SEE HERE?
http://www.actionpa.org/fluoride/map
Sodium Fluorosilicate [MSDS] (Material Safety Data Sheet)
http://www.fluoridealert.org/pesticid…
Paint The Town: Anti-Fluoridation Poster Campaign
http://www.facebook.com/DemandSafeWater
PDF Poster:
http://www.infowars.com/pdfs/tapwater…
http://www.infowars.com/poison-tap-water
Open Letter to City Concerning Water Fluoridation
(Print and Deliver to your elected public officials)
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note…
Articles:
Australian TV Runs Serious Report on Dangers of Fluoride
http://ur1.ca/117eo
Studies on Neurotoxic Effects of Fluoride
http://ur1.ca/117et
Studies on Fluoride Links to Cancer
http://ur1.ca/117ev
Studies on Fluoride and Bone Fractures
http://ur1.ca/117ez
Study on Fluoride’s Effects on Liver and Kidney
http://ur1.ca/117fb
Studies on Fluoride and the Thyroid
http://ur1.ca/04jsn
Studies on Fluoride and IQ reduction
http://ur1.ca/117fk
Studies on Fluoride and Dental Flourosis
http://ur1.ca/117fn
Studies on Fluoride and Tooth Decay
http://ur1.ca/117fo
Jacob Appel Calls for Spiking Public Water With Lithium and Other Drugs
http://ur1.ca/117ft
Biosafety Level wikipedia
EXCERPT:
A biosafety level is the level of the biocontainment precautions required to isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed facility. The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1 to the highest at level 4. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified these levels.[1] In the European Union, the same biosafety levels are defined in a directive.[2]
China and it's reaction to American Brand recalls
EXCERPT:
Many still remember some of the most severe cases. Last year DuPont faced the "Teflon-coated pan case," as a result of which, some large Chinese department stores removed non-stick pans that used DuPont's Teflon coating from their shelves (for relevant report see Beijing Review Issue No. 34, 2004). Then Proctor & Gamble was sued by a consumer who believed that its SK-II de-wrinkle cream contained caustic substance. Some U.S. brands, including Heinz and KFC, were stricken as their products were said to contain carcinogenic "Sudan 1." Later, Johnson & Johnson, Lipton, Colgate and Haagen-Dazs were involved in successive negative incidents.
Chinese consumers have always trusted foreign brands, which they believe adhere to strict production standards and thus have credible quality. But these negative incidents are damaging the trustworthiness of foreign brands.
KFC and Sudan 1 scandal
EXCERPT:
KFC diners seek advice over fear of Sudan I
Latest Updated by 2005-03-22 10:49:51
A rising number of KFC customers have begun seeking legal advice after the US fast food chain's Beijing restaurants suspended three more items from their menus over fears they may contain the carcinogenic food colouring Sudan I.
Last Saturday, 10 days after the restaurants' New Orleans range was discontinued because of Sudan 1 contamination, the illegal dye was found again in popcorn chicken, spicy chicken wings and hamburgers in one of the company's Beijing outlets.
Sudan 1 scandal
EXCERPT:
Unfortunately, this one crisis is unlikely to change the behaviour of either consumers or producers. There are too many barriers at present preventing this kind of systemic learning which has to happen at multiple levels. But as I wrote in Getting into the Dirt (which alludes to some of the multifaceted causes why the current system is so unsustainable) these kinds of food shocks and disruptions will increase in frequency and be those "inevitable surprises" we should have seen coming. Yes, a prediction of sorts because the pattern is becoming clear: like BSE, foot and mouth disease, and SARS (which was caused because of poor livestock practices in dense urban areas), this latest Sudan 1 crisis is the thunder signaling a much larger storm on the near horizon unless we make some big course corrections within our global food system.
There is poison in the tap water
WACYorkPA squads up and travels directly south of York to a forcibly poisoned town called Red Lion (Pop.15,000) with bright yellow “Poison in the Tap” Posters.
Join us for a full day of Truth Action on the Eleventh Day of Every Month at http://WeAreChangeYorkPA.com and please consider donating at http://wearechangeyorkpa.chipin.com/6…
Is YOUR Water Fluoridated (Poisoned) in Pennsylvania?
SEE HERE?
http://www.actionpa.org/fluoride/map
Sodium Fluorosilicate [MSDS] (Material Safety Data Sheet)
http://www.fluoridealert.org/pesticid…
Paint The Town: Anti-Fluoridation Poster Campaign
http://www.facebook.com/DemandSafeWater
PDF Poster:
http://www.infowars.com/pdfs/tapwater…
http://www.infowars.com/poison-tap-water
Open Letter to City Concerning Water Fluoridation
(Print and Deliver to your elected public officials)
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note…
Articles:
Australian TV Runs Serious Report on Dangers of Fluoride
http://ur1.ca/117eo
Studies on Neurotoxic Effects of Fluoride
http://ur1.ca/117et
Studies on Fluoride Links to Cancer
http://ur1.ca/117ev
Studies on Fluoride and Bone Fractures
http://ur1.ca/117ez
Study on Fluoride’s Effects on Liver and Kidney
http://ur1.ca/117fb
Studies on Fluoride and the Thyroid
http://ur1.ca/04jsn
Studies on Fluoride and IQ reduction
http://ur1.ca/117fk
Studies on Fluoride and Dental Flourosis
http://ur1.ca/117fn
Studies on Fluoride and Tooth Decay
http://ur1.ca/117fo
Jacob Appel Calls for Spiking Public Water With Lithium and Other Drugs
http://ur1.ca/117ft
Animal cruelty and family violence making the connection
EXCERPT:
Pets are part of the family in the majority of American households, where nearly three-quarters of families with school-age children have at least one companion animal. These animals are often treated like members of the family, but if the family is experiencing violence they can become targets as well. Pets are often an important source of comfort and stability to the victims of abuse, particularly children. But abusive family members may threaten, injure, or kill pets, often as a way of threatening or controlling others in the family.
SWINE FLU WAS MAN MADE IN A USA LABORATORY WITH FBI DOCUMENT
Animal abuse causes recall youtube
Bear Baying in South Carolina w/video
HSUS investigators recently attended several bear baiting (also known as bear baying) events in South Carolina. What they found will shock you.
In each event, a captive bear—claws and many teeth cut down or removed—is tethered in an arena. Team after team of dogs is released into the arena to bark at, jump on, and bite the frightened, defenseless bear for hours at a time. These events are billed as training exercises for hounds but are nothing more than public spectacles.
Please sign the petition asking the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources to prohibit bear baiting (which they call bear baying) and revoke the permits for people who torment bears so cruelly.
» South Carolina residents: your DNR needs to hear from you especially!
Your messageStop cruel bear baying
To: S.C. Department of Natural Resources
The undersigned ask the state of South Carolina to end the barbaric practice of bear baying. Captive bears, with claws and many teeth cut down or removed, should not be used as live bait for dogs in a cruel spectacle for human entertainment.
We ask that you 1) revoke possession permits from anyone who uses bears in these cruel spectacles, and 2) inspect all captive bears to ensure they are not used for bear baying.
Sincerely,
[Your Name]
[Your Address]
[City, State ZIP]
The Meatrix interactive (Teach and Learn)
Meet your meat video
Pig farm horrors exposed youtube
Cattle Abuse video and text (video doesn't work)
February 19, 2008
Recall Recoil
It was President's Day yesterday. But from my perspective, it was also a day of false assurances.
See the undercover video that led to the recall.
Arguably the top story across the country for the last two days has been the nation's largest ever recall of beef, prompted by The HSUS’s long-term undercover investigation at the Hallmark/Westland Meat Co. in Chino, Calif. A hidden camera investigation at the plant exposed downed dairy cows being struck with paddles, extensively prodded with electric shocks to the eyes and other highly sensitive areas, rammed with forklifts, and abused in other deplorable ways in order to get these animals to stand. The poor cows were bellowing in response to these assaults, but their cries generated not a hint of mercy from their abusers. They wanted to squeeze every last dime out of these ailing dairy cows, and they were ruthless in subjecting these creatures to an astonishing array of tools of torment.
The HSUS has been telling the story to America, with me and several other spokespersons appearing on many of the major media outlets. But the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the National Cattlemen's Beef Association have been offering their own perspectives and also talking to the American people. There's no denying the cruelty, and spokespersons from the federal government and the Cattlemen's Association concur that the inhumane treatment of these “spent” dairy cows was unacceptable. Good for them, and let's hope that the USDA continues with a vigorous investigation and has more news for us. We at The HSUS are particularly pleased that the new Agriculture Secretary called in the USDA's Office of Inspector General—the agency's semi-independent law enforcement arm—to investigate, since it has been a powerful and positive force on a number of animal protection issues.
But what I can't agree with are the claims by the USDA and the Cattlemen's Association that this plant represents an isolated case and all else is well with the regulation of slaughter plants in America. In an interview with PBS yesterday, the USDA's Kenneth Petersen said the incident is "an aberration," while a Cattlemen's Association representative told the Associated Press that most cattle bound for slaughter are treated humanely and the documented abuse is "something we don't condone and don't tolerate."
Now, I presume that if the Cattlemen's Association knew about the abuses at the Chino plant, it would have spoken up about it. Right? But the leaders of the group didn't speak out, so we must assume they had no knowledge of what was occurring.
If they did not know what was happening at that plant, they probably also don't know what's happening at the 900 other cattle slaughter plants in the United States. Their statement that this is an isolated case is a statement of faith, not fact.
The USDA has been trotting out the same line of argument. But let's concede two related points: First, the abuses at the Chino plant would not have come to light without the undercover operation by The HSUS. And second, these abuses occurred, as U.S. Rep. George Miller told USA Today, "right under the USDA's nose." In fact, the USDA honored this company as its 2004-05 Supplier of the Year to the National School Lunch Program.
If the USDA could not see abuses occurring at a plant where it had its full force of inspectors, how can it assure us that these terrible abuses are not happening elsewhere?
What we do know is that in the limited number of slaughter plant investigations conducted by The HSUS, PETA, Farm Sanctuary, Humane Farming Association, Compassion Over Killing, Mercy for Animals, and other animal protection groups, we see time and again that there have been gross abuses. PETA found workers slamming chickens against the walls of a slaughter plant. Other groups found animals being dismembered alive.
In 2006, the USDA’s own Office of Inspector General found that downers were getting into the food supply. In one case in Iowa, a USDA inquiry found that inspectors were sleeping and playing computer games on the job, while cows were being abused. This past week, Tyson fired several plant employees who were implicated in a chicken abuse scandal. Are these all also isolated incidents?
So let's leave the false assurances aside. We'd be grateful just to have the federal government do its job, and for the Cattlemen's Association and other industry groups to hold its colleagues to a basic standard of decency and begin to police its ranks. Their spin may make a few people dizzy, but I find it hollow and entirely unconvincing.
Obsolete Americans and their dead dream
EXCERPT:
Paula Hay - Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Yes I know I said light posting for the next couple of weeks, but two articles have crossed my path which bear attention.
The first is an article from a couple weeks ago at Salon: Are The American People Obsolete? The author makes a compelling case that the elites have broken the social contract between themselves and the rest of us, and that they no longer need us:
Have the American people outlived their usefulness to the rich minority in the United States? A number of trends suggest that the answer may be yes.
In every industrial democracy since the end of World War II, there has been a social contract between the few and the many. In return for receiving a disproportionate amount of the gains from economic growth in a capitalist economy, the rich paid a disproportionate percentage of the taxes needed for public goods and a safety net for the majority.
In North America and Europe, the economic elite agreed to this bargain because they needed ordinary people as consumers and soldiers. Without mass consumption, the factories in which the rich invested would grind to a halt. Without universal conscription in the world wars, and selective conscription during the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies might have failed to defeat totalitarian empires that would have created a world order hostile to a market economy.
Globalization has eliminated the first reason for the rich to continue supporting this bargain at the nation-state level, while the privatization of the military threatens the other rationale.
The offshoring of industrial production means that many American investors and corporate managers no longer need an American workforce in order to prosper. They can enjoy their stream of profits from factories in China while shutting down factories in the U.S. And if Chinese workers have the impertinence to demand higher wages, American corporations can find low-wage labor in other countries.
This marks a historic change in the relationship between capital and labor in the U.S. The robber barons of the late 19th century generally lived near the American working class and could be threatened by strikes and frightened by the prospect of revolution. But rioting Chinese workers are not going to burn down New York City or march on the Hamptons.
What about markets? Many U.S. multinationals that have transferred production to other countries continue to depend on an American mass market. But that, too, may be changing. American consumers are tapped out, and as long as they are paying down their debts from the bubble years, private household demand for goods and services will grow slowly at best in the United States. In the long run, the fastest-growing consumer markets, like the fastest-growing labor markets, may be found in China, India and other developing countries.
This, too, marks a dramatic change. As bad as they were, the robber barons depended on the continental U.S. market for their incomes. The financier J.P. Morgan was not so much an international banker as a kind of industrial capitalist, organizing American industrial corporations that depended on predominantly domestic markets. He didn't make most of his money from investing in other countries.
In contrast, many of the highest-paid individuals on Wall Street have grown rich through activities that have little or no connection with the American economy. They can flourish even if the U.S. declines, as long as they can tap into growth in other regions of the world.
. . .
If much of America's investor class no longer needs Americans either as workers or consumers, elite Americans might still depend on ordinary Americans to protect them, by serving in the military or police forces. Increasingly, however, America's professional army is being supplemented by contractors — that is, mercenaries. And the elite press periodically publishes proposals to sell citizenship to foreigners who serve as soldiers in an American Foreign Legion. It is probably only a matter of time before some earnest pundit proposes to replace American police officers with foreign guest-worker mercenaries as well.
Offshoring and immigration, then, are severing the link between the fate of most Americans and the fate of the American rich. A member of the elite can make money from factories in China that sell to consumers in India, while relying entirely or almost entirely on immigrant servants at one of several homes around the country. With a foreign workforce for the corporations policed by brutal autocracies and non-voting immigrant servants in the U.S., the only thing missing is a non-voting immigrant mercenary army, whose legions can be deployed in foreign wars without creating grieving parents, widows and children who vote in American elections.
If the American rich increasingly do not depend for their wealth on American workers and American consumers or for their safety on American soldiers or police officers, then it is hardly surprising that so many of them should be so hostile to paying taxes to support the infrastructure and the social programs that help the majority of the American people. The rich don't need the rest anymore.
EXCERPT:
Pets are part of the family in the majority of American households, where nearly three-quarters of families with school-age children have at least one companion animal. These animals are often treated like members of the family, but if the family is experiencing violence they can become targets as well. Pets are often an important source of comfort and stability to the victims of abuse, particularly children. But abusive family members may threaten, injure, or kill pets, often as a way of threatening or controlling others in the family.
SWINE FLU WAS MAN MADE IN A USA LABORATORY WITH FBI DOCUMENT
Animal abuse causes recall youtube
Bear Baying in South Carolina w/video
HSUS investigators recently attended several bear baiting (also known as bear baying) events in South Carolina. What they found will shock you.
In each event, a captive bear—claws and many teeth cut down or removed—is tethered in an arena. Team after team of dogs is released into the arena to bark at, jump on, and bite the frightened, defenseless bear for hours at a time. These events are billed as training exercises for hounds but are nothing more than public spectacles.
Please sign the petition asking the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources to prohibit bear baiting (which they call bear baying) and revoke the permits for people who torment bears so cruelly.
» South Carolina residents: your DNR needs to hear from you especially!
Your messageStop cruel bear baying
To: S.C. Department of Natural Resources
The undersigned ask the state of South Carolina to end the barbaric practice of bear baying. Captive bears, with claws and many teeth cut down or removed, should not be used as live bait for dogs in a cruel spectacle for human entertainment.
We ask that you 1) revoke possession permits from anyone who uses bears in these cruel spectacles, and 2) inspect all captive bears to ensure they are not used for bear baying.
Sincerely,
[Your Name]
[Your Address]
[City, State ZIP]
The Meatrix interactive (Teach and Learn)
Meet your meat video
Pig farm horrors exposed youtube
Cattle Abuse video and text (video doesn't work)
February 19, 2008
Recall Recoil
It was President's Day yesterday. But from my perspective, it was also a day of false assurances.
See the undercover video that led to the recall.
Arguably the top story across the country for the last two days has been the nation's largest ever recall of beef, prompted by The HSUS’s long-term undercover investigation at the Hallmark/Westland Meat Co. in Chino, Calif. A hidden camera investigation at the plant exposed downed dairy cows being struck with paddles, extensively prodded with electric shocks to the eyes and other highly sensitive areas, rammed with forklifts, and abused in other deplorable ways in order to get these animals to stand. The poor cows were bellowing in response to these assaults, but their cries generated not a hint of mercy from their abusers. They wanted to squeeze every last dime out of these ailing dairy cows, and they were ruthless in subjecting these creatures to an astonishing array of tools of torment.
The HSUS has been telling the story to America, with me and several other spokespersons appearing on many of the major media outlets. But the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the National Cattlemen's Beef Association have been offering their own perspectives and also talking to the American people. There's no denying the cruelty, and spokespersons from the federal government and the Cattlemen's Association concur that the inhumane treatment of these “spent” dairy cows was unacceptable. Good for them, and let's hope that the USDA continues with a vigorous investigation and has more news for us. We at The HSUS are particularly pleased that the new Agriculture Secretary called in the USDA's Office of Inspector General—the agency's semi-independent law enforcement arm—to investigate, since it has been a powerful and positive force on a number of animal protection issues.
But what I can't agree with are the claims by the USDA and the Cattlemen's Association that this plant represents an isolated case and all else is well with the regulation of slaughter plants in America. In an interview with PBS yesterday, the USDA's Kenneth Petersen said the incident is "an aberration," while a Cattlemen's Association representative told the Associated Press that most cattle bound for slaughter are treated humanely and the documented abuse is "something we don't condone and don't tolerate."
Now, I presume that if the Cattlemen's Association knew about the abuses at the Chino plant, it would have spoken up about it. Right? But the leaders of the group didn't speak out, so we must assume they had no knowledge of what was occurring.
If they did not know what was happening at that plant, they probably also don't know what's happening at the 900 other cattle slaughter plants in the United States. Their statement that this is an isolated case is a statement of faith, not fact.
The USDA has been trotting out the same line of argument. But let's concede two related points: First, the abuses at the Chino plant would not have come to light without the undercover operation by The HSUS. And second, these abuses occurred, as U.S. Rep. George Miller told USA Today, "right under the USDA's nose." In fact, the USDA honored this company as its 2004-05 Supplier of the Year to the National School Lunch Program.
If the USDA could not see abuses occurring at a plant where it had its full force of inspectors, how can it assure us that these terrible abuses are not happening elsewhere?
What we do know is that in the limited number of slaughter plant investigations conducted by The HSUS, PETA, Farm Sanctuary, Humane Farming Association, Compassion Over Killing, Mercy for Animals, and other animal protection groups, we see time and again that there have been gross abuses. PETA found workers slamming chickens against the walls of a slaughter plant. Other groups found animals being dismembered alive.
In 2006, the USDA’s own Office of Inspector General found that downers were getting into the food supply. In one case in Iowa, a USDA inquiry found that inspectors were sleeping and playing computer games on the job, while cows were being abused. This past week, Tyson fired several plant employees who were implicated in a chicken abuse scandal. Are these all also isolated incidents?
So let's leave the false assurances aside. We'd be grateful just to have the federal government do its job, and for the Cattlemen's Association and other industry groups to hold its colleagues to a basic standard of decency and begin to police its ranks. Their spin may make a few people dizzy, but I find it hollow and entirely unconvincing.
Obsolete Americans and their dead dream
EXCERPT:
Paula Hay - Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Yes I know I said light posting for the next couple of weeks, but two articles have crossed my path which bear attention.
The first is an article from a couple weeks ago at Salon: Are The American People Obsolete? The author makes a compelling case that the elites have broken the social contract between themselves and the rest of us, and that they no longer need us:
Have the American people outlived their usefulness to the rich minority in the United States? A number of trends suggest that the answer may be yes.
In every industrial democracy since the end of World War II, there has been a social contract between the few and the many. In return for receiving a disproportionate amount of the gains from economic growth in a capitalist economy, the rich paid a disproportionate percentage of the taxes needed for public goods and a safety net for the majority.
In North America and Europe, the economic elite agreed to this bargain because they needed ordinary people as consumers and soldiers. Without mass consumption, the factories in which the rich invested would grind to a halt. Without universal conscription in the world wars, and selective conscription during the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies might have failed to defeat totalitarian empires that would have created a world order hostile to a market economy.
Globalization has eliminated the first reason for the rich to continue supporting this bargain at the nation-state level, while the privatization of the military threatens the other rationale.
The offshoring of industrial production means that many American investors and corporate managers no longer need an American workforce in order to prosper. They can enjoy their stream of profits from factories in China while shutting down factories in the U.S. And if Chinese workers have the impertinence to demand higher wages, American corporations can find low-wage labor in other countries.
This marks a historic change in the relationship between capital and labor in the U.S. The robber barons of the late 19th century generally lived near the American working class and could be threatened by strikes and frightened by the prospect of revolution. But rioting Chinese workers are not going to burn down New York City or march on the Hamptons.
What about markets? Many U.S. multinationals that have transferred production to other countries continue to depend on an American mass market. But that, too, may be changing. American consumers are tapped out, and as long as they are paying down their debts from the bubble years, private household demand for goods and services will grow slowly at best in the United States. In the long run, the fastest-growing consumer markets, like the fastest-growing labor markets, may be found in China, India and other developing countries.
This, too, marks a dramatic change. As bad as they were, the robber barons depended on the continental U.S. market for their incomes. The financier J.P. Morgan was not so much an international banker as a kind of industrial capitalist, organizing American industrial corporations that depended on predominantly domestic markets. He didn't make most of his money from investing in other countries.
In contrast, many of the highest-paid individuals on Wall Street have grown rich through activities that have little or no connection with the American economy. They can flourish even if the U.S. declines, as long as they can tap into growth in other regions of the world.
. . .
If much of America's investor class no longer needs Americans either as workers or consumers, elite Americans might still depend on ordinary Americans to protect them, by serving in the military or police forces. Increasingly, however, America's professional army is being supplemented by contractors — that is, mercenaries. And the elite press periodically publishes proposals to sell citizenship to foreigners who serve as soldiers in an American Foreign Legion. It is probably only a matter of time before some earnest pundit proposes to replace American police officers with foreign guest-worker mercenaries as well.
Offshoring and immigration, then, are severing the link between the fate of most Americans and the fate of the American rich. A member of the elite can make money from factories in China that sell to consumers in India, while relying entirely or almost entirely on immigrant servants at one of several homes around the country. With a foreign workforce for the corporations policed by brutal autocracies and non-voting immigrant servants in the U.S., the only thing missing is a non-voting immigrant mercenary army, whose legions can be deployed in foreign wars without creating grieving parents, widows and children who vote in American elections.
If the American rich increasingly do not depend for their wealth on American workers and American consumers or for their safety on American soldiers or police officers, then it is hardly surprising that so many of them should be so hostile to paying taxes to support the infrastructure and the social programs that help the majority of the American people. The rich don't need the rest anymore.
Monday, August 9, 2010
Good onya Mia Farrow
.Farrow, Campbell draw spotlight to war-crime trial
Buzz up!64 votes Share
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EmailPrint.. AP – Actress Mia Farrow is seen in this image taken from TV at the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone …
.Celebrity Video:Naomi's evidence contradicted Australia 7 News .
Play Video Celebrity Video:Jennifer Aniston talks motherhood AP .
Play Video Celebrity Video:Farrow: Campbell said gift was 'huge diamond' AP .
By TOBY STERLING, Associated Press Writer Toby Sterling, Associated Press Writer – 42 mins ago
LEIDSCHENDAM, Netherlands – Naomi Campbell flirted with Liberia's former president across the dinner table at Nelson Mandela's presidential mansion in 1997 and boasted the following morning that Charles Taylor had given her a huge diamond during the night, Mia Farrow and another witness testified at Taylor's war crimes trial Monday.
Prosecutors hope testimony from the actress-turned-human rights activist and from Campbell's estranged former modeling agent will help tie Taylor to the illicit "blood diamond" trade that fueled Sierra Leone's civil war. Both contradicted Campbell's account from the witness stand last week that she did not know the nature or value of what she had received.
The episode was a surreal interlude of glamour in a grim case focused on murder and mutilation in the jungles of West Africa.
Taylor says he is innocent of 11 war-crimes charges linked to allegations he supported rebels during Sierra Leone's vicious 11-year civil war, which ended in 2002 with an estimated 100,000 dead.
He has dismissed suggestions he was involved in the diamond trade as "complete, complete nonsense."
Farrow, however, recounted what she called the "unforgettable" memory of an excited Campbell coming down for breakfast the morning after Mandela's dinner party, so excited she could hardly sit.
Click on image to see photos of Farrow testifying at tribunal
AP
"She said 'Oh my God, last night I was awakened by men knocking at the door and it was men sent by Charles Taylor and he sent me a huge diamond'," Farrow said.
Campbell, who resisted appearing before the war-crimes court for months, testified under subpoena Thursday that she was given several small "dirty-looking" stones by men she didn't know after the function in Pretoria.
The British model said she hadn't known they were diamonds, nor who had sent them, and said Farrow was the one who suggested the gift was from Taylor.
Defense lawyers accused the prosecution of calling the unlikely witnesses as a publicity stunt to raise the profile of the trial, which has gone on for more than two years. Taylor himself was on the stand for seven months, portraying himself as an African liberator and statesman who sought to bring stability and peace to his turbulent corner of the continent.
Taylor's chief counsel, Courtenay Griffiths, said Farrow was unlikely to accurately remember what happened at a breakfast 13 years ago. He noted that Campbell received three uncut diamonds — not the single diamond Farrow insisted she heard Campbell talk about.
The defense also suggested Farrow's credibility was tainted by her activism, particularly her campaigns for the victims of Africa's wars.
Farrow, 65, conceded she had never seen the diamond or diamonds herself, and that Campbell might not have used the word "huge." But she insisted remembering Campbell only mentioned a single diamond.
South African businessman Jeremy Ractliffe, the former head of the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, confirmed last week he had three stones he had received from Campbell to donate to charity after the 1997 dinner. He said he hadn't done anything with them because he feared that a blood diamond scandal might attach to Mandela or Campbell as a result. He has now handed them over to South African authorities and they have been identified as uncut diamonds, but their origins are unknown.
In court, Judge Julia Sebutinde asked Farrow whether it was possible she might have seen the 2006 movie "Blood Diamond" and been influenced by its plot, which centers on a single large diamond.
But Farrow denied any suggestion that she was confusing reality with Hollywood.
Agent Carole White, who fell out with Campbell several years ago, told the court that Taylor and her then-client enjoyed each other's company at the dinner table.
"I think she was flirting with him and he was flirting back," she said.
At one point during the meal, White said, Campbell leaned back to speak to her. She "was very excited and she told me he was going to give her some diamonds," White told the court.
She said Campbell later appeared disappointed when she saw the uncut diamonds and they were "not very impressive and not enormously big."
But under cross examination, Griffiths strongly challenged White's testimony.
"You have a very powerful motive for lying," he said, noting that White is suing Campbell for millions of dollars over an alleged breach of contract.
Campbell has served community service twice after pleading guilty in minor assault cases. A few of her former aides and maids have sued her, accusing her of violent outbursts and usually settling on undisclosed terms.
Follow Yahoo! News on Twitter, become a fan on Facebook
.Farrow, Campbell draw spotlight to war-crime trial
Buzz up!64 votes Share
retweet
EmailPrint.. AP – Actress Mia Farrow is seen in this image taken from TV at the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone …
.Celebrity Video:Naomi's evidence contradicted Australia 7 News .
Play Video Celebrity Video:Jennifer Aniston talks motherhood AP .
Play Video Celebrity Video:Farrow: Campbell said gift was 'huge diamond' AP .
By TOBY STERLING, Associated Press Writer Toby Sterling, Associated Press Writer – 42 mins ago
LEIDSCHENDAM, Netherlands – Naomi Campbell flirted with Liberia's former president across the dinner table at Nelson Mandela's presidential mansion in 1997 and boasted the following morning that Charles Taylor had given her a huge diamond during the night, Mia Farrow and another witness testified at Taylor's war crimes trial Monday.
Prosecutors hope testimony from the actress-turned-human rights activist and from Campbell's estranged former modeling agent will help tie Taylor to the illicit "blood diamond" trade that fueled Sierra Leone's civil war. Both contradicted Campbell's account from the witness stand last week that she did not know the nature or value of what she had received.
The episode was a surreal interlude of glamour in a grim case focused on murder and mutilation in the jungles of West Africa.
Taylor says he is innocent of 11 war-crimes charges linked to allegations he supported rebels during Sierra Leone's vicious 11-year civil war, which ended in 2002 with an estimated 100,000 dead.
He has dismissed suggestions he was involved in the diamond trade as "complete, complete nonsense."
Farrow, however, recounted what she called the "unforgettable" memory of an excited Campbell coming down for breakfast the morning after Mandela's dinner party, so excited she could hardly sit.
Click on image to see photos of Farrow testifying at tribunal
AP
"She said 'Oh my God, last night I was awakened by men knocking at the door and it was men sent by Charles Taylor and he sent me a huge diamond'," Farrow said.
Campbell, who resisted appearing before the war-crimes court for months, testified under subpoena Thursday that she was given several small "dirty-looking" stones by men she didn't know after the function in Pretoria.
The British model said she hadn't known they were diamonds, nor who had sent them, and said Farrow was the one who suggested the gift was from Taylor.
Defense lawyers accused the prosecution of calling the unlikely witnesses as a publicity stunt to raise the profile of the trial, which has gone on for more than two years. Taylor himself was on the stand for seven months, portraying himself as an African liberator and statesman who sought to bring stability and peace to his turbulent corner of the continent.
Taylor's chief counsel, Courtenay Griffiths, said Farrow was unlikely to accurately remember what happened at a breakfast 13 years ago. He noted that Campbell received three uncut diamonds — not the single diamond Farrow insisted she heard Campbell talk about.
The defense also suggested Farrow's credibility was tainted by her activism, particularly her campaigns for the victims of Africa's wars.
Farrow, 65, conceded she had never seen the diamond or diamonds herself, and that Campbell might not have used the word "huge." But she insisted remembering Campbell only mentioned a single diamond.
South African businessman Jeremy Ractliffe, the former head of the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, confirmed last week he had three stones he had received from Campbell to donate to charity after the 1997 dinner. He said he hadn't done anything with them because he feared that a blood diamond scandal might attach to Mandela or Campbell as a result. He has now handed them over to South African authorities and they have been identified as uncut diamonds, but their origins are unknown.
In court, Judge Julia Sebutinde asked Farrow whether it was possible she might have seen the 2006 movie "Blood Diamond" and been influenced by its plot, which centers on a single large diamond.
But Farrow denied any suggestion that she was confusing reality with Hollywood.
Agent Carole White, who fell out with Campbell several years ago, told the court that Taylor and her then-client enjoyed each other's company at the dinner table.
"I think she was flirting with him and he was flirting back," she said.
At one point during the meal, White said, Campbell leaned back to speak to her. She "was very excited and she told me he was going to give her some diamonds," White told the court.
She said Campbell later appeared disappointed when she saw the uncut diamonds and they were "not very impressive and not enormously big."
But under cross examination, Griffiths strongly challenged White's testimony.
"You have a very powerful motive for lying," he said, noting that White is suing Campbell for millions of dollars over an alleged breach of contract.
Campbell has served community service twice after pleading guilty in minor assault cases. A few of her former aides and maids have sued her, accusing her of violent outbursts and usually settling on undisclosed terms.
Follow Yahoo! News on Twitter, become a fan on Facebook
DEAR SORROW
There are no words to convey the sadness that leads my path...
Sorrow so pure it achingly clings to the shadows...
Honesty within that attracts the home of utter turmoil...
I’m unable to share or even allow for the mistake of vulnerability...
Stepping up to make the decision that changes all and nothing...
Understanding sure to collapse in the confusion of certainty lacked...
Feeling so alone in a crowd, struggling to breathe and make it thru...
A void so wide that nothing can lie in its wake...
A plea to stand by and assemble the sins incapable of forgiveness...
My anger so unsettling that it leaves no chance to be heard...
Carrying on my back the hopes of many and the failure of self...
Stepping aside to encounter that which can't be named...
Aligning such doubts that match the treks of my soulful tears...
Begging for the light to shine away from the mirrors reflection...
Who hears the toll that the bell illuminates as vibrations shatter silence...
No commitment is granted for the issues that continue to hold me a prisoner…
I am so tired...
Sincerely,
Hope
There are no words to convey the sadness that leads my path...
Sorrow so pure it achingly clings to the shadows...
Honesty within that attracts the home of utter turmoil...
I’m unable to share or even allow for the mistake of vulnerability...
Stepping up to make the decision that changes all and nothing...
Understanding sure to collapse in the confusion of certainty lacked...
Feeling so alone in a crowd, struggling to breathe and make it thru...
A void so wide that nothing can lie in its wake...
A plea to stand by and assemble the sins incapable of forgiveness...
My anger so unsettling that it leaves no chance to be heard...
Carrying on my back the hopes of many and the failure of self...
Stepping aside to encounter that which can't be named...
Aligning such doubts that match the treks of my soulful tears...
Begging for the light to shine away from the mirrors reflection...
Who hears the toll that the bell illuminates as vibrations shatter silence...
No commitment is granted for the issues that continue to hold me a prisoner…
I am so tired...
Sincerely,
Hope
License plate 187USA
Twilight Zone intro. youtube
Cassie just turned 18 yesterday and she just recently graduated from high school.
Cassie's dentist's appointment went great and now all she had to do was wait it out till next week and she could do her life's dream.
Cassie ran out to her new Prius and was all ready to go. She saw Amy's books in the back and thought she'd ask her little sister to ride along with her to Walgreens. She opened her door and honked her horn. Amy opened the door and shrugged as in 'What?' (aside in Cassie's brain; "Why is Amy's books still in my car?")
Cassie yelled at Amy to come over to the car. "Do you wanna ride along with me to the drugstore?"
Amy smiled, it wasn't often since her sister got her brand new Prius that she was asked to tag along and it delighted her to be asked.
Amy climbed in and away the two girls went to the store.
Cassie didn't take long making her purchases as she was anxious to get home to have a good look at the work the dentist had done today.
She paid the clerk and told Amy......."Let's go!"
The girls got in the car and headed to home.
About half-way to the house, Cassie noticed the lights behind her.
Cassie pulled over.
The police officer walked up to the car.
Cassie was surprised as she surely didn't know what she had done.
"Miss, may I see your license and registration please."
Cassie obliged and gave the paperwork to the officer.
"Miss, may I see that bag please?"
Cassie started to respond but decided it was best just to hand over her bag.
"Miss, I see on this receipt that there were 4 items purchased and there are only 3 here, where is the 4th item?"
Cassie looked at Amy and Amy handed over her Nestle's water bottle.
"Miss, I'm going to have to ask you to step out of the car."
Cassie opened the car door and stepped out.
The officer had called his partner out and handed over the items and the partner was bagging the four items.
"Miss Cassie Warden, you have the right to remain silent anything you say or do can and will be held against you, do you understand?"
Cassie was stunned and blinked back the tears and nodded yes.
The officer had handcuffed Cassie and was walking her back to the patrol car.
Amy was allowed to walk home.
"Now in looking at all of this, what do you think?"
Cassie had purchased Toothpaste, Mouthwash, dental floss and a bottle of Nestle's water.
The Flouride and Aluminium in each of these products is to be considered hazardous material.
California Hazardous Waste pdf
California Code of Regulations, Title 22, Section 66261.126 lists 791 chemicals as "Hazardous Waste" 39 of these are fluoride compounds.
Cassie would be charged with possession of a hazardous material, and contributing to the deliquency of a minor. (The water bottle would be used to test Amy's DNA and charted in the Department of Homeland Security's record books.)
Will Cassie's work record be impacted by these charges? Will her life be changed forever because of some law put in place before her birth? hmmmmmmmmmm Will Cassie be on 'the no fly lists at airports' and be considered a potential terrorist?
Do you think this can't happen, if the USA continues down the path it's going, I wouldn't be surprise.
Chemical company convicted of illegal dumping 1988
EXCERPT:
Chemical Company Convicted of Illegal Dumping
By ERIC SCHMITT, Special to the New York Times
Published: May 15, 1988
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GLEN COVE, L.I.— A chemical distribution company with a long record of pollution violations has been convicted on criminal charges of illegally storing and dumping hazardous wastes at its plant here.
The verdict Wednesday by a jury in Nassau County Court, after a three-week trial, ended years of litigation by the state against the company, Mattiace Industries Inc., which Attorney General Robert Abrams called ''one of the most notorious environmental scofflaws in the state.''
'This sends a signal ...........OBVIOUSLY NOT AS IT IS NOW 2010 ..... DUH ...cal
Why our children might be a little confused in today's world?
"Mommie, Mommie, why do you make me sit in a carseat when the food you're giving me as a snack for my ride contains toxics?"
The Willowbrook Experiment
US Government Experiments
On Children During
The Cold War
From Carol Rutz
From raven1@bestnet.org - Organization CAHRA
3-14-00
Preface Of Upcoming Book
This is the story of someone you know-your neighbor, your classmate, your brother or sister, your mother or father. It is the secret they have been holding within their hearts because they were afraid the American public could not believe their government would carry out human experimentation on children, in direct defiance of the Nuremberg Code, which has been official United States policy since 1946.
Some of the very same Nazi doctors who worked in mental institutions before WWII, deciding whether mentally deficient children should be sterilized or killed because of their defective genes, also perfomed horrendous experiments in the death camps. Their medical expertise, along with hundreds of Nazi scientists was considered so vital to the "Cold War" effort that they would be brought into the United States and Canada to work side by side with some of the greatest, but most perverse minds the 20th century would ever see. It is a story interwoven with incest and government mind control. It involves the use of drugs, sensory deprivation, hypnosis, and electric shock to gain control of these children's minds.
Impossible, you say. I wish it were. We live in such a sheltered little world. It's much easier to believe that incest and violence and mind control belong to the few; but they belong to the many. One in three girls faces some type of sexual abuse before they are eighteen years old. The statistics on men is one in seven, but that is debatable since it is so much more difficult for them to come forward. Dr. Alan W. Scheflin, Professor of law at Santa Clara University Law School, and a judicially recognized expert in mind and behavior control states in a letter dated March 9, 1995 that secret government mind control experimentation is ongoing and vastly more expansive than the government authorities are willing to admit. He also is co-author of a nonfiction book entitled The Mind Manipulators which was published in a dozen countries. He says that he has been studying these secret programs since 1975 and it is his conclusion that there are at minimum hundreds, and most likely thousands of American citizens who were used as guinea pigs against their will in government research projects. What he does not say is that most of the children used in these experiments were sold by one of their caretakers in the name of "National Security" and subjected to untold horrors at the hands of their government.
In light of so many abuses of power coming before the public in recent years, many adult survivors of these childhood experiments are stepping forward to be heard. The government has admitted wrong doing in the Tuskegee Experiments, where poor black man were allowed to go untreated for their syphilis so the government could study the effects. Best remembered are the atomic tests on 2584 military personnel in the Nevada desert in 1953. Less known were such experiments as the feeding of radioactive cereal in the 1940s and 1950s to young male science club members who were institutionalized at the Fernald School in Massachusetts. The researchers had little experience with radionuclides in humans; consequently this approach to medical investigation gave them that opportunity. The parents, as well as the children, were simply told they were being fed a diet rich in iron.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Dr. Saul Krugman of New York University conducted studies of hepatitis at the Willowbrook State School, an institution for the severely mentally retarded. To study the natural history, effects, and progression of the disease, Krugman and his staff systematically infected newly arrived children with strains of the virus. In October 1995 the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments reported that secret radiation experiments on indigent patients and mentally retarded children were not only done, but that these people were deceived about the nature of their treatments. Dr. William Silverman asserted that performing nontherapeutic experiments on childrenn without authorization from parents was part of a broader "ethos of the time" in which "everyone was a draftee" in a national war on disease.
Then there is the case of the 12 human "guinea pigs" who were secretly injected with radioactive Plutonium 239 and uranium in government experiments in the 1940's. Energy Secretary Hazel Oleary in announcing the settlement of $4.8 million to be paid to their families said the government was "grateful" to the victims for "the tough lessons they have taught us about trust, responsibility, and accountability between the government and the people." In a Congressional subcommittee hearing in Washington, DC on September 28, 1994 it was revealed that up to 500,000 Americans were endangered by secret defense-related tests between 1940 and 1974 -- including covert experiments with radioactive materials, mustard gas, LSD, and biological agents. The General Accounting Office testified that between 1949 and 1969, the Army released radioactive compounds in 239 cities to study the effects.
In a decision dated April 16, 1985 Chief Justice Burger of the United States Court of Appeals delivered the opinion of the Court in the case of CIA v. SIMS, 471 U.S. 159. This case focused around the publics right under the Freedom of Information Act, to have declassified the grant proposals and contracts, and the names of the institutions and individuals who had performed research under the CIA financed research project, code-named MKULTRA. MKULTRA was established to counter soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques and consisted of 149 subprojects contracted out to at least 80 institutions.
In 1977, Director of Intelligence, Stansfield Turner described in an affidavit that the program was initiated because the Agency was confronted with "learning the state of the art of behavioral modification at a time when the U.S. Government was concerned about inexplicable behavior of persons behind the 'iron curtain' and American prisoners of war who had been subjected to so called 'brainwashing'". It began with a proposal from Richard Helms, then the Agency's assistant Deputy Director for Plans. Helms outlined a special funding mechanism for highly sensitive Agency research and development projects that would study the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior.
MKULTRA was approved by Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence on April 13, 1953. Twenty years after the conception of the MKULTRA project, all known files pertaining to it were ordered destroyed by Richard Helms before he retired. In 1977 through a Freedom of Information Act request by John Marks, 16,000 pages of documents were found; held as part of the Agency's financial history. Thank God, for the bean counters. Further attempts at declassification resulted in the decision rendered by Chief Justice Burger that the "intelligence sources" who were guaranteed confidentiality at the time of these CIA funded research projects would continue to remain protected and classified.
To those of us who have survived these experiments, this decision means that our stories will continue to lie in the government vaults of classified materials. Most of the important details were conveniently destroyed under orders of Richard Helms, probably not unlike what took place when the concentration camps were liberated. If not for the survivors, their stories would never have been told and the disappearance of 6 million people could have remained a question mark in history. I have no other choice than to tell this story myself. My goal in writing this book is to expose the misuse of power that took place in this country during the Cold War due to fear. Thousands of innocent children, who have now grown into adults are silently suffering from the effects of the experiments that were done to them by their own government. Many have been diagnosed incorrectly and institutionalized. Some died because they knew too much. Others, like myself, were able to obtain competent medical help, and are struggling to heal from the physical and mental ravages upon our beings.
Will we let this story lay in the shadows forever, or do we have the courage to address these wrongs and give survivors back their voices? You be the judge.
FOR K A R E N #01182 who died fighting 4/23/99.
Twilight Zone intro. youtube
Cassie just turned 18 yesterday and she just recently graduated from high school.
Cassie's dentist's appointment went great and now all she had to do was wait it out till next week and she could do her life's dream.
Cassie ran out to her new Prius and was all ready to go. She saw Amy's books in the back and thought she'd ask her little sister to ride along with her to Walgreens. She opened her door and honked her horn. Amy opened the door and shrugged as in 'What?' (aside in Cassie's brain; "Why is Amy's books still in my car?")
Cassie yelled at Amy to come over to the car. "Do you wanna ride along with me to the drugstore?"
Amy smiled, it wasn't often since her sister got her brand new Prius that she was asked to tag along and it delighted her to be asked.
Amy climbed in and away the two girls went to the store.
Cassie didn't take long making her purchases as she was anxious to get home to have a good look at the work the dentist had done today.
She paid the clerk and told Amy......."Let's go!"
The girls got in the car and headed to home.
About half-way to the house, Cassie noticed the lights behind her.
Cassie pulled over.
The police officer walked up to the car.
Cassie was surprised as she surely didn't know what she had done.
"Miss, may I see your license and registration please."
Cassie obliged and gave the paperwork to the officer.
"Miss, may I see that bag please?"
Cassie started to respond but decided it was best just to hand over her bag.
"Miss, I see on this receipt that there were 4 items purchased and there are only 3 here, where is the 4th item?"
Cassie looked at Amy and Amy handed over her Nestle's water bottle.
"Miss, I'm going to have to ask you to step out of the car."
Cassie opened the car door and stepped out.
The officer had called his partner out and handed over the items and the partner was bagging the four items.
"Miss Cassie Warden, you have the right to remain silent anything you say or do can and will be held against you, do you understand?"
Cassie was stunned and blinked back the tears and nodded yes.
The officer had handcuffed Cassie and was walking her back to the patrol car.
Amy was allowed to walk home.
"Now in looking at all of this, what do you think?"
Cassie had purchased Toothpaste, Mouthwash, dental floss and a bottle of Nestle's water.
The Flouride and Aluminium in each of these products is to be considered hazardous material.
California Hazardous Waste pdf
California Code of Regulations, Title 22, Section 66261.126 lists 791 chemicals as "Hazardous Waste" 39 of these are fluoride compounds.
Cassie would be charged with possession of a hazardous material, and contributing to the deliquency of a minor. (The water bottle would be used to test Amy's DNA and charted in the Department of Homeland Security's record books.)
Will Cassie's work record be impacted by these charges? Will her life be changed forever because of some law put in place before her birth? hmmmmmmmmmm Will Cassie be on 'the no fly lists at airports' and be considered a potential terrorist?
Do you think this can't happen, if the USA continues down the path it's going, I wouldn't be surprise.
Chemical company convicted of illegal dumping 1988
EXCERPT:
Chemical Company Convicted of Illegal Dumping
By ERIC SCHMITT, Special to the New York Times
Published: May 15, 1988
Recommend
Sign In to E-Mail
GLEN COVE, L.I.— A chemical distribution company with a long record of pollution violations has been convicted on criminal charges of illegally storing and dumping hazardous wastes at its plant here.
The verdict Wednesday by a jury in Nassau County Court, after a three-week trial, ended years of litigation by the state against the company, Mattiace Industries Inc., which Attorney General Robert Abrams called ''one of the most notorious environmental scofflaws in the state.''
'This sends a signal ...........OBVIOUSLY NOT AS IT IS NOW 2010 ..... DUH ...cal
Why our children might be a little confused in today's world?
"Mommie, Mommie, why do you make me sit in a carseat when the food you're giving me as a snack for my ride contains toxics?"
The Willowbrook Experiment
US Government Experiments
On Children During
The Cold War
From Carol Rutz
From raven1@bestnet.org - Organization CAHRA
3-14-00
Preface Of Upcoming Book
This is the story of someone you know-your neighbor, your classmate, your brother or sister, your mother or father. It is the secret they have been holding within their hearts because they were afraid the American public could not believe their government would carry out human experimentation on children, in direct defiance of the Nuremberg Code, which has been official United States policy since 1946.
Some of the very same Nazi doctors who worked in mental institutions before WWII, deciding whether mentally deficient children should be sterilized or killed because of their defective genes, also perfomed horrendous experiments in the death camps. Their medical expertise, along with hundreds of Nazi scientists was considered so vital to the "Cold War" effort that they would be brought into the United States and Canada to work side by side with some of the greatest, but most perverse minds the 20th century would ever see. It is a story interwoven with incest and government mind control. It involves the use of drugs, sensory deprivation, hypnosis, and electric shock to gain control of these children's minds.
Impossible, you say. I wish it were. We live in such a sheltered little world. It's much easier to believe that incest and violence and mind control belong to the few; but they belong to the many. One in three girls faces some type of sexual abuse before they are eighteen years old. The statistics on men is one in seven, but that is debatable since it is so much more difficult for them to come forward. Dr. Alan W. Scheflin, Professor of law at Santa Clara University Law School, and a judicially recognized expert in mind and behavior control states in a letter dated March 9, 1995 that secret government mind control experimentation is ongoing and vastly more expansive than the government authorities are willing to admit. He also is co-author of a nonfiction book entitled The Mind Manipulators which was published in a dozen countries. He says that he has been studying these secret programs since 1975 and it is his conclusion that there are at minimum hundreds, and most likely thousands of American citizens who were used as guinea pigs against their will in government research projects. What he does not say is that most of the children used in these experiments were sold by one of their caretakers in the name of "National Security" and subjected to untold horrors at the hands of their government.
In light of so many abuses of power coming before the public in recent years, many adult survivors of these childhood experiments are stepping forward to be heard. The government has admitted wrong doing in the Tuskegee Experiments, where poor black man were allowed to go untreated for their syphilis so the government could study the effects. Best remembered are the atomic tests on 2584 military personnel in the Nevada desert in 1953. Less known were such experiments as the feeding of radioactive cereal in the 1940s and 1950s to young male science club members who were institutionalized at the Fernald School in Massachusetts. The researchers had little experience with radionuclides in humans; consequently this approach to medical investigation gave them that opportunity. The parents, as well as the children, were simply told they were being fed a diet rich in iron.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Dr. Saul Krugman of New York University conducted studies of hepatitis at the Willowbrook State School, an institution for the severely mentally retarded. To study the natural history, effects, and progression of the disease, Krugman and his staff systematically infected newly arrived children with strains of the virus. In October 1995 the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments reported that secret radiation experiments on indigent patients and mentally retarded children were not only done, but that these people were deceived about the nature of their treatments. Dr. William Silverman asserted that performing nontherapeutic experiments on childrenn without authorization from parents was part of a broader "ethos of the time" in which "everyone was a draftee" in a national war on disease.
Then there is the case of the 12 human "guinea pigs" who were secretly injected with radioactive Plutonium 239 and uranium in government experiments in the 1940's. Energy Secretary Hazel Oleary in announcing the settlement of $4.8 million to be paid to their families said the government was "grateful" to the victims for "the tough lessons they have taught us about trust, responsibility, and accountability between the government and the people." In a Congressional subcommittee hearing in Washington, DC on September 28, 1994 it was revealed that up to 500,000 Americans were endangered by secret defense-related tests between 1940 and 1974 -- including covert experiments with radioactive materials, mustard gas, LSD, and biological agents. The General Accounting Office testified that between 1949 and 1969, the Army released radioactive compounds in 239 cities to study the effects.
In a decision dated April 16, 1985 Chief Justice Burger of the United States Court of Appeals delivered the opinion of the Court in the case of CIA v. SIMS, 471 U.S. 159. This case focused around the publics right under the Freedom of Information Act, to have declassified the grant proposals and contracts, and the names of the institutions and individuals who had performed research under the CIA financed research project, code-named MKULTRA. MKULTRA was established to counter soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques and consisted of 149 subprojects contracted out to at least 80 institutions.
In 1977, Director of Intelligence, Stansfield Turner described in an affidavit that the program was initiated because the Agency was confronted with "learning the state of the art of behavioral modification at a time when the U.S. Government was concerned about inexplicable behavior of persons behind the 'iron curtain' and American prisoners of war who had been subjected to so called 'brainwashing'". It began with a proposal from Richard Helms, then the Agency's assistant Deputy Director for Plans. Helms outlined a special funding mechanism for highly sensitive Agency research and development projects that would study the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior.
MKULTRA was approved by Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence on April 13, 1953. Twenty years after the conception of the MKULTRA project, all known files pertaining to it were ordered destroyed by Richard Helms before he retired. In 1977 through a Freedom of Information Act request by John Marks, 16,000 pages of documents were found; held as part of the Agency's financial history. Thank God, for the bean counters. Further attempts at declassification resulted in the decision rendered by Chief Justice Burger that the "intelligence sources" who were guaranteed confidentiality at the time of these CIA funded research projects would continue to remain protected and classified.
To those of us who have survived these experiments, this decision means that our stories will continue to lie in the government vaults of classified materials. Most of the important details were conveniently destroyed under orders of Richard Helms, probably not unlike what took place when the concentration camps were liberated. If not for the survivors, their stories would never have been told and the disappearance of 6 million people could have remained a question mark in history. I have no other choice than to tell this story myself. My goal in writing this book is to expose the misuse of power that took place in this country during the Cold War due to fear. Thousands of innocent children, who have now grown into adults are silently suffering from the effects of the experiments that were done to them by their own government. Many have been diagnosed incorrectly and institutionalized. Some died because they knew too much. Others, like myself, were able to obtain competent medical help, and are struggling to heal from the physical and mental ravages upon our beings.
Will we let this story lay in the shadows forever, or do we have the courage to address these wrongs and give survivors back their voices? You be the judge.
FOR K A R E N #01182 who died fighting 4/23/99.
Sunday, August 8, 2010
All righty then..... FYI if this seems a bit too far fetched, file 13 and realize I ain't et in several days, hee hee. There may be a few mistakes in this so please forgive me as I need a nap already.
This is my '8th' day of my hunger strike and first of all, I need to get this oughta the way............ on the 2nd day I fudged and ate french fries and a bite of a bacon cheese burger from Wendys... SO, I guess I'm not really into my 8th day. I'm in my 6th day. (I can't have any of this based on lies so that's why I'm clearing this up. The reason I ate the stuffs is my son-in-law is very fragile these days and I didn't wanna get him off track in his journey. He's doing real good; growing tomatoes and stuffs on the porch and trying to do all this within his own ways.)
I'm trying to hold down a couple of fronts here so wanted to keep straight, k? I still have anger management problems with my son-in-law and try to always simply be non judgemental. (It's asif I live in a parellel universe, eh?) He's a good loving man but this is the hardest thing I think I've ever gone thru as he never sees what his 'ways' does to the kids. (Did I see what I was doing to my own kids when I was a falling down drunk??? NO!) I know he would change in a heart beat if he could but it ain't that easy.) .........anyways past my transgressions and onto this blog.
God has informed me that he's 100% behind my hunger strike. Hey, you wanna know how I know he supports me? hmmmmmmmmm
Back in the day, I had a major drinking problem. I mean to tell you I thought I was a lifer and it scared the hell out of me but for the life of me, I couldn't stop. I'm a telling you I threw up, blacked out, shit myself and drove when I was blacked out................ anyways, it was not a pretty site and was the darkest period of my life............ worst of it all my kids saw me through all of this.
One day I woke up and said this is a done deal and I'm quitting. (Sounds pretty freakin brave, doesn't it?) I didn't know if I could do it or not but I did it. I said it out loud and it became a reality.
I guess I'm different from others that claim they can never drink again. I can on occasion have a drink or two and I'm NEVER tempted to continue until I'm falling down drunk in a pool of vomit.
I always feel it was a higher intervention and now with what I've experienced this last week realize I was right. God was behind it.
BTW, if God isn't from this earth, what does that make him? ALIEN, eh?
This week I haven't had an urge to eat after the little bacon, cheese, hamburger incident? (God or whoever did tell me that getting all that 'shit' stuffs completely out of my body was better than eating it.)
This morning I was wrestling with all the stuffs God has been trying to teach me the last few days and WOW, he came through again. I have had some wild and vivid dreams about space crafts and airplanes and it has simply been awesome.
While I lounged a bit in bed this morning it 'finally' dawned on me the next step in this journey....... studying and learning what the HELL the evils are doing in the 'spacewar' sector??? OMG!!!
If the bastards are doing what they are doing Right HERE on OUR world, what are they doing out in the universe in our names?
I wrestled a bit with it and then I fell off in a nap only to be in another dream. God, again??????????? YEP!!!! You Betcha!!! It's very funny cause I never know it's God as he simply talks to me and persuades me?????????? Go figure eh?
HeShe let me know that it's time to move onto the next part of this journey. It's time to put the 'EVILS' in holding cells and ship them off to the open universe on a vessel that will keep them in 'limbo' for the next hundred or so years.
It's time to get on!
I shared with him about my PR campaign I was working through with this hunger strike. He said that was all well and good but if others aren't paying attention, how did I expect that to work. (He knows of my fear of being in public.) hmmmmmmmmmmm I told Him/Her my own kids would simply say I was starving for attention and he gently let me know I had to let them travel on their journys at their own pace and I couldn't let what they thought of me stop or slow down my pace in mine.
I woke up. Of course HE/SHE was gone as HE/SHE only comes to me thata way. I hem hawed around for a while and came up with this to share with you guys.
Here's the deal............... we can schedule me on the Lopez Tonite Show and 'The View' and maybe even Steven Colbert.............. Here's the clencher........ I will be in hologram form????????? ...anyways, I'm still thinking on this as I don't even wanna be the person answering the questions, I want you guys to do this. (I'm gonna put 2 pictures of me on the this blog and you can use either one.) The curly one is me in the 70's and the other is me in the 90's.) your call.......... (Hey, you can even use me in cartoon form if you wanna........... I'll put my version of cal on the right as well.) maybe the cartoon version isn't such a good idea as that wouldn't really be a hologram, would it?
You are welcome to use my name as well. Dedra Lee Anderson Cipriani McCullough b/d 3/19/1848
Bill Gates holographic appearance
EXCERPT:
Bill Gates addressed a 400-person audience at the World Congress of Information 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, which is nothing unusual except for the way he did it: he appeared using a 15.1-foot holographic projection, probably starting his five-minute pre-recorded speech saying "I'M GOING TO EAT YOU ALL!!!" followed by a megalomaniacal laughter. Sadly, that didn't happen and he looked more like a giant-sized Yoda than an Oz-bound Palpatine.
The 15.1-foot projection is a lot bigger than the first holographic appearance by a public personality, a life-sized Prince Charles at Abu Dhabi's World Future Energy Summit
Should the United States
“Weaponize” Space?
Military and Commercial Implications
EXCERPT:
Control of space is at the crux of the debate
about the future of U.S. military space policy.
The question is not about militarizing space.
Clearly, we have been using and will continue to
use space for military purposes. But, whereas we
are currently using space assets to support terrestrial
(ground, sea, and air) military operations,
what Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.), the Space
Commission (which was chaired by current
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), and
others have proposed is that the United States
move toward “weaponizing” space for space control.
Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. military
policy for space argue that the United States is
more reliant on the use of space than is any other
nation, that space systems are vulnerable to
attack, and that U.S. space systems are thus an
attractive candidate for a “space Pearl Harbor.”
But as important and potentially vulnerable as
current U.S. space-based assets may be, deploying
actual weapons (whether defensive or offensive)
will likely be perceived by the rest of the
world as more threatening than the status quo.
Any move by the United States to introduce
weapons into space will surely lead to the development
and deployment of anti-satellite
weapons by potentially hostile nations. As the
dominant user of space for military and civilian
functions, the United States would have the
most to lose from such an arms race.
Although there are legitimate (and unique)
military requirements for space assets, virtually
all are “dual use.” Military requirements should
not necessarily dictate those other uses. In fact,
commercial efforts in space often lead those of
the government and the Department of Defense
and usually have lower costs, due to market
influences and competition.
National security must be one component of
total U.S. space policy, but it must certainly not
be the primary component. In the post–Cold
War environment—with no immediate threat
from a rival great power and none on the horizon—
the United States must not establish overstated
and costly military requirements for
space-based resources. The military must make
greater use of commercial space assets. Also, the
United States should strive to foster an environment
that allows commercial space activity to
grow and flourish rather than use it to create a
new area for costly military competition.
Should the United States
“Weaponize” Space?
Military and Commercial Implications
by Charles V. Peña and Edward L. Hudgins
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Charles V. Peña is senior defense policy analyst and Edward L. Hudgins is former director of regulatory studies at
the Cato Institute.
Executive Summary
No. 427 March 18, 2002
Introduction
Before becoming secretary of defense,
Donald Rumsfeld chaired two blue ribbon
commissions at the request of Congress. The
first—called the Rumsfeld Commission—
issued the “Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States.” The report received much
attention because it raised the specter of a
ballistic missile threat to the United States by
so-called “rogue states” and concluded that
the threat was more imminent than had been
predicted by an earlier National Intelligence
Estimate. The second—but probably lesser
known—commission chaired by Rumsfeld
was the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and
Organization, more commonly referred to as
the Space Commission. The report of this
second Rumsfeld commission (released in
January 2001) has received less attention, but
its conclusions are similarly foreboding:
• The United States is more dependent
than any other nation on the use of
space.1
• Space systems can be vulnerable to a
range of attacks.2
• Nations hostile to the United States
possess or can acquire the means to disrupt
or destroy U.S. space systems.3
• The United States is an attractive candidate
for a “space Pearl Harbor”4
As a result, the Space Commission recommended
“that U.S. national security space
interests be recognized as a top national security
priority”5 and that “the U.S. must develop
the means both to deter and to defend against
hostile acts in and from space.”6 Even though
the Space Commission report has received less
media attention than the first Rumsfeld
Commission report, its conclusions and recommendations
could have a greater and
broader impact now that Rumsfeld is secretary
of defense.7
Space is the new military “high ground,” as
highlighted in a January 2001 war game—the
first one that focused on space as the primary
theater of operations. That war game, conducted
at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, postulated
a conflict taking place in 2017 between
“Blue” and “Red” forces (resembling the United
States and China, respectively). Both sides possessed
space weapons as well as ground-based
lasers. The Blue side had a national missile
defense and the Red side had anti-satellite
weapons.8 For the first time, a war game actually
fought a war with weapons in space rather
than just using space systems to support
ground, sea, and air operations—seemingly taking
its cues from the Space Commission report
and the incoming Bush administration’s interest
in the military uses of space.
Given that space is likely to be a new
national security priority during the Bush
administration, it is worth examining
defense space policy in both its military and
its commercial implications. This study will
address the following issues:
• What are the military and civilian/
commercial uses of space?
• What are the threats (both near- and
long-term) to space assets?
• How can the United States best
respond to those threats?
• How do the military uses of space
affect (either adversely or positively)
civilian/commercial uses?
It is important to point out that the issue is
not whether the United States should militarize
space. The militarization of space has already
occurred and will continue. The more immediate
issue is whether we should weaponize space,
at least in the near- or mid-term, and more
important, whether military uses and requirements
in space should be the driving force
behind our national space policy.
Military Uses of Space
More than a decade ago, John M. Collins
at the Congressional Research Service wrote:
2
The militarization
of space has
already occurred.
The more immediate
issue is
whether we
should weaponize
space.
Space, the ultimate “high ground,”
overarches planet Earth, its occupants,
and all activities thereon.
Effective use of that medium for military
purposes therefore may be
needed to safeguard national interests
in survival, security, peace,
power, stability, and freedom of
action.
Every technologically advanced
land, sea, and air service already
depends on space satellites. . . .
Reliance continues to increase,
because systems in space offer strategic
and tactical advantages that are
otherwise unavailable. . . .
Military interests in space almost
surely will intensify and spread during
the next decade.9
In order to understand the debate over
weaponization of space, one must know the
military uses of space, which include integrated
tactical warning and attack assessment
(ITW&AA), weather and environmental monitoring,
satellite communications (satcom), surveillance
and reconnaissance, navigation and
positioning, space control, ballistic missile
defense (BMD), and force application (i.e.,
using weapons that travel through or are based
in space). For more detail, see the Appendix.
ITW&AA
ITW&AA is a unique military requirement
that cannot be met using nonmilitary
resources. It is essentially monitoring the signs
of attacking long-range aircraft and missiles,
either toward the United States or within a theater/
region of operations. The Defense Support
Program satellites, using infrared sensors, currently
provide early warning and assessment
capability for attacks by long-range intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Space
Based Infrared System (SBIR) high program is
the planned follow-on to DSP.
Weather and Environmental Monitoring
Weather and environmental satellites are
an example of dual-use space satellites.
According to the RAND report: “Weather
satellite information is crucial to mission
planning for all the armed services, as well as
vital to civilian public safety and scientific
research around the world.”10 Currently,
both the Department of Defense (DoD) and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration have separate weather satellite
programs, which use different orbital
paths and instruments but use the same
orbital vehicle or bus.
Satcom
Communications probably represents the
single biggest use of space for both the military
and civilian/commercial sectors.
According to former U.S. Air Force vice chief
of staff Gen. Thomas S. Moorman Jr. (ret.):
“Space-based communications is the giant in
space commerce. The giant clearly will be
even more dominant in the future, and the
information revolution will be the driver.”11
Although the DoD operates several communications
satellites (or payloads on other
military satellites to provide communications
services)—for example, the Defense Satellite
Communications System, Air Force Satellite
Communications System (AFSATCOM),
Leasat, UHF Follow-On (UFO), and Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR)—this
segment is largely commercially driven.
Indeed, according to the RAND report: “The
technology for new satellite communications,
especially high-speed mobile services, is evolving
so rapidly that the DoD is planning to
make greater use of commercial systems
rather than fielding its own systems.”12
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Space-based remote sensing for surveillance
and reconnaissance is essentially an
extension of aerial observation done previously
by balloons and aircraft. Clearly, this is an
area where the military might have some
unique requirements—for example, a legitimate
concern that remote-sensing data cannot
be accessed by other (potentially hostile)
users to reveal the disposition and movement
of U.S. forces in times of crisis and war. This is
3
less of a concern if the military uses dedicated
satellites, but more of a concern if the military
is relying on shared satellites. Despite this
legitimate concern, “commercial remote sensing
offers the U.S. military potential new
sources of remote-sensing data without
requiring it to pay for the development of the
space system.”13 General Moorman believes
“that these new commercial capabilities will
both complement and reduce the numbers of
military and intelligence systems required.
The resulting savings could be substantial.”14
Navigation and Positioning
The Department of Defense operates a
constellation of 24 satellites that make up
the space segment of the Global Positioning
System. These satellites transmit precise time
signals; and receivers in view of the satellites
can calculate their positions and velocities
anywhere in the world.15
Although GPS was originally developed
for the military, the commercial GPS equipment
industry (i.e., receiver sales) is growing
rapidly. According to RAND, “Civilian and
commercial sales are outstripping defense
procurement of ground equipment, and the
user equipment industry is being commercially
driven by fierce competition in electronics
packaging, manufacturing, and software
technology.”16 A background paper prepared
for the Space Commission by Linda J.
Haller and Melvin S. Sakazaki claims that the
location/navigation sector has been growing
at a yearly rate of about 20–25 percent and is
expected to continue that growth to become
a major revenue-producing part of the worldwide
commercial space industry within the
next five years.17
Space Control
The term “space control” is often used in
the context of ensuring free passage in and
through space. The most common analogy is
to guaranteeing maritime commerce on the
high seas. However, Hays and Mueller, on the
faculty at the School of Advanced Airpower
Studies, reject this analogy. They contend
that commercial space activities are fundamentally
different from maritime merchant
shipping and air transport. Whereas merchant
shipping and air transport involve the
movement of goods and passengers, space
commerce involves either the collection or
transmission of information. Therefore, they
contend, commercial space activities have
more in common with the telegraph and
radio than with steamships and airliners. 18
The real essence of space control is the
ability to deny the use of space to an enemy.
Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) has stated:
(1) America’s future security and
prosperity depend on our constant
supremacy in space; (2) although we
are ahead of any potential rival in
exploiting space, we are not unchallenged,
and our future dominance is
by no means assured; and (3) to
achieve true dominance, we must
combine expansive thinking with a
sustained and substantial commitment
of resources and vest them in a
dedicated, politically powerful, independent
advocate for space power.19
Furthermore, according to Senator Smith:
“With credible offensive and defensive space
control, we will deter and dissuade our adversaries,
reassure our allies, and guard our
nation’s growing reliance on global commerce.
Without it, we will become vulnerable
beyond our worst fears.”20
Space control is at the crux of the current
debate about the future of U.S. military space
policy. Currently, space is used by the military
to support ground, sea, and air operations.
The Space Commission argues:
Space is not simply a place from
which information is acquired and
transmitted or through which
objects pass. It is a medium much
the same as air, land, or sea. In the
coming period, the U.S. will conduct
operations to, from, in, and through
space in support of its national interests
both on earth and in space. As
4
Space-based
assets themselves
are not the most
likely or easiest
targets of attack.
with national capabilities in the air,
on land, and at sea, the U.S. must
have the capabilities to defend its
space assets against hostile acts and
to negate the hostile use of space
against U.S. interests.21
Instead of merely using space assets to support
terrestrial (ground, sea, and air) military
operations as is done now, the Space
Commission and others have proposed that
the United States move toward weaponizing
space for the purposes of controlling it—in
other words, establishing space control by
exerting force application in space.
The Costs of Weaponizing
Space Outweigh
the Benefits
There are those who feel the United States
is currently at risk and should act now to
seize the military high ground in space.
Senator Smith has stated:
I do see an opportunity for us to exploit
this period of unchallenged conventional
superiority on Earth to shift substantial
resources to space. I believe we
can and must do this, and, if we do, we
will buy generations of security that all
the ships, tanks and airplanes in the
world will not provide. . . .
Control of space is more than a
new mission area—it is our moral
legacy, our next Manifest Destiny,
our chance to create security for centuries
to come.22
Not surprisingly, Senator Smith was instrumental
in getting the Congress to charter the
Space Commission.
The chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force,
Gen. Michael E. Ryan, has endorsed the
deployment of space-based weapons to protect
the nation’s satellites and predicted that
the United States would develop the capacity
to shoot down other countries’ satellites and
spacecraft.23 According to General Ryan: “We
have to in some way be able to protect those
assets, at least defensively. . . . I would suggest
that sometime in the future here, we’re going
to have to come to a policy decision on
whether we’re going to use space for defensive
and offensive capabilities.”24
Critics of such a policy shift are concerned
that weaponizing space could trigger a dangerous
arms race. They are quick to point out that
no country currently has weapons in space and
that a U.S. move to deploy weapons (either
offensive or defensive) would only provide
unneeded impetus for other countries to follow
suit. Jonathan Pike of Globalsecurity.org states,
“It [weaponizing space] runs fundamentally
against the main theme of our space policy for
the last half century—to demonstrate America’s
power in space in a nonthreatening way.”25 And
U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Hays and Karl
Mueller (both faculty at the School of Advanced
Airpower Studies) argue that “it is no longer
clear that the relationship between space and
national security is, or should be, shaped primarily
by international military competition.”26
Is there a clear and present danger in
space? And is becoming more militarily
active (including deploying weapons, either
defensive or offensive) in space the next logical
step?
Does the United States Risk a Space Pearl
Harbor?
As noted above, the argument the Space
Commission makes about the vulnerability
of space and the need to “develop and deploy
the means to deter and defend against hostile
acts directed at U.S. space assets and against
the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests”27 is
relatively straightforward:
• The United States is more dependent
on space than any other nation.
• The U.S. military is increasingly dependent
on space systems.
• U.S. security and economic well-being
depend on the ability of the United
States to operate successfully in space.
• Nations hostile to the United States
5
Although U.S.
satellites might
be vulnerable to
ASATs, the threat
is more hypothetical
than real.
either possess or can acquire the means
to destroy U.S. space systems.
• U.S. space systems are vulnerable to a
range of attacks.
Thus, the Space Commission warns that the
United States has not paid sufficient attention to
the threat and, as a result, “the U.S. is an attractive
candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor.’”28
It is indeed true that the United States is
more dependent on space than are other
countries and that the U.S. military in particular
is becoming increasingly dependent on
space systems. Furthermore, space systems
are currently undefended and, therefore,
potentially vulnerable to attack. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the United
States will suffer a “Space Pearl Harbor.”
Ground Stations More Vulnerable
According to the Space Commission,
“Nations hostile to the U.S. possess or can
acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S.
space systems by attacking the satellites in
space, their communications nodes on the
ground and in space, or ground nodes that
command the satellites.”29 Much of the
Space Commission’s focus has been on the
vulnerability of and threat posed to satellites
in space. However, Hays and Mueller point
out, “Satellites . . . are likely to be a more difficult
and thus less attractive target set for
direct attack under most circumstances than
are other components of space systems, such
as launch facilities or ground-control stations,
and if they are attacked, it will most
likely be through indirect means such as
communications jamming.”30 A background
paper prepared for the Rumsfeld Commission
also states that “one of the easiest ways
to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy the utility
of space systems is to attack or sabotage
the associated ground segments.”31
Thus, the more immediate concern
should be the vulnerability of ground-based
components. Those elements could be susceptible
to a variety of threats, including
direct military attack (e.g., with aircraft or
missiles), terrorist attack, sabotage, and jamming.
Space-based assets themselves are not
the most likely or easiest targets of attack,
particularly for so-called poor rogue states.
Thus, there is a less pressing need to focus on
space itself and the potential threats to spacebased
assets.
Theater missile defense systems and air
defense systems could be used to protect
ground stations from short-range ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft.
Commando attacks are another potential
threat, which requires appropriate responses
and safeguards. Thus, perimeter security
around satellite ground stations should be
increased.
Jamming
Electronic jamming is already within the
technical competence of many countries,
including Russia, China, Iraq, North Korea,
Iran, and Cuba.32 Most commercial and civilian
satellites do not have anti-jamming capability
and are, therefore, susceptible to such attacks.
Electronic jamming is a legitimate concern
because it can be done relatively easily
and cheaply. For example, two rookie engineers
from the U.S. Air Force Research
Laboratory were able to build a homemade
jammer using a petrol-driven electricity generator,
wood, plastic piping, and copper tubing.
The total cost was only $7,500, and all of
the required parts were obtained at an electronics
enthusiasts’ swap meet.33 According
to Steve Blum, president of Tellus Venture
Associates, a satellite consulting firm, sending
a signal up to a given satellite and jamming
it is nothing new.34 Also, satellite jamming
is relatively easy to trace.35
But jamming can be greatly mitigated by the
use of encryption or the use of anti-jamming
equipment. For example, Raytheon in the
United Kingdom has developed an antijamming
antenna for GPS that recognizes
sources of interference and, by adjusting the
way in which it receives the satellite signals,
rejects the interference, thus allowing the navigation
equipment to function accurately.36
Another effective way to defeat jamming
is through “frequency hopping,” which
6
A less interventionist
U.S. foreign
policy vis-Ã vis
China could
ultimately be
more conducive
to reducing any
potential ASAT
threat.
avoids interference from jamming on a particular
frequency by switching to a new frequency
after transmitting or receiving a
packet of data.37 When this method is used,
the signal can be effectively jammed only if
the jammer knows the frequencies being
used, the time during which they are being
used, and the sequence of use38—not easy
information to come by. The signal is more
resistant to jamming the faster the hops
between frequencies and the shorter the
information packets.
Since electronic jamming is an easier and
less expensive alternative to direct attack,
efforts should be made to employ as many
anti-jamming techniques and technologies
as possible, such as encryption, anti-jamming
equipment, and frequency hopping.
No Anti-Satellite Threat
Although the Space Commission report
and more ardent “space hawks” might lead
one to believe otherwise, there is no current
anti-satellite (ASAT) threat. In fact, operational
ASATs are vestiges of the Cold War era.
Richard L. Garwin, a physicist and senior fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations,
writes, “In the Cold War era, it was perfectly
clear that deployment of space weapons by
the Soviet Union would have led to an effective
ASAT deployed by the United States;
conversely, the Soviet Union was fully capable
of providing the necessary ASAT to
counter U.S. space weapons.”39 But in the
post-Soviet era, neither the United States nor
Russia has dedicated space ASAT weapons
deployed.40 According to RAND, no other
“nation possesses an operational ASAT capability
that poses a significant threat to U.S.
national security space systems.”41
Thus, although U.S. satellites—both military
and commercial—might be vulnerable to
ASATs, the threat posed by ASATs is more
hypothetical than real. Space Commission
staff member Tom Wilson states:
The proliferation of ballistic missile
and space technology has made it
easier to develop direct ascent antisatellite
weapons and to obtain the
capability to deliver nuclear warheads
into space. Studies have shown
that the detonation of a low-yield
nuclear weapon in LEO [low earth
orbit] will not only fatally damage
nearby satellites but will also increase
the naturally occurring radiation
around the earth, reducing most
LEO satellites’ lifetimes from years
to months. Many countries such as
China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and
Russia have this capability.42
It is important to point out that “this capability”
to which Wilson refers does not mean
that those countries have operational ASATs.
It means, rather, that those countries have a
nuclear weapons capability or they have a
capability to launch a payload into a low
earth orbit. It does not mean that they have
mated those two capabilities to develop and
deploy an ASAT weapon.
Moreover, the ASAT threat that is postulated
is a nuclear threat. According to noted
defense analyst James Kitfield, “The U.S. military
has long worried that an adversary might
detonate a crude nuclear weapon in space, frying
the delicate electronics of all satellites, and disproportionately
hamstringing U.S. troops
who rely on satellites for missile and bomb
guidance and for communications.”43 If such
a detonation were to occur, even though not
directed at a terrestrial target, the nuclear
threshold would have been crossed. Even a socalled
“irrational” adversary would have to
think twice before using a nuclear weapon.
And, certainly, the United States would view
such an attack differently than if a conventional
weapon had been used and would
respond accordingly. During the Cold War, a
distinct demarcation between conventional
and nuclear weapons existed. Even if lower
yield battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons
had been used (e.g., in a scenario involving a
Warsaw Pact invasion of a NATO country),
escalation to a larger-scale retaliation using
the United States’ strategic nuclear arsenal
was a very real possibility. Although a “doc-
7
The best and least
expensive way to
increase survivability
against a
potential
microsatellite
ASAT threat is to
use decoys.
trine” may not be in place to respond to a lowyield
nuclear ASAT scenario, the United States
would probably go beyond the use of conventional
weapons to retaliate. Potential adversaries
know this. For example, the United
States made clear to Iraq that use of chemical
or biological weapons would trigger an appropriate
U.S. response, including the possibility
of nuclear weapons.44
Microsatellite ASATs
One nonnuclear ASAT threat comes in
the form of microsatellites, also known as
parasitic satellites. These are small, lightweight,
inexpensive, and highly capable systems
that could perform a variety of missions
(many of them legitimate peacetime operations).
According to Wilson, microsatellites
could be used for counterspace operations by
being flown alongside a target until commanded
to disrupt, and then disable or
destroy the target. Detecting and defending
against such an attack would be difficult.45
Stephen Cambone, former special assistant
to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and
current principal deputy under secretary of
defense for policy, notes, “There are any
number of companies, both in the United
States and abroad, that are preparing to
deploy micro-satellites.”46 And Wilson cites
Chinese plans to develop and deploy a
microsatellite ASAT:
The Sing Tao newspaper recently
quoted Chinese sources as indicating
that China is secretly developing a
nanosatellite ASAT weapon called
“parasitic satellite.” The sources
claim this ASAT recently completed
ground testing and that planning
was underway to conduct testing in
space. The Chinese ASAT system is
covertly deployed and attached to
the enemy’s satellite. During a conflict,
commands are sent to the
ASAT that will interfere with or
destroy the host satellite in less than
one minute.47
But historically, Chinese plans for high-technology
weapon systems have vastly exceeded
China’s ability to successfully develop and
field them. For example, China has not been
able to develop and deploy a modern fighter
aircraft that is even remotely on par with former
Soviet or current U.S. planes.
Michael Krepon, founding president of
the Henry L. Stimson Center, points out:
Even if Washington decides not
to put weapons in space, Moscow
and Beijing might still pursue antisatellite
technologies. Although neither
Russia nor China can compete
effectively with the United States in
conventional or nuclear weapons or
in missile defenses, either country
could respond “asymmetrically” to
American superiority by damaging
U.S. satellites. The Pentagon defines
asymmetrical warfare as “countering
an adversary’s strengths by focusing
on its weaknesses.” Asymmetrical
warfare allows a weaker opponent to
level the playing field by unorthodox
means. Antisatellite programs are a
good example of asymmetrical warfare:
they are less expensive and technically
challenging than engaging in
conventional or missile-defense arms
races but allow a weaker opponent to
gain an edge (at least temporarily)
over a stronger one.
Given U.S. military predominance,
it will be difficult to dissuade
Russia and China from developing
ASATs. But it will be well worth the effort
to try, and it can be accomplished only if
the United States does not take the lead in
pursuing ASATs.48
In fact, a less interventionist U.S. foreign
policy vis-Ã -vis China could ultimately be
more conducive to reducing any potential
ASAT threat than deploying weapons (either
defensive or offensive) in space would be. A
good example is current U.S. policy toward
Taiwan and how it affects America’s relations
8
Possession of a
technology by a
potentially hostile
power does not
mean that the
country will be
able to translate
the technology
into an effective
military system.
with China. The Cato Institute’s vice president
for defense and foreign policy studies,
Ted Galen Carpenter, has stated:
In addition to the balance of military
forces, three factors are especially
important in determining whether
deterrence is likely to succeed or fail:
the importance of the interests at
stake to the guarantor power, the
importance of those interests to the
challenging power, and the inclination
of the challenging power to
gamble. All three factors work
against the United States in the case
of Taiwan.49
Recognizing that Taiwan is not a vital
American national security interest,
Carpenter recommends that the United
States issue a firm statement that it will not
become involved in any armed struggle
between Taiwan and mainland China.50 By
reducing the likelihood of such armed conflict,
this would reduce the incentive for
China to directly challenge the United States
by developing and deploying ASATs.
Even if the United States adopted a more
restrained foreign policy toward China, however,
it would be imprudent to dismiss the
potential Chinese ASAT threat completely,
especially given the reported ground testing
by China of a microsatellite ASAT. But in the
two years since that news was initially reported,
there have been no apparent follow-on
events to indicate that the Chinese are indeed
moving forward with space testing and eventual
deployment of the microsatellite ASAT.
Even if such a threat were to evolve, the
question is: What is the appropriate response?
If the supposed microsatellite ASAT were nonnuclear,
then “hardening” satellites against
nuclear explosions or electromagnetic pulse
would not increase their survivability.
According to Tom Wilson, maneuverability
would allow a satellite to evade or dodge a
directed ASAT attack, but adding maneuverability
to a satellite system would increase the
total cost by between 10 and 20 percent,
depending on the satellite altitude (warning
time), nature of the threat, and threat detection
efficiency.51 Also, self-defense would be
problematic because a microsatellite ASAT
would be difficult to detect and would probably
reside in an otherwise nonthreatening
satellite. And, of course, the United States
should not adopt a policy of shooting down
every Chinese satellite launched on the presumption
that it might contain a microsatellite
ASAT. Perhaps the best and least expensive
way to increase survivability against a potential
microsatellite ASAT threat is to use decoys
that simulate the radar and optical signatures
of the target satellite. Jamming systems could
also be employed to confuse an ASAT’s homing
system. Analysts estimate that satellite
decoys would increase the total system cost by
between 1 and 10 percent.52
Other Potential ASAT Threats
Other potential ASAT weapons include
laser, radio frequency (RF), and particle beam
weapons.53 Laser weapons would generate
intense beams of light to inflict thermal
damage on the target satellite. RF weapons
would emit an intense burst of radio energy—
usually either high power microwave (HPM)
or ultrawideband (UWB)—to disable the
satellite’s electronic components. Particle
beam weapons use accelerated atomic particles
(such as negative hydrogen or deuterium
ions) to generate an intense beam that disables
electronic components. Again, it is
important to emphasize that these are postulated—
not operational—ASAT weapons.
Further, they are all very technologically
advanced, extremely expensive, and therefore
outside the capabilities of most—if not all—
potential adversaries, especially rogue states.
The Quality and Costs of Space Systems
When evaluating a threat to U.S. spacebased
military and commercial assets, it is
important to note that possession of a technology
by a potentially hostile power does
not mean that the country will be able to
translate the technology into an effective military
system. During the Cold War, the Soviet
9
A military
requirement to
protect satellites
may be a way to
pursue development
and deployment
of a global
NMD.
Union had scientists and engineers doing
cutting-edge work, but it often found it
extremely costly and difficult to produce in
quantity—or sometimes prototype—the most
cutting-edge systems, equipment, or devices.
The race to the moon was a case in point. The
Soviet Union produced many space firsts but
ultimately could not produce refined, quality
systems that could be launched successfully,
time after time. America had its major mistakes
as well, such as the fire on the launch
pad of Apollo 1 in 1967. But America learned
from its mistakes and constantly improved
its systems, even ones run by the American
government.
In the late-1960s, the Soviet Union built
what for some years was the world’s largest
telescope, the Bolschoi Teleskop Azimultalnyi.
The problem was that it rarely worked properly.
At a more basic and humble level, the Soviet
Union was not able to produce quality consumer
products in quantity.
China, the country often feared as threatening
U.S. space-based assets, has quality
problems similar to those of the old Soviet
Union. For example, it has never been able to
produce in quantity a quality fighter plane,
which would be far more important to its
military needs than exotic space weapons.
Thus, the fact that a country possesses a technology
that could be developed to threaten
U.S. space assets is a reason for attention and
concern, but it is not a reason for new, costly
programs to counter phantom threats.
More to Lose Than to Gain
As important and potentially vulnerable as
current U.S. space-based assets might be,
deploying actual weapons (whether defensive
or offensive) would likely be perceived as very
threatening to the status quo. Because of this,
any move to weaponize space would likely precipitate
a response to counter such capability.
And weapons in space would indeed be tempting
targets for a preemptive attack by an adversary.
To be sure, not deploying weapons in
space is no guarantee that potentially hostile
nations (such as China) will not develop and
deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain
that deploying U.S. weapons in space will lead
to the development and deployment of ASATs
to counter such weapons. The United States
should therefore not be the first to weaponize
space—either with defensive weapons or with
offensive ASATs. But deploying defensive
decoys—rather than weapons—would not
inevitably lead to such an arms race.
In the final analysis, any near-term moves
toward weaponizing space are premature. If
the U.S. government is concerned that some
nations may find its military and commercial
satellites tempting targets, then the United
States ought to look first to its foreign policy
and military posture as a factor in motivating
those nations to take hostile actions toward
the United States. According to Richard Betts
at the Council on Foreign Relations,
“American activism to guarantee international
stability is, paradoxically, the prime
source of American vulnerability.”54
To the extent that the U.S. government is
concerned that a potential enemy might try
to knock out satellite-provided military capability,
such as GPS, it needs to also understand
the consequences of such action to the
attacker. If an adversary were to jam or
destroy GPS satellites, it would deny such
capability not only to the United States but
also to itself (unless, of course, it was using
the Russian Global Navigation Satellite
System, or GLONASS). Furthermore, the
United States can switch the encrypted military
P-code back on if deemed necessary for
national security reasons; it is presumably
more jam resistant than the commercial C/Acode.
Even in a worst-case scenario where
U.S. forces might be denied GPS signals, our
military personnel are sufficiently trained to
be able to use a map and compass to navigate
and determine their location.
Space and National
Missile Defense
Although it can be considered part of the
space control mission, ballistic missile
defense (BMD) is usually treated separately.
10
U.S. security
could ultimately
be reduced if
hostile nations
are spurred to
develop and
deploy ASATs in
response to U.S.
deployment of
space-based
missile defense.
And distinctions are usually made between
theater missile defense (TMD) and national
missile defense (NMD). The whole subject of
NMD and the debate surrounding it is
beyond the scope and purpose of this
paper.55 However, in the Bush administration,
it is important to understand that there
is a relationship between NMD and space
defense policy.
The Bush administration has made clear
its intentions to build and deploy an NMD
system. Despite opposition and concerns
from many different sources—domestic,
allied, and foreign (notably Russia and
China)56—the administration intends to
build a missile defense test site in Alaska (presumably
as a precursor to a land-based
deployment) and begin development within
four years of a multilayered shield that will
include ship-launched missiles and lasers
mounted on airplanes.57
Although the Bush administration has yet
to lay out in detail an exact plan or architecture
for a national missile defense system,
during the presidential campaign Bush
argued forcefully that a U.S. missile defense
system must protect not only the United
States but also friends, allies, and forces
deployed overseas.58 Bush also repeatedly
made clear that to move forward on NMD,
he intended to abandon the ABM Treaty.59
He recently carried out this pledge by giving
Russia the requisite six months’ notice of
U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.60
Certainly, any NMD system will need to
rely on space systems—at a minimum for
launch detection and early warning (currently
provided by the DSP satellites, which are
supposed to be replaced by the SBIRS high
satellites).61 Even a ground-based system (i.e.,
interceptors and radars) might be supported
by space-based sensors for midcourse tracking
and discrimination (such as the proposed
SBIRS low satellites).62
The question the president has left open,
at least for now, is whether NMD will include
space-based weapons. Bush has not specifically
excluded space-based weapons as part
of NMD and has abandoned the ABM
Treaty—hints that space-based weapons
could eventually become a reality.
Perhaps more important, however, is the
fact the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is
viewed by many as the architect and moving
force behind both missile defense63 and space
policy in the Bush administration. If
Rumsfeld is indeed the architect, then it is
reasonable to conclude that the prescription
for space policy outlined in the Space
Commission report might represent a blueprint
for action.
Specifically, the report argues that the
United States needs space-based weapons (to
defend satellites) and implies that we should
employ them as part of national missile
defense.64 United States space policy and capabilities—
as they have been described in the
Space Commission report and discussed by
some in the military—are, by their very nature,
global. As such, they only serve to foster a global,
space-based NMD system. In other words,
the only way to defend the panoply of satellites
orbiting the earth is to have a constellation
of space-based weapons to provide “space
superiority.” And those space-based weapons
will have an inherent capability to shoot at ballistic
missiles (whether they threaten the satellites
or not). Thus, a military requirement to
protect satellites (even in the absence of a true
anti-satellite or ASAT threat) may be a way to
pursue development and deployment of a
global NMD in a potentially less visible and
publicly debated way.
Previous Cato Institute reports have
argued that a national missile defense system
should be a truly national defense to protect
the United States homeland and not a global
defense to provide worldwide protection.65
The reasons that NMD should be limited to
protecting the United States include the following:
• The technology for a limited landbased
system is the most mature and is
currently in its early stages of operational
testing.
• U.S. allies are wealthy enough to build
their own missile defenses.
11
A vibrant commercial
space
industry will support
and enhance
U.S. military
capabilities far
better than letting
military
requirements
dominate space
policy.
• Any defense expenditure must be commensurate
with the threat, and the limited
ballistic missile threat does not justify
the large expenditures required for
a global, layered defense system.
• If thicker and wider missile defenses
cause U.S. policymakers to feel more
secure against missile attacks, they may
be more tempted to engage in reckless
overseas military adventures, which
would actually reduce U.S. security.
The concern here is that—much as missile
defense advocates have used sea-based missile
defense as an attempt to open the door to
a larger, more expensive global missile
defense66—space defense policy will be used
as a way justify and achieve a global—as
opposed to national—missile defense.
Indeed, if space policy is implemented as outlined
in the Space Commission report, a
global missile defense may be inevitable.
And if there are any doubts about the
inextricable relationship between space policy
and NMD under Rumsfeld, consider the
following statement by Senator Smith:
With the completion of the Rumsfeld
national missile defense and space
commissions, followed by the choice
of Rumsfeld to serve as the first
Secretary of Defense for the 21st century,
we were already batting threefor-
three. . . . Now, if Rumsfeld is able
to weave space and missile defense
into our national defense posture in a
way that makes them absolutely
essential, which I’m convinced he is
determined to do, then the potential
is there for a historic grand slam.67
Yet building a global NMD system may
actually be counterproductive. Such a system
would be able to shoot down not only ballistic
missiles but also ASATs as well as orbiting
satellites and spacecraft. Nations that feel that
the United States is trying to hold their satellites
at risk or prevent them from launching
satellites will have incentives (that would be
nonexistant in the absence of such a threat) to
develop ASATs, regardless of the technological
hurdles, and will be more likely to expend the
necessary resources to acquire such a capability.
Those ASATs could put the whole constellation
of U.S. military and civilian satellites at
risk. With the greatest dependence of any
nation on space assets (both civilian and military),
U.S. security could ultimately be reduced
if hostile nations are spurred to develop and
deploy ASATs (which they currently do not
have) in response to U.S. deployment of spacebased
NMD.
Weaponizing Space Could
Harm the Civilian Space
Industry
It is also important to consider the chain
of events that is likely to occur if the United
States tries to dominate space militarily and
the effects that weaponizing space could
have on the commercial space sector. John
Newhouse, senior fellow at the Center for
Defense Information, states:
The [Space Commission] report does
not call for but implies a U.S. need to
accelerate development of antisatellite
weapons, some of them space-based.
But deploying such weapons will press
other countries to develop and deploy
countermeasures. And in any such tit
for tat, the United States has the most
to lose, since it is far more dependent
on satellites for commercial communications
and data-gathering operations
than any other country. Among the
effects could be a sharp rise in the cost
of insuring commercial satellites and
an outcry from industry.68
In other words, weaponizing space could be
costly to an American industry that has great
promise to grow and increase its contribution
to the U.S. (and world) economy.
Ultimately, a vibrant commercial space
industry will support and enhance U.S. mili-
12
Lower costs for
space activities—
produced by private-
sector
efforts—would
mean a greater
capacity for
defense.
tary capabilities far better than letting military
requirements dominate space policy.
Therefore, the government should avoid
overregulating commercial space activities
and imposing costly military requirements.
For example, the Heritage Foundation has
recommended designating the Global
Positioning System as critical national infrastructure,
making the Department of
Defense the lead agency responsible for GPS,
and deploying a more secure GPS satellite
network.69 Although GPS was originally
designed for and is operated by the U.S. military,
70 it is now interconnected with commercial
satellites, and civilian and commercial
use now dwarfs military use. More stringent
military requirements imposed on the GPS
system could have adverse effects on the
commercial sector, such as increased complexity
and higher cost of equipment.
The past decade has seen expanded commercial
use of sophisticated communications
satellites for the Internet, television,
and other broadband applications, but commercial
suppliers still struggle under tight
launch and export restrictions. Currently
there are major efforts afoot in Congress to
ease federal regulations imposed on private
commercial space ventures, to deal with
structural problems caused by activities of
the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and to promote private
space ventures.71 Space-related defense systems
and strategies, if not wisely structured,
could seriously hinder the development of
future commercial activities in space and, in
the long run, could harm America’s defense
capabilities. Conversely, the Pentagon’s ability
to defend the nation could benefit from a
flourishing of commercial activities.
The weaponization of space could ultimately
lead to the federal government regulating
commercial satellites for military purposes.
As a result, the growth of private-industry
ventures in space could be hindered by poorly
conceived specifications and regulations in
the name of national defense. There are unintended
consequences of military requirements
on certain kinds of dual-use technology.
Consider NASA’s experience with designing
the Space Shuttle.72 In order to garner political
support for the shuttle, NASA asked the
Pentagon what capabilities it would want in
such a vehicle. The Pentagon replied that it
wanted the shuttle to be able to maneuver in
the atmosphere so that it might land at any
number of bases in the United States. Thus,
the shuttle, which had to be designed with
large wings, heated up more on reentry than
would a nonmaneuverable craft with far
smaller wings. This design required 34,000
heat resistant tiles, which of course added cost
to the shuttle. A nonmaneuverable vehicle
might have been able to use a different heatresisting
system. Further, in the early years of
the shuttle project, these custom-made tiles
tended to fall off, requiring more time and
cost to maintain the vehicles. In addition, the
tiles altogether weighed some 25,000 pounds,
cutting the shuttle cargo capacity in half.73
Thus, it is no mystery why the shuttle cost
so much and never became a commercially
viable system. In this case, the Pentagon did
not mandate the design of the craft, but
instead NASA chose the design for political
reasons. This example shows how the unintended
consequences of technology mandates
can hinder the development of the very
technology that is the target of the mandates.
Another current example of a government
intervention that is hindering space commercialization
is export licensing. The Strom
Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Act, passed in 1998, transferred export licensing
from the Commerce Department to the State
Department. The State Department has been
much stricter on exports than Commerce, producing
serious delays for businesses.
Sometimes the consequences of the export
control process are truly destructive to private
space efforts. Take the case of the company
MirCorp, owned 40 percent by private
Western investors and 60 percent by the
mostly private Russian rocket company
Energia. MirCorp wanted to export from the
United States to Russia a tether that would be
launched from Russia up to the Mir space station,
which MirCorp was in the process of
13
The current
threat to U.S.
satellites does not
warrant the nearterm
weaponization
of space.
commercializing. That tether would have
been deployed outside of Mir to provide the
station with power. But the State Department
delayed approval, only granting export permission
the day after the Russian government
decided to de-orbit Mir.
Certainly there are security concerns
about space-related exports. But the current
system does not focus narrowly on keeping
dangerous technology out of the hands of
America’s enemies. Rather, its overbroad and
often arbitrary rules cause considerable collateral
damage to American entrepreneurs.
To further illustrate how Defense
Department requirements imposed on the
commercial sector could stunt innovation
and growth, consider an analogy with the
computer and information sector. Lower
launch costs could revolutionize satellites in
the same way that personal computers (PCs),
software, and the Internet—developed
together, free from regulations—created syngeries
that revolutionized the PC itself. PCs
in the early 1980s, like their large mainframe
brothers, were used principally for storing
data and crunching numbers. Now PCs are
tools for entertainment, communications,
and undreamed of potential applications.
The development of the PC also has been
characterized by unprecedented increases in
processing capacity, hard drive space, and
reductions in price. For example, Moore’s Law,
(named after Gordon Moore, one of the
founders of Intel) states that processor speed
doubles, while prices drop by half, every 18
months. Although it is conceivable that some
of the technologies incorporated into PCs—
for example, the mouse—could have been
devised in government defense labs, making
PCs at prices that anyone can afford was the
achievement of private entrepreneurs.
Farsighted defense planners have long recognized
the importance of commercial sector
innovation to defense. For example, a
December 1999 report issued by the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Globalization
and Security discussed how the Department of
Defense depends on the private sector in the
United States to move faster than its overseas
competitors in developing new products and
new applications of technology.74 The
Pentagon builds on such commercial progress.
The benefits of the free-market growth in
PCs and software to national defense can be
seen in flight simulator software. For example,
Mike Coligny, the CEO of Flyit Simulators of
San Diego, observed that “we developed a
[helicopter] simulator that the government
typically would pay millions of dollars for, and
ours cost $65,000. It’s been on the market
since late July [2000].”75 And Ensign Herb Lacy
at the Pensacola Naval Air Station purchased a
$50 Microsoft Flight Simulator game that he
modified to recreate the controls of a T-34C
Turbo Mentor, for a total cost of only $250.
Using the same software as Lacy, the Navy created
six makeshift simulators at a cost of
$6,000 each, compared to millions of dollars
for conventional simulators.76
But the Pentagon’s interest in space activities
could short-circuit this process. For
example, defense specialists foresee greater
defense use of the commercial communications
network currently in orbit and are concerned
that the network should not be compromised
or blinded by an adversary. This
concern could prompt the Pentagon to seek
authority to mandate certain specifications
for commercial satellites that would make
them less vulnerable to potential enemies.
But such mandates could have adverse unintended
consequences similar to those that
might have occurred had the Pentagon decided
to set specifications on PCs to protect
them from disabling electromagnetic pulses
caused by atomic blasts. Twenty years ago, the
Pentagon might have reasoned that such a
requirement would make PCs more appropriate
for defense uses. Yet we know after the fact
that such a requirement would have added
significantly to the cost of PCs and forced
manufacturers to take such requirements
into account in every new phase of PC development.
In the end, the PC revolution as we
now know it might have been stillborn.
The bottom line is that if the Pentagon
needs satellites that are more resistant to
attack, it would be better to commission
14
Farsighted
defense planners
have long
recognized the
importance of
commercial
sector innovation
to defense.
hardened satellites specifically for its needs.
Buying such specialized satellites would be a
legitimate defense expenditure. The Pentagon
would likely have to spend more money than
it would if the government forced manufacturers
to accept certain costly standards, but
the latter approach would simply shift costs
to the private sector. Such private, societal
costs would likely be higher than the government’s
budget expenditures dedicated to military
satellites. The Pentagon would need to
plan its strategies on the assumption that a
private space network would be more vulnerable
than it might find ideal. But the alternative,
in the long term, would be a weakened
overall private satellite network that would be
less useful for defense purposes.
In any case, commercialization of space,
which could lead to lower launch costs and
more versatile satellites, would make for a
more extensive, redundant, and secure satellite
system. This redundancy would be good
for the Pentagon as a hedge against technical
failure, as well as making it more difficult and
costly for a potential adversary to destroy.
Other private efforts could also be a boon
for America’s defense. For example, Nevada
businessman Robert Bigelow and his company
Bigelow Aerospace plan to devote as much
as $500 million to developing a private space
station based on light yet durable inflatable
structures that would, with three launches,
place into orbit the same volume of interior
station space that would take NASA dozens of
launches, thus radically cutting costs.77 And
the Space Island Group, a U.S. company developing
space transportation systems and destinations,
proposes that the 150-foot tall external
fuel tanks for the shuttle, which currently
are jettisoned and burn up in the atmosphere
just before the shuttle enters orbit, be placed
in orbit as well to serve as platforms for space
activities.78 (Using tanks for stations is not a
new idea. It was the second stage of a Saturn 5
rocket that served as Skylab in the mid-1970s.)
Further, the Space Island Group is discussing
with Boeing the possibility of developing a
Shuttle II that would cost only 10 percent of
what the current shuttle costs. The proposed
Shuttle II would simply ferry tanks, passengers,
or cargo to orbiting platforms, eliminating
the requirements—and high costs—associated
with the current Space Shuttle design for
long stays in orbit.79
The combination of a private Shuttle II
and cheap orbiting platforms (e.g., privately
owned space stations) could be used to transport
military equipment in only one hour to
any point on the planet (compared with several
hours for aircraft and days for ships).
Other military support technologies likely
would result from increased commercial
activity. For example, extensive private space
activity would result in an increasing
demand for satellites that repair or reengineer
other satellites while in orbit.
Moreover, the Pentagon might be able to
utilize such repair satellites or other commercial
advances in satellite technology to
frustrate or counter the use of microsatellite
ASATs by a potential enemy. Developing
microsatellites that can be used to disable
American satellites would be an expensive
and time-consuming enterprise in any case. If
American satellite technology advances to
the point of making countermeasures easier,
that would add further to the costs of
microsatellite systems and make their effectiveness
problematic. These factors might
cause an opponent such as China to abandon
development of such systems.
America’s defense has relied on space technologies
and will continue to do so. During
the Cold War, submarine-launched nuclear
missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles were considered the ultimate
insurance against a Soviet attack. Overflights
of Soviet territory by reconnaissance planes
gave way to orbiting surveillance satellites.
Today’s sophisticated imaging satellites
played a crucial role in military operations in
Afghanistan. Communications satellites
form an indispensable part of the defense
command-and-control infrastructure. And a
potential future missile defense system (even
one with only ground-based interceptors) by
its nature will rely on space-based technologies.
Therefore, lower costs for space activi-
15
The Department
of Defense
should make use
of commercial
assets rather than
spend needlessly
on unique military
assets.
ties—produced by private-sector efforts—
would mean a greater capacity for defense.
Conclusion
The current threat to U.S. satellites does
not warrant the near-term weaponization of
space. Civilian space assets (which the United
States depends on more and more in day-today
life) are relatively more vulnerable than
military systems; they are not hardened
against nuclear attack and do not have antijamming
capabilities. John Logsdon, director
of the Space Policy Institute at the George
Washington University has stated: “There
appears to be no demand from the operators
of commercial communication satellites for
defense of their multibillion-dollar assets. If
there were to be active military operations in space,
it could be difficult not to interfere with the functioning
of civilian space systems.”80
Just as important is the relationship
between military and commercial uses of
space. Certainly, there are some uses of space
that are unique to the military—such as
ITW&AA. This is an area where military needs
and requirements cannot be met by commercial
systems. That is, the military will be the
sole user for systems such as DSP satellites,
which monitor missile launches worldwide.81
But virtually all other applications of space
are “dual use.” To be sure, military needs and
requirements must be recognized. For example,
the military and intelligence agencies may
have unique requirements for surveillance and
reconnaissance that can be met only with their
own dedicated satellites—either for reasons of
security of data or technical requirements (e.g.,
resolution, processing time). A similar situation
exists with regard to communications.
For example, Milstar is a dedicated military
satellite communications system that provides
secure, jam-resistant, nuclear-hardened
communications for all U.S. forces.82 But in
general, the military should make greater use
of commercial space satellites.
First, wherever possible, the Department
of Defense should make use of commercial
assets rather than spend needlessly on unique
military assets. For example, the military
should use existing communications satellites
for its nonsecure communications capability.
Former vice chief of staff of the Air
Force General Moorman asserts that by making
maximum use of civilian satellites, “military
satellite communications will benefit in
terms of access to additional capacity
(tremendous increases in available bandwidth
and flexibility, as well as multiplicity of alternative
communications paths).”83 Also, the
military can make use of commercial imaging
satellites, such as Earth Watch’s EarlyBird 1,
Space Imaging’s EOSAT (which will initially
offer one-meter resolution, the highest resolution
of any commercially available system),
84 and Orbiting Image’s OrbView.
Second, wherever possible, the military
should consider using distributed and
redundant commercial satellite systems as a
means to reduce vulnerability to attack
rather than deploying unique military systems
that are likely to be more expensive and
take longer to deploy. For example, it may be
more cost-effective to develop and deploy
smaller satellites in a distributed system configuration
designed to operate at low earth
orbit and medium earth orbit than larger,
heavier satellites operating in geosynchronous
(stationary) orbit.85 That approach is
especially meritorious if there is a potential
shortage of heavy-lift launch capability.
Third, military requirements should not be
imposed on shared nonmilitary satellites. For
example, the military should not require hardening
against electromagnetic pulse on commercial
satellites that are also used by the military.
To the extent that such requirements are
absolute needs, the military should deploy its
own dedicated systems to meet those requirements.
Neither commercial satellite operators
nor the other users of commercial satellites
should shoulder any cost burdens imposed by
the military (and clearly, the military must be
more realistic about its requirements).
In short, in the future, the military will likely
have greater reliance on commercial space
systems. As General Moorman has stated:
16
Wherever possible,
the military
should consider
using distributed
and redundant
commercial satellite
systems as a
means to reduce
vulnerability to
attack.
On the one hand, commercialization
is not a total panacea. . . . On the other
hand, the commercial space industry
is expanding at such a rate and with
such marvelous capabilities that it
seems reasonable if not inevitable that
a number of missions—heretofore the
exclusive province of the government—
can be satisfied or augmented
commercially. We can also realize significant
efficiencies by taking advantage
of commercial space.86
However, even if commercial space is not a
panacea for the military, it should be the driving
force of space and shape space policy. In
other words, defense and national security
need to be one component of overall U.S.
space policy, but certainly not the primary
component. In the post–Cold War environment—
with no immediate threat from
another great power and none on the horizon
(at least in the near- to mid-term)—the
U.S. government must avoid establishing
inflated and costly military requirements for
space-based resources. U.S. space policy
should strive to foster an environment that
allows commercial space activity to grow and
flourish rather than create a new area for
costly military competition.
17
U.S. space policy
should strive to
foster an environment
that allows
commercial space
activity to grow
and flourish
rather than create
a new area for
costly military
competition.
18
19
20
21
Notes
1. Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization
(Washington: Government Printing Office, January
11, 2001), p. 18. Hereinafter Space Commission.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 22.
5. Ibid., p. 99.
6. Ibid., p. 100.
7. It is also worth noting that the staff director for
both Rumsfeld commissions was Stephen A.
Cambone, who then became a special assistant to
Rumsfeld and is currently principal deputy under
secretary of defense for policy. See Al Kamen,
“Senators Have a Cambone to Pick,” Washington Post,
June 27, 2001, p. A23.
8. See Thomas E. Ricks, “Space Is Playing Field
for Newest War Game,” Washington Post, January
29, 2001, p. A1; and Jonathan Broder, “Forward,
March . . . into Space,” MSNBC, http://www.
msnbc.com/news/546843.asp.
9. John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next
50 Years (McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International
Defense Publishers, 1989), pp. 43–44.
10. Dana J. Johnson, Scott Pace, and C. Bryan
Gabbard, Space: Emerging Options for National
Power, RAND MR-517, 1998, p. 33.
11. Thomas S. Moorman Jr., “The Explosion of
Commercial Space and the Implications for
National Security,” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring
1999, www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/
apj/apj99/spr99/moorman.htm.
12. Johnson, Pace, and Gabbard, p. 29.
13. Ibid., p. 32.
14. Moorman.
15. Johnson, Pace, and Gabbard, p. 35.
16. Ibid., p. 36.
17. Linda L. Haller and Melvin S. Sakazaki,
“Commercial Space and United States National
Security,” Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization,
www.space.gov/commission/support-docs/
aritcle06/aritcle06.html.
18. Peter Hays and Karl Mueller, “Going Boldly—
Where?” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2001,
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/
apj01/spr01/hays.htm.
19. Bob Smith, “The Challenge of Space Power,”
Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 1999, www.airpower.
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/spr99/
smith. html, [emphasis added].
20. Ibid.
21. Space Commission, p. 13.
22. Smith.
23. Vernon Loeb, “Air Force’s Chief Backs Space
Arms,” Washington Post, August 2, 2001, p. A17.
24. Quoted in ibid.
25. Quoted in ibid. See also Michael Krepon, “Lost in
Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite
Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001; and John M.
Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to Space Power,” Issues in
Science and Technology, Spring 2001.
26. Hays and Mueller.
27. Space Commission, p. 27.
28. Ibid., p. xiii.
29. Ibid., p. 19.
30. Hays and Mueller.
31. Tom Wilson, “Threats to United States Space
Capabilities,” Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization,
www.space.gov/commission/support-docs/
article05/article05.html.
32. Space Commission, p. 19.
33. “Backyard Satellite Jammers Concern US
Airforce,” News in Science, April 25, 2000, www.
abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s120537.htm.
34. Corey Grice, “Satellite Hack Raises Security Questions,”
CNET News.com, March 3, 1999, http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-339481. html.
35. Ibid.
36. “GPS Anti-Jam Technology,” Raytheon,
www.raytheon.co.uk/raytheonnoflash/sections/p
roducts/product_systems/navigation_system_de
fence/navigation_system_defence.htm.
22
23
37. “What’s the Advantage of Frequency-
Hopping?” Johnson Consulting, www.swedetrack.
com/images/bluet11.htm.
38. Jim Geier, “Spread Spectrum: Frequency
Hopping vs. Direct Sequence,” May 1999,
www.wireless-nets.com/whitepaper_spread.htm.
39. Richard L. Garwin, Toward National Security:
The Role of Space Weapons, Antisatellite Weapon Tests,
and National Missile Defense, October 21, 1999,
www.fas.org/rlg/102599-lakhdhir.htm.
40. According to Hays and Mueller: “‘Space weapons
such as the U.S. nuclear-tipped Program 505 and
427 antisatellite (ASAT) systems or the Soviet
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System and coorbital
ASAT systems were actually deployed to a
limited extent beginning in the 1960s but . . . no such
dedicated systems are deployed today.”
41. Johnson, Pace, and Gabbard, p. 41.
42. Wilson.
43. James Kitfield, “The Permanent Frontier,” Foreign
Affairs, March 17, 2001, p. 784. Emphasis added.
44. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that he
assumed Saddam Hussein knew “that if he were
to resort to chemical weapons, that would be an
escalation to weapons of mass destruction and
that the possibility would then exist, certainly
with respect to the Israelis, for example, that they
might retaliate with unconventional weapons as
well.” Quoted in Robert Toth, “American Support
Grows for Use of Nuclear Arms,” Los Angeles Times,
February 3, 1991, p 1. Also, according to Neil
Livingston, “The American government reportedly
used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq
that ‘in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass
destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the
right to use any form of retaliation (presumably
up to and including nuclear weapons).’” Sea
Power, June 1991, pp 29–30.
45. Wilson.
46. Quoted in Kitfield, p. 784.
47. Wilson. See also Cheng Ho, “China Eyes Anti-
Satellite System,” Dragon Space, January 8, 2000,
www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01c.html.
48. Krepon. Emphasis added.
49. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Going Too Far: Bush’s
Pledge to Defend Taiwan,” Cato Institute Foreign
Policy Briefing no. 66, May 30, 2001, p. 1.
50. Ibid., p. 5.
51. Wilson.
52. Ibid.
53. See Wilson for a more detailed technical discussion
of these weapons.
54. Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass
Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, January/February
1998, p. 28.
55. See Charles V. Peña and Barbara Conry,
“National Missile Defense: Examining the
Options,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 337,
March 16, 1999, and Charles V. Peña, “Arms
Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually
Exclusive,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 376,
July 26, 2000, as two examples of more detailed
analysis of national missile defense.
56. For example, see Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld
Defends Missile Shield to Apprehensive Allies in
Europe,” Washington Post, February 4, 2001, p. A24;
Roberto Suro, “Missile Defense Is Still Just a Pie in
the Sky,” Washington Post, February 12, 2001, pp.
A3–A4; Jack Ruina, “46 Years, No Winners. Aim
Elsewhere,” Washington Post, March 4, 2001, p. B3;
Steven Mufson, “Democrats Plot Strategy on Missile
Defense,” Washington Post, May 20, 2001, p. A14; Mark
K. Anderson, “Nuke Shield Can’t Stop Critics,”
Wired News, July 17, 2001, www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,45273,00.html; Charles
Aldinger, “Russia Rejects U.S. Argument for
Scrapping ABM,” Lycos News, August 13, 2001,
http://news.lycos.com/news/story.asp?section=
Politics&pitem=POLITICS-RUSSIA-USADC&
rev=20010813&pub_tag=REUTG; Charles
Aldinger, “Russia Rejects U.S. Reasoning ABM
Obsolete,” Lycos News, August 13, 2001, http://
news.lycos.com/news/story.asp?section=Breakin
g&pitem=NEWS-RUSSIA-USA-DC&rev=
20010813&pub_tag=REUTG; and Robert Burns,
“Russia Rejects ABM Withdrawal,” Lycos News,
August 13, 2001, http://news.lycos.com/news/
story.asp?section=World&pitem=AP-Rumsfeld-
Russia&rev=20010813&pub_ag=APONLINE.
57. Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, “Bush
Speeds Missile Defense Plans,” Washington Post,
July 12, 2001, p. A1.
58. Suro, “Missile Defense Is Still Just a Pie in the
Sky,” p. A3.
59. Carla Anne Robbins and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. May
Violate the ABM Treaty ‘Within Months,’” Wall
Street Journal, July 12, 2001, p. A4.
60. See Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM
Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” New York
Times, December 13, 2001, www.nytimes.com/
2001/12/13/international/13CND-BUSH.html.
61. Both the SBIRS high and low programs are
experiencing cost, technical, and schedule problems.
See Tony Cappacio, “Lockheed Missile
Defense Program Is over Cost and 3 Years Late,”
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2001, www.
bloomberg.com.
62. For a more detailed description of the SBIRS
program, see “SBIRS: Space-Based Infrared
System,” 1997 United States Air Force Issues Book,
www.af.mil/lib/afissues/1997/app_b_18. html.
63. See Mark Thompson, “The Secretary of
Missile Defense,” Time, May 14, 2001.
64. In fact, the report explicitly states that “the U.S.
Government should vigorously pursue the capabilities
called for in the National Space Policy to
ensure that the President will have the option to
deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary,
defend against attacks on U.S. interests.” Emphasis
added. Space Commission, p. 17.
65. Ivan Eland, “Let’s Make National Missile
Defense Truly ‘National,’” Cato Institute Foreign
Policy Briefing no. 58, June 27, 2000.
66. See Charles V. Peña, “From the Sea: National
Missile Defense Is Neither Cheap Nor Easy,” Cato
Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 60,
September 6, 2000.
67. Quoted in Kitfield, pp. 781–82.
68. John Newhouse, “The Missile Defense
Debate,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, p. 105.
69. Heritage Foundation, Defending the American
Homeland, January 8, 2002, pp. 19–21.
70. For a detailed discussion on GPS, see Peter H.
Dana, “Global Positioning System Overview,”
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/note
s/gps/gps_f.html.
71. Among space-related reform bills under consideration
by Congress are the following: The
Invest in Space Now Act (H.R. 2177), introduced
by Rep. Ken Calvert (R-Calif.), offers tax credits
for investments in commercial space activities;
the Spaceport Equity Act (H.R. 1931, S. 1243)
would allow spaceports to raise construction and
renovation funds through tax-exempt bonds; the
Zero Gravity, Zero Tax Act (H.R. 2504), sponsored
by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), would
exclude from federal taxes income derived from
certain products and services produced in space;
and the Space Tourism Promotion Act (H.R.
2443), offered by Rep. Nick Lampson (D-Tex.),
would give loan guarantees and capital gains tax
exclusions for investments in space tourism.
72. David Gump, Space Enterprise: Beyond NASA
(New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 17–18.
73. Ibid.
74. “Final Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on Globalization and Security,” Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, December 1999,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/globalization.pdf.
75. Quoted in Sandra I. Erwin, “$65K Flight
Simulator Draws Skepticism from Military
Buyers,” National Defense Magazine, November
2000, www.national defensemagazine.org/article.
cfm?Id-354.
76. Harold Kennedy, “Simulation Reshaping Military
Training: Technology Jumping from Teenagers’
Computers to Pilots’ Cockpits,” National Defense
Magazine, November, 1999, www.nationaldefense
magazine.org/article.cfm?Id=113.
77. Robert Bigalow, National Institute for Discovery
Science, comments at Space Privatization Leadership
Summit, June 11–12, 2001, Las Vegas, Nevada.
78. For a detailed discussion, see the Space Island
Group website, www.spaceislandgroup.com/
homepage.html.
79. Ibid.
80. John M. Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to Space
Power,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring
2001, p. 36. Emphasis added.
81. For a thorough history of the DSP program,
see Jeffrey Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP
Satellites and National Security (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1999).
82. “Milstar Satellite Communications System,”
U.S. Air Force fact sheet, www.af.mil/news/factsheets/
Milstar_Satellite_Communicati.html.
83. Moorman.
84. Ibid.
85. Low earth orbit is at an altitude of 60 to 300
miles, medium earth orbit is at an altitude of
5,000 to 10,000 miles, and geosynchronous orbit
is at an altitude of 22,300 miles. Collins, p. 138.
86. Moorman.
24
25
Published by the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis is a regular series evaluating government policies and offering
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FOIA
EXCERPT:
18 November 1965
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses ‘
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleof
18 NOVEMBER 1965
Authenticated:
@+B EXECUTIVE SECRE
400
COO2784 69 UNCLASSIFIED
Tho following intelligence organizations participated in the preporation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency ond the intelligence orgonizotions of the Deportments
of Stote, Defense, NSA, and AEC.
Concurring:
Mr. Richord Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas 1. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence ond Reseorch, Department of
Lieutenont General Joseph F. Corroll, USAF, Director, Defense lnfelligence Agency
Lieutenont General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Director of the Nationol Security
Mr. Howard Brown, Assistant General Manager for Administrotion, Atomic Energy
Stote
Agency
Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
. .
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I E D
. . .
c
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM .................................................... 1
CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ....................................................... 4
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES . . . . . . 4
11. AIR DEFENSES ............................ .‘. .................... 5
Warning and Control ............................................. 5
Interceptors ..................................................... 6
Surface-to-Air Mi+Ies ............................................. 8
111. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES ................................ 10 a
-c
Defense of Moscow .............................................. 11
Other Possible Deployment ....................................... 12
Prospects for Missile Defenses ..................................... 12
IV. ‘ANTISATELLITE DEFENSES ... ...................... .... .. .. .. 13
V. CIVIL DEFENSE ............................................... 14
ANNEX: TABLES .................................................. 15
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED
SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR
AND MISSILE DEFENSES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and limitations of Soviet strategic air
and missile defense forces through mid-1967, and general trends in
these forces through 1975.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Confronted by powerful Western strategic attack forces, the
USSR is sustaining its vigorous effort to strengthen its defenses. We
believe that the Soviets are responding to those chdenges to. theirsecurity
that they can now see or foresee from aircraft, ballistic misdes,
and earth satellites. (Paras. 1 5 )
Air Defenses ~
I . _ _
B. The Soviets have achieved a formidable-capability against aircraft
attacking at medium and high altitudes, but their air defense
system probably is still susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons
and low-altitude tactics. The Soviets probably foresee little reduction
in the bomber threat over the next ten years. To meet this
challenge, they are improving their warning and control svstems and
are changing the character of their interceptor force through the
introduction of new high-performance, all-weather aircraft. In addition,
there are recent indications that the Soviets are now employing
light AAA in some areas for low-aItitude defense. (Parus. 3,4, 8-19)
C. The Soviets probably wiIl c o n ~ u e to improve and to rely on
the SA-2 as the principal SAM system. We believe that they will
develop an improved or new SAM system for low altitude defense;
such a system would probably be deployed more extensively &an the
SA-3. Deployment of a long-range SAM system probably is now
.
.
COO2784 69
. .
UNCLASSIFIED
underway in tlic northwestern USSR and probably will bc cxtended
to other petiplieral areas and to sonic key urban locations iu the
interior.' ' ( PUNZS. 20-26)
Ballistic Missile Defenses
D. For nearly ten years, the Soviets have given high priority to
research and development of antimissile defenses. We estimate that
they have now begun to deploy such defenses at Moscow. These
defenses could probably achieve some capability as early as 1967, but
we think a more likely date for an initial operational capability is
1968. We do not yet know the performance characteristics of this
system, or how it will function.
The Soviets will almost certainly continue with their extensive
effort to develop ballistic missile defenses to counter the increasingly
sophisticated threat that will be posed by US strategic missile forces.
We cannot now estimate with confidence the scale or timing of future
Soviet ABM deploymcnt. We believe, however, that the Soviets will
deploy ABM defenses for major urban-industrial areas. By 'I975, -
they could deploy defenses for some 20 to 30 areas containing a quarter
of the Soviet population and more than half of Soviet industry.
(Paras. 3637)
(Paras. 2734)
E.
- _.
Antisatelli te Defenses
The Soviets cou!d already have developed a limited antisatellite
capability based on an operational missile with a nuclear warhead and
existing electronic capabilities. We have no evidence that they have
F.
' Lieutenant Ceneral Joseph F. Carroll. USAF Director, Defense Intelligena Agcncy, Major
Ceneral John J. Davis, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. US Amiy, and Major Ceneral
Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligen=..US Air Force. believe that the nirny
uncertainties stemming from analysis of available evidence doer not permit a confident judgment
as to the specific mission of the new defensive system king deployd in northwest
USSR. They acknowledge that available evidence does support a conclusion that the sites
in the northwest may be intended for defense against the aerodynamic threat. However.
on balance. considering all the evidence, they believe it is more likely that the -tea being
deployed at these sites are primarily for defense against ballistic missiles.
'Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Assistant Chief of Naval Oprations (Intelligene). Department
of the Navy, and Lieutenant Ceneral Marshall s. Carter, USA, Diredor, National Security
Agency, do not concur in the degree of confidence reflected in this judgment Although
they concur that the deployment activity is more likely a long range SAhf systcni than an
ABM system, they believe that the evidence at this tinic is such that a confident judgment is
premature.
2
I
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED I ,
-
done so. In any event, we believe that the Soviets would prefer to
have a system which could track foreign satellites more accurately and
permit the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms. We estimatc that ttie
Soviets will have an operational capability with such a system within
the next few years. We believe, however, that the Soviets would
attack a US satellite in peacetime only if, along with a strong desire
for secrecy, they were willing for other reasons to greatly disrupt
East-West relations." (Paras. 3841 )
* Mr. Thomas L. Hughes. the Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State. bclieves
that thc Soviets would conclude that the adverse consequenm of destroying or damaging
US satellites in peacetime woutd ouhvcigh the advantages of such an action. Hc therefore
believes it highly unlikely that they would attack US satellita in peacetime.
3
_.
COO278469 U NCLASS I F I ED
rrrnrr
JLLl\L I
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES
1. Confrontcd by large and powcrfril Wcstcrn st~atcgic attack form, the
Sovicts have madc a sustaincd and vigorous cffort to improve their defcilscs.
111 thc past several ycars, siirfacc-to-air missiles and iicw gcncrations of intcrccptor
aircraft have been widely deployed. Wariiiiig and control systems have
been cxpandcd and sophisticated. At thc sainc tirnc, tlic Sovicts have pursued
I{ and D on more advanced air defense systems. And for nearly a decade they
liave continued a large-scalc. high-priority program to develop antimissile
defenses.
2. Soviet expenditures for strategic defciise have grown steadily sincc 1950.
In recent years, these expenditures have roughly equaled those for strategic
attack, when the major buildup of strategic missile forces was in proas. The
IXSR devoted a much larger share of its military expenditures tL strategic
defense during the 1961-1964 period than did the US. Manpower allocated to
the strategic defense mission has also increased markedly-from about E0,OOO
in 1950 to almost 500,OOO men at present This increase occurred during a
period of large scale reductions in military manpower.
3. Despite impressive improvements, however, Soviet strategic defense capabilities
have not overtaken incrwingly sophisticated US attack capabilities.
Thus, while the USSR has achieved a formidable capability against aircraft
attacking at medium and high altitudes, its air defense system probably is still
susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons and to low-altitude tactics.
Finally, the Soviets must realize that their surface-to-air (SAM) and interceptor
forces and the supporting warning and control elements of their air defense system
would be highly vulnerable to attack by missile strikes which they would
expect to be coordinated with an air attack against the USSR
4. While the bulk of Soviet expenditures for strategic defense in the past few
years has gone to air defense, the character of the US threat has changed. In
assessing the future threat, the Soviets undoubtedly consider the most pressing
problem to be the threat posed by massive and growing US ballistic missile
forces, because this threat cannot now be met adequately by either pre-emptive
attack or active defense. In addition, the threat posed by bombers has probably
not diminished in Soviet eyes. Considering the forthcoming introduction of
advanced aircraft by the US, the Soviets probably foresee little reduction in the
bomber threat into the 1970s. Thc Soviets are no doubt also cancerned with
US activities in space which have military applications.
5. The Soviets must feel pressed to respond to these US capabilities. Following
a basically deterrent strategy, they are now strengthening their forces for
strategic attack, but they are not. we believe, attempting to achieve a counter-
-- ’
COO2784 69 UNCLASSIFIED
h c c capability.'
IIC rcspondiirg to the cllallcngcs to their security that they caii now scc atld
fol-cscc-aircraft, ballistic missilcs, and cart11 sntellitcs. Tlic licavy Soviet ex-
Iiciitliturcs for air dcfcnse in the past scrvc as a strong indicator that tlic Soviets
\vi11 accept tlic continuing high costs for strategic dcfcnsc in the coming years.
In building tlicir forces for strategic dcfcnsc, they appear E
11. AIR DEFENSES
6. Tlic Sovict air defcnsc mission is the. responsibility of the PVO Strany
( Anti-Air Defense of the Country). wliosc commander-in-chief, a Dcputy Ministcr
of Dcfcnsc. is ranked with the licads of the ground, naval, air, and strategic
missile forces. The PVO Strany includes three major components, each of
which performs one of the key functions'of the air defense mission, i.c. early
warning and control, interceptor, and SAM operations. The commander of tlic
PVO Strany probably is also assigned the mission of ballistic missile defense.
In addition to forces directly assigned to the PVO Strany, other Soviet forces
which can contribute to the air defense mission are also operationally available
to this command.
7. The air defenses of the East European countries of the Warsaw Pact,
although separate national systems, are coordinated with each other and with
the Soviet air defense organization. For most practical purposes, they constilute
an extension of the Soviet system. The East European air defense forces are
cquipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel, and the USSR will continue -
its policy of improving their capabilities. Although the Chinese Communist air
defense system still maintains some contact with the Soviet organization, cooperation
between them is minimal.
Warning and Control
8. There are now more than 5,OOO radars depIoyed at well over 1,OOO sites in
the USSR. These sites have at least two radars and many are equipped with
five to seven sets. This deployment provides overlapping radar coverage of
most of the nation; coverage is particularly dense west of the UraL and in
peripheral areas. The density of coverage heightens the probability of detection,
and frequency diversification provides some defense against elecbonic
countermeasures (ECM). But, at the same time, the redundancy of radar
coverage increases the load on communications and filter centers.
9. Early Warning. The altitude coverage of the Soviet early w h h g (EW)
system exceeds the combat ceiling of any US aircraft. Under optimum conditions,
the Soviet EW system could detect and track aircraft fl*g at medium
or high altitudes at least 200 n.m. away from Soviet territory, and under normal
'Major General Jack E. Thomu, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, woultl
reword the sentence as fokws: "We believe they will continue to adhere to the concept of
deterrent force so long as they remain in a position of strategic inferiority, but the intenrive
Soviet Military R and D effort raises the possibility that Soviet leaders almdy am focusing
on achievement of a strategic superiority which would enable more Pararive p-it of
their political aims, perhaps within the time frame of this ectimate."
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I ED -
cotiditions dctcctioii a i d tracking of cncmy aircraft flyiiig nt such altitttdcs is
vircunlly assured at about 135 n.m. I~lowcvcl-, a11 attack I)y supersonic aircraft
niid criiisc missilcs. Lccausc of tlicir vcry high spccds. \vorild reduce tlic wariiitig
tiinc provided by tliis system. l'lic detection rnngc of the E\V system is progrcssivcly
rcdticcd against aircraft ptrnctrating at lo\wr altitudes. Moreover.
cvcti wlicci dctcctioii of low altitrldc pcnctrators occurs. tlic systcrn is unlikcly
to be able to :iccoinplish continuous tracking ol iiii iircruding ciicniy aircraft
bclow 3,000 feet, mid it Ins virtually 110 capability below about 1.ooO fert.
-
LO. C,.oriticf-Cor~r.olIcd Ititcrccpt. About otic-third of the Soviet . radar sitcs
:?I'C c?.;?,?b!c S! CCt.d:::i.lg gXXind-CGE:i;%c! ~6liCl~cclJt (Cerj ulwsaliolls. Tiic
effectiveness of the CCI systcm varies with altitudc, rnrigc, and, spccd of tlic
target. Against medium and liigli altitudc targets, we estimate that CCI rangc
capabilities vary from about 85 n.m. to UM nm. depending on the radar employed
at the site. We belicvc that most CCI radars employ moving tar$ indicators
or anticlutter techniques in order to improve low-altitude covcrage. However,
law altitude CCI capability probably drops off sharply below +ooO feet and
would be almost iion-existent below. 1,ooO feet.
11. Communications. The Soviet air defense warning and weapons control
structure employs a communications network which has a high degree .of rcdundancy
and flexibility. The most important development in air defense
communications in reccnt years has been the spread of a semiautomat+data
transmission system. The ground-to-ground link of this system has ' probably
been deployed extensively in the USSR and in parts of Eastern Europe. Origii
d l y believed to be associated only with early warning and interceptor control,
the system probably is now being used to support SAM operations in some instances.
We believe that the ground-to-air link has been deployed extensively
in the USSR and is being used by Soviet forces in East Cermany, Poland, and
Hungary. It is also probably being employed by one or two oE the East European-
air forces.
12. Outlook. During the next ten years, the number of radar sites probably
will remain steady or decline slightly. We estimate that the number of radar
sets, however, depending on their age and serviceability, will be reduced
from the present level, perhaps by as much as one-half. The Soviets will
probably deploy new radars designed to enhance low altitude and antijamming
capabilities. We estimate that deployment of the ground-to-ground link of
the semiautomatic data transmission system will be extended, and SAM units will
be fully incorporated in the system; the ground-to-air link will be standard equipment
on all new interceptors. We believe that the Soviets are developing more
fully automated systems for interceptor control which could become operational
iii the next year or two.
Interceptors
most .of them deployed, in western USSR.
13. There now are about 3,800 operational interceptors in the PVO Strany,
Rouglily half of the interceptor
6 -
. ,
A C C I T I T R . . , .. . , . . . . -. . . .. . . . . .. .. .' . . , i , - ., . .. . . . . . ,..
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I ED
forcc is made up of all-weatlicr rnodcls.” Only iibout onc-fourth OF tlic Kterceptors
arc capable of Mach 2, thc rcmnindcr arc older models, wl>icli elitered
scrvicc bcforc 1959. Tlie Soviets could also WIIIII OII employing in tlic :iir
dcfcnsc mission many of the figliters assigned to Tactical Aviation. Tlicrc iirc
about 2,400 figliters iii Tactical Aviation. tlic I,iilk of \vliicli arc dcployctl iir
wcstcrii USSH itnd ill tliosc Warsaw Pact countries wlicrc Soviet forces :ire
stationed.‘
14. New Atodels. The Soviets arc now in [lie early stages of what iqq)c;irs
to bc a large-scale program to modernize tlic interceptor forcc. W e bclicvc
that they now have two new interceptors in production; tho I%ebnr. \vhicli
entcrcd service in 199 and the Fiddler, which probably will enter servicx in
191% or 1967. The Firebar probably is bcing used for low-altitttdz interwllts.
and the Fiddler is best suited for long-range intercepts. A third new model,
probably an improved all-weather interceptor of short or medium range, may
go into production in the near future; this aircraft will probably have a maximum
speed approaching Mach 3. About 1,OOO of thesc three interceptors will probably
be in service by the early 1970s..
15. In addition to the interceptors now in production or likely soon to be,
* we believe that the Soviets are conducting an extensive development program
for very high performance aircraft. An advanced all-weather interceptor with
cruise speeds in the Mach 3 region could be operational in the early 1970s.
Virtually all of the older Soviet intercep& and some of
current models are equipped with guns and rockets. Less than half of the
currently operational Soviet interceptors are equipped with air-to-air missiles
( AAMs). For the most part these aircraft are limited to effective attack ranges
of less than five n.m., and all are restricted to tail chase attack tactics. We
believe that the Firebar, Fiddler, and other new interceptors will be armed with
improved MMs and radars which will allow these interceptors to employ ndditional
attack tactics at effective ranges of more than ten n.m.
16. Armament.
17. Cupabilities. The Soviet interceptor force has good capabilities against
subsonic, and to a lesser extent against supersonic aircraft attacking at medium
and high altitudes, in daylight or under clear air mass conditions. The force
has, however, limited all-weather capabilities and poor low altitude capabilities.
Despite increased training in low altitude intercepts and attempts to employ
the Firebar in this role, the problems of lead pursuit and taiI chase attack at
altitudes below 3,000 feet, and particularly below 1,OOO feet, remain severe.
The Soviets probably also plan to use their interceptors against air-to-surface
missiles, at least as an interim measure.
18. Force LeoeLs. The old model Soviet interceptors (Fresco, Farmer, and
Flashliglit) are now being retired at a fairly rapid rate. We believe that replacement
by newer aircraft is on a slightly less than one-for-one basis, and we
~~
For perfomann characteristics of Soviet interceptors and fighters, see Annex, Table 1.
‘For a discussion of fighter aircraft not in PVO Sh-any units. see NIE 11-144, -Capabilities
of Soviet General Purpose Forces” (Semt, 21 October 1965).
7
I
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I ED
expect this trcnd to continue for the next few ycars.
gradual reduction in the size of tlic forcc tlirougli mid-19G7. as shown in the
f o I I owing tabu In t ion :
Thus, wc look for
ESTIMATED JNTEI~CEI'I'OR I,'OItCE Ll3LI.S
OGIOUEII 1 9 6 Miu-ISGG hlio-1967
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Old Models 2.840 2.450-2.G50 2.o00-2.250
975-1.075 1,090-1.225 . . . . Currciit n i ~ l h'cw Motlcls 950 -
Total 3,800 3.4254725 3.100-3.475 .....................
We believe that the size of thc force will decline further over the next ten
years; by 1970 tlic forcc probably will have been rcduccd to about two-thirds
of tlic current Icvel. After 1970;tlie force may level off or it mxy be reduced
further, perhaps to about one-lialf the present force level by 1975.'
19. Outlook. As the number of newer aircraft in the force grows; its capabilities
will increase significantly, particularly under all-weather conditions and
against attacks by supersonic vehicles. The newer aircraft will be equipped
with improved airborne intercept radars and missiles and Soviet'EW and CCI
capabilities will also grow, but low altitude intercept capabilities probably will
remain limited throughout the period.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
- 20. SA-2 System. We estimate that as of mid-1965, there were about'5,ood
SA-2 sites in the USSR. We believe that some 800-900 of these sites are occupied
by operational units, and that the remainder are not manned or equipped
on a permanent basis. These sites probably are intended to augment existing
defenses or to defend lower-priority targets. The Soviets will probably activate
them in threatening situations, but we cannot determine which of these sites
will be occupied at any given time. Although we expect the Soviets to construct
additional sites of this type, we do not believe that they plan to increase SA-2
operational units above the present force level.
21. The Soviets have continued to improve the SA-2 system; both the missile
and the guidance radar have either been modified or replaced several times.'
These improvements increase the range of the system from 17 to about 25 n.m.,
raise the maximum intercept altitude from 80,OOO to W,OOO fcet, and lower the
minimum intercept altitude from 3,000 to about 1,500 feet.O They have im-
' Major General Jack E. Thomas, hrtistant Chief of Staff. Intelligcn~e. WAF. bel- the
reduction in IA PVO fighter forces wiIl not be as great as is estimated. He would substitute
the following for the final two renten-: "We believe that the size of the fom will ddinc
further over the next ten years; by 1970 the fore probably will have been redud to appmxitnately
3,000 aircraft. After 1970, the fore may level off, but if a long-range intemptor L
introduced in significant numbers, the total size of the IA PVO may mntinue to dedine
somewhat."
.
'For performance characteristics of SAM systens, see Annex, Table 2.
'Most SA-2s exported by the Soviets to counties outside the Warsaw Pad arc mdier
niodek, and thus have performance characteristics which equate to the system's original
capabilities.
.I
'i
I W F I F n , . . . . . . . . . . rf. I - . . . .
I
U NCLASS IF I ED COO278469
proved tile accuracy and thc detection capability of the systcm and its pcrfomacl'y
in an ECM cnvironmcnt. Modifications are still bcirig made and operational
tinits contintic to bc rccquippcd with advanced modcls of tlrc missile alid
guidnncc radar. SA-2s dcploycd in peripheral nrcns in tlic USSR, and probably
most of tliosc in tlic interior, cmploy improved versions of tlic missiles and
guidance radars.
Wc bclicvo that dcployiiiuit of tlic SA-3 systcm ltas also
cciinc to n virtual Iinlt, and that oiily n fcw new sites wcrc colistructcd in 1965.
Wc cstitnatc that total dcploymcnt of this system now stands at abolit I10 sites.
Ilcployincnt, usually in conjunction with SA-2 sites, is largely restricted to the
pcripliwal areas of thc USSR and the cities of Leningrad and Moscow. Tlac
slow hiid small deployment of tlic SA-3 strongly suggests that it docs not provide
n much better lo\v altitude capability than that of the modified SA-2 or of existing
ntrtiaircraft artillcry (AAA). In addition, there arc recent indications that the
Soviets may be employing light AAA in some areas for low-altitude defense.
Such crnployment would serve as an interim measure until development of improved
or more advanced systems.
23. SA-1 System. The SA-1 system, deployed only at Moscow, remains operational.
There are no indications that the Soviets intend to phqe out the system
in the near future. The SA-1, deployed during .the 1950s at 56 large sites in
two rings around Moscow, was designed as a dkfense agaitt mass bomber"'
attacks.
high altitude capabilities. In addition to the SA-1, Moscow's air defenses include
some SA-2 and SA3 sites, and the Soviets may provide additional SAM defenses
for Moscow. In any event, we believe that the SA-1 system will not be phased
out during the next few years and possibly not until the 1970's.
24. Long-Range System. The Soviets are deploying a new defensive system
in northwestern USSR. It.is probably a SAM system with a range several tinies
that of the SA-2. We cannot, however, discount the possibility that this deployment
is intended for ballistic missile defense.Ia lL
22. SA-3 Sysleri~.
The Sovietr have since modified it, probably improving its range and -
Lieutenant Ceneral Joseph F. Carr~ll. USAF, Director. Defense Intelligence Agency. Major
Ceneral John J. Davis, Assistant Chief of St&, Intelligence, US Amy. and Major Ccneml
Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Sa, Intelligence, US Air Force. believe that the niany
uncertainties stemming from analysis of available evidence does not pennit a confident judgment
as to the specific mission of the new defensive systems being dcployed in northwat
USSR. They acknowledge that available evidence does support a condusion that the siin
the northwest may be intended for defense against the aerodynamic threat. However,
on balance, mnsidering all the evidence, they believe it is more likely that the syrtems king
deployed at these sites are primarily for defense against ballistic missiles.
"Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor. hrritant Chief of Naval Operatiom (Intelligence),
Department of the Navy and Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter. USA. Diractor. National
Security Agency, do not concur in the degree of confidence reflected in this judgment.
Although they concur that the deployment activity is mom likely a long mige SAM systenl
that an ABM system, they believe that the evidence at this time ic wrdi that a contident
judgment is premature.
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED
25. We believe that tlie system is a change from an carlicr system wliicli the
Soviets began to deploy at Leningrad iii 1960; tlic carlicr system probably war
intended to liave a capability apinst a small unsopliisticntcd ballistic misrilc
tlirent and against ncrodynninic vehicles as well. This concept apparently was
nlxuidoncd prior to completion of the tlircc Leningrad complexes, and dcploymerit
of tlic new system was undertaken."' Allliough we tliiiik that tlic Crilfoii
missile was intenclcd for iisc witti tlie original Leningrad systcin, wc miinot
dctcriniiie wlictlicr this new system will crnploy ii Criffon-type missile or soinc
otlicr which we liavc not as yet identified. We belicvc that deployment of tlic
siiiie system is underway at a few otlier locations in tlic Soviet nortliwcst, e-6..
1 n l l i i i on tlic C-!:ic 222s: 2r.d CI:ery::.ctr nL.2::: I?Ci! 5!c:-x::h of >.!3scow.
'!'wo of the Leningrad complexes could be opcrational by early 1966. The third
Leningrad complex and the otlicr deployments in northwestern USSR could
become operational during 1966 and the following year.
Although the present Soviet SAM defenses provide good allweather,
medium- and high-altitude protection against aircraft and air-to-surface
missiles, they are deficient in long-range and low-altitude capabiktier Over
thc next few years the Soviets will attempt to overcome these deficiencies. They
will probably expand the deployment of their new long-range SAM system tu
provide a barrier defense against bombers and long-range air-to-surface missilcs
in the peripheral areas of the USSR and at some key urban locations.I0 It Such
. deployment would probably involvc a total 6f 2545 complexes and couidebe
completed before 1970. The Soviets may seek to meet their requirement for
very low-altitude capabilities with improved AAA We believe it more likely.
however, that they will develop an improved SA-3 or a new SAM system,
although we have no evidence of such development. Deployment of a new
system could begin as early as 1968 and would probably be more extensive than
that for the SA-3 system.
.C
26. Outlook.
.
I l l . BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
27. For the past decade, the Soviets have been assiduously working to develup
defenses against ballistic missiles. The R and D activities associated with the
Soviet program continue to be conducted at the large Sary Shagan missile test
center in central Asia. A number of missiles, radars and other system components
have been developed and tested over the years for both tactical and
skategic systems. We believe that the Soviets have conducted an atmospheric
intercept test program, and they have probably investigated exoatmospheric intercept
techniques as well. It seems likely that they have studied both point
and area defenses and examined the feasibility of precision and barrage type
intercepts. In the field of eIecbonics, they have explored the advantages of
using relatively low frequencies as well as those higher in the spectrum; they
have worked with large dish-type and phased-array radars. Thus, the scope
and diversity of the program have been impressive, but the Soviets linve evidently
experienced many failures and frustrations.
10
CO 02 7 8 469 UNCLASSIFIED
26. Despite thc limitations of our collection, wc bclicvc tIiat tIic Soviets mu=
not Itavc conducted more than a few antimissile missilc (AMM ) firings to ao-
:i tmosplicric nltitudcs witliout our knowledge. Tlicy probably liave not attctnptcd
full system tests involving intercepts at tlicse altititdcs. Furthermore,
tvc' cstitnatc that tlic Sovicts nrc likely to carry out full antiballistic missile (ABM)
syatctn tcsts (perhaps cxcluditig use of nuclear warlicnds) against targets having
or sitnulntiiig ICBM clinrxtcristics. Although the Soviets could conduct sotnc
sitcli tcsts without ow knowlcdge, we believe thnt tlic clinticcs iirc good t h t
we would ncquirc sitfficicnt evidence to identify sucli testing ici ;idv:iiicT of tlic
:icIiicvctncnt of an operational capability.
. 29. Tlic Soviets almost certainly have not as yet tcstcd AhlMs with iiuclcar
warlieads. Although the nuclear tests conducted at Sary Sliagan in late 19G1
and 1962 wcrc not of this nature, the Soviets may have derived some data on
thc dcstructivc effects of exoatmospheric nuclear bursts from them. We know
of no tests that they have conducted specifically for tliis purpose. but they could
have acquired some information on, these effects without our kiiowlcdgc from
underground tests.
Defense of Moscow
30. We estimate that the Soviets are now deploying a11 ABM system for tlic
defense of M o s y . ~ . We do not yet know thc characteristics of this system, or
how it will function. We believe, however,'that we have ibentitied some OF
its key elements. There are several large radars in the northwestern USSR and -
facilities in the Moscow area which probably serve the functions of early warnitig,
target acquisition and tracking, and missile guidance. In addition, it is
possible that the Galosh missile. which the Soviets displayed in 1964, is associated
with the system.
31. The Soviets are constructing very large radars in the northwest,
which probably are intended to function as part of a ballistic missile defense.
These dual Hen House radars are being installed at Olenegorsk on the Kola
Peninsula and at S h n d a on the Baltic coast, and could be operational in 1966.
These radars, developed at Sary Shagan, probably are phased-arrays transmitting
at a relatively low frequency, ia, in the VHF Land. They arc oriented in
such a fashion as to be able to detect ICBMs launched from the YS toward most
targets in western USSR: they will probably also be capable of detecting ballistic
missiles launched by submarines in the Norwegian Sea and the NO* Atlantic
at targets in the Soviet northwest We believe that these radars will serve a
ballistic missile early warning function, and may provide some tmcking and
prediction data for use by AMM launch units. They will probably have ;I
secondary task of satellite detection and tracking.
32. The Soviets are constructing a huge radar (Dog House) of a different
configuration about 30 miles southwest of MOCOW. Although we know of no
prototype for this radar, we think it evolved from developmental. work at Saty
Shagan and that it too is a phased-may. It is situated so that the northern
- . . . . , . .. . ..... .. .I .. . .. . . , . -:. ..I PI AC!QLELKn I
COO2784 69 UNCLASSIFIED
face could scan tlic ICBM tlircnt corridor to Moscow; n southern fam may be
itddcd rvliich could scan thc Polaris threat from southern launch points. We
tliink that this radar is intcndcd to scrvc as A long-range acquisition and early
tiirgct tracking facility for any ballistic missile dcfcnscs in the Moscow area. and
c:ould I x operational in 1961. As with tlic Hen I-Iouscs. tlic Moscow radar may
linvc A sccondnry function as part of a satcllitc detection and tracking system.
33. In addition to the Dog House, the Soviets arc continuing to work on a series
of "triads" locatcd at somc of the outer ring SA-1 sites in Moscow. A triad
consists of onc large building and two smaller ones, each probably having a
disli-type radar atop. We believe that the triads will provide final target trackiiig
and missile guidancc for thc Moscow ABM system.
34. If Calosh or a similar missile is to be uscd, the system is likely to bc
intended to perform exoatmospheric intercepts at ranges up to some 300 miles.
On thc other hand, the Moscow system may be designed to use another type of
missile and to achieve atmospheric intercepts of incoming warheads. It is even
possible that both types of missiles and intercepts are planned for the,system.
Regardless of the system's characteristics, we estimate that ballistic missile
defenses at Moscow could achieve some capabiIity as early as 1967, but we
think a more likely date for an initial operational capability is 1968.
Other Possible Deployment
. -35. We have previously discussed defekive deployments'at Leningrad whYich
may have originally been intended as a dual-purpose system to defend against
both aerodynamic vehicles and ballistic missiles (see paras. 25 and 26). We
presently estimate that the system now under deployment at the Leningrad
complexes and the other similar complexes in the northwestern USSR is intended
for air defense, but we cannot exclude the possibility that its purpose is ballistic
niissile defense.l2 Considering the locations of these complexes, such an ABM
system would be designed for area defense using a barrage-type, exoatmospheric
intercept.
Prospects for Missile Defenses
36. The USSR will almost certainly continue its extensive R and D effort
on antimissile defense. This effort will be directed generally toward countering
the increasingty sophisticated threat that will be posed by US strategic missile
forces. Whatever the present characteristics of the Moscow system, we believe
that future defenses will provide for hth long-range exoatmospheric intercept
and short-range intercept within the atmosphere.
37. We believe that over the next ten years the USSR will extend its antimissile
defenses beyond the Moscow area The evidence is insufficient for us
to estimate with confidence the scale or timing of such deployment or to determine
whether point or area defenses will be emphasized. We believe, however,
that the Soviets will deploy ABM defenses for major urban-industrial areas.
.
"For dissenting views to this judgment, see fmtnater 10 and 11 to paragraph 24.
Uy 1975, they could deploy dcfcnscs for sornc to 30 n r c ~ coirtaining :I clu;lrtcr -
of tlic Soviet population and morc than half of Soviet industry.
IV. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSES
38. Tlic Soviets continuc to RC'L'IISC thc US of cniploying its spacc vcliicles
iii;liiily for reconnaissancc and cspionagc purposes, and their traditional concern
tor military secrecy gives tlrc Soviets an inccntivc to dcvclop defenses apinst
US satellites. In addition, the Soviets arc probably concerned that the US will
cvcntually develop space weapon systems. They could already havc developed
x limited antisatellite capability based on ail operational missile (c.x.. tlic SS-41
with a nuclear warhead and on existing electronic facilities. Wc have iro cvidcnce
that they liave done so. In any cvcnt, we believe that tlic Soviets would
prefer to have a system which could track foreign satellites morc accurately ?nd
permit the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms.1s
/
39. The Soviets are constructing a series of large Hen Iiouse radars, most of
which will probably be completed in the next year or two. Thc locations and
orientations of these radars indicate that they are intended for a space surveillance
system. The Hen House radars at Olenegorsk and S h n d a and the Dog
House radar associated with ABM deployment at Moscow probably have a
secondary role of space surveillance, and they are likely to be linked together
with the other Hen Houses to form a satellite detection and tracking system.
Such a system would enable the Soviets to observe and tr&k satellites during
most of the passes over the USSR. It probably would allow the Soviets to
predict the orbits and positions of non-Soviet satellites and space vehicles with
a high degree of accuracy after a few crossings over the USSR, and thus could -.
' provide the information required by an antisatellite system.
40. An antisatellite system employing these radars could use an existing missilc
with a nuclear warhead. Non-nuclear kill, on the other hand, would require n
homing missile capable of exoatmospheric maneuver which could be developed
in about two years after a decision to do SO. Although we have no evidence of
such development, it could be well under way without our knowledge. We
believe, therefore, that at about the time the Hen Houses become operational
the Soviets could have an antisatellite capability with either nuclear or nonnucIear
kill. We consider the latter more likely because the capabilities of the
Hen House radars appear to exceed that required for a nuclear kill.
41.. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we estimate that the Soviets
will have an operational antisatellite capability with a sophisticated system
"Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligenrr and RcKarcli. Dcliarttiicnt of Stntc.
believes that the rationale presented in this paragraph for a Soviet nntuttellitc prugrniii
places undue emphasis on the Soviet conccrn over US peacetime satellite operations. Hc
believes that the Soviets have been concerned more generally with the future of spare as
a military environment Moscow would wish to develop a contingency clpability for wartitile
use against the broad spectrum of possible rndibry space missions. T h e would include
systems for military support, such as reconnaissance, communications, and navigation utrIIites,
ac well as the possibility of spaceborne wwpons systems.
-.
within thc ncxt few ycars. Tlic dccision to usc this capability in peacctime
would, howcvcr, confront tlic Soviet lcaders with vcry serious problems. AItliorigh
they Iiavc displaycd growing mnccrn ovcr US satcllitc opcrations,
tlw Soviets would rccognizc that damaging or dcstroying a US satellite
could stirnulatc Wcstcrn military programs and cxpose thcir own satcllites
to attack. Attacking a manncd US satcllitc would carry wcii graver consc-
(ILICI~CCS. iticliiding thc risk of US rctaliatory action against any manncd Soviet
satcllitc. Wc thcreforc bclicvc that thc USSR would attack a US satcllitc
in peacetime only if, along with a strong desire for sccrecy, the Soviets werc
willing for other reasons to grcatly disrupt East-West rclation~.~'
!
V. CIVIL DEFENSE
42. Military control of Soviet civil defense has increased steadily since 1960.
when the program was shifted to the Ministry of Defense. The ranks of the
military officers assigned to civil defense staffs have also been upgraded, and
the curent head of the program is a Marshal and a Deputy Minister of Defense.
During the same period, the Soviets have continued to implemenl compulsory
training courses for the general public; we estimate that as many as one hundred
million Soviets have been exposed to inshction, and that many have been highly
trained in basic civil defense procedures. In their training, the Soviets.have
been emphasizing ways to conduct strategic urban evacuation and construction
. of simyle homemade. fallout shelters. They have also created mobile units, or
rescue-columns, to provide post-attack assistance both in urban and rural areas.
The effectiveness of these procedures depends on strategic warning. Furthermore,
apathy on the part of the public has tended to reduce the planned effectiveness
of this training.
43. We calculate that there are about 25 million fallout shelter spaces available
for the urban population, or roughly one space for every five city-dwellers.
Most of these shelters were built during the 195Os, when new public buildings
and apartment houses were constructed with special basements for civil defense
purposes. Since the late 1950s the Soviets have severely curtailed their urban
shelter construction program, and we have no evidence to indicate that they are
planning a resumption of a major shelter construction program. They have, however,
probably made some provisions for including shelters in certain public facilities
now under construction. In view of the program's emphasis on urban evacuation
and rural self-reliance, we believe that the Soviet leadership does not expect
the present civil defense program to provide significant protection for more
than a small portion of the population. Although the Soviets might during the
decade resume large-scale shelter construction, we think that other demands of
Soviet resources, particularly those for advanced weapon systems, will prevent
such a development
" Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State,
believes that the Soviets would conclude that the adverse consequences of destroying or
damaging US.sate1lites in peacetime would outweigh the advantage of such an action. He
therefore believes it highly unlikely that they would attack US satellites in pucctime.
I
I
.
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED
. ..
ANNEX
TABLE I: SOVIET INTERCEPTORS AND F~CHTERS:
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE IN AN
. AIR DEFENSE ROLE
TABLE 2: SOVIET SAM SYSTEMS:
. ..
ESTIMATED CHARACTERIST[CS AND PERFORMANCE
15
CO 0 2 7 8 4 6 9 U NCLASSI F I ED -
TABLE 1*
SOVI 6'1' I NTllRCEPTOIZS ANI) FICIITERS: ESTIMATED CI1AILACTEILISTICS ANU 1'Eltl~OI~h.IANCE
IN AN A I R DEFENSE ItOLE
I'ICESCO A (MIG-17)
FLtESCO I3 (MIC-17)
FRESCO C (MIC-17)
FRESCO 1) (MIC-17)
FRESCO E (MIG-17)
FLASHLIGHT (YAK-25)
FARMER A (MIG-19)
FARMER. E (MIC-19)
1953
1953
1954
1955
1954
1955
1955
1957
FARMER C (MiC-19) 1957
FARMER D (MIG-19) 1957
FARMER E (MIC-19) 1959
FITTER (SU-7) ' 1959
FISHPOT (SU-9) 1959
FISHBED C (MIC-21) I 1960
FISHBED D (MIC-21) I 1962
FISHEED E (MIC-21) ' 1961
FIRE BAR 1964
. See I O o t n O k s at end or h b l c .
16
EN- .IT COLlB.\T
TEflED Ol7ILIUY CEILING
SERV- ALTlTUDE (FEET)
hlODEL I C E (KNOTS)
GO5
GO5
620
620
605
610
755
755
755
755
74 5
I , 205
1,205
1,150
I , 150
1,150
1,100
53,400
53,4w
54,500
54,500
53,400
49,400
54,500
54,500
54,500
'54,500
54,900
57,600
58.000
61,500
61,500
61,500
56,100
).(A XI Ll U LI
EFFEC-
11.4 DI us
(K. u.)
540 ,
540
510
510
540
575
520
520
520
520
520
580
540
450
450
450
500
. < En SEARCHI L'ITACK Al7ACK RANGE cArA- cAr.\- TnAcK MAIS DILITY (N.M.) .tRLIALIEI;T (N.U.) BILITP No No No Yes YeS YeS No Yes No No YCS No YeS No YeS No YeS . . . tiuils/RockcLs 0.5 Tail Attack CunsIRockcG 0.5 Cuns/Rockcts 0.5 Cuns/Ilockcts 0.5 AAbfs 2-3 Cuns/Roc$ets 0.5 AAMs 2-3 Guns 0.5 CunelRockets 0.5 Guns 0.5 CuoslRockets 0.5 Cuns/Rockets 0.5 AAMs 3-4 GuosIRockets 0.5 AAMs 5-6. AAMs 3-4 AAhls 5-6 -c AAMs 5-6 AAMs 5-6. AAMs 10-12 Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack - Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack' .- COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED ENTEIIEII 5 C IIVLIOUCI, ICE L'1I)IJLEIL I'JGGI9G7 I hI I' It 0 V E U \VISATIIBI: INTLlt- I!IGS CEI'TOIL ' A L 1,- I'JG7- [All'lL~\'ElJ TACTICAL IW7- FIC'HTEIL f 1 'JGS ll.\U.\ IC ll.\ SUE *E.\lICII/ fll.\CK XI.\iS (5. XI .) 40/3U AAhIs W I G AAhls .\ i i ~ i .\ &I t x r Attnch Maximum ~ p m l s and combat ceilings havc k n calculatcd indcpciidcittly and caitiiot bc acliicvcd oii lbc aaiitc Ilight profile. Soviet bfacli 2 iittcrccptom cquippcd witli ecarch/lrack radars haw tlic capability to iliakc iiitcrccpb, \ V i l l i liiititccl cffcctivciicss, in dynamic cliinb against subsoiiic targcfs at altitudcs oti the unlcr of i ( I , o W fwt ~-1icn ucidw closc GCI direction. With cxtcriial fuel. -c + - d Scarclr and track pcrforinaiiccs dcnotc raiigu: oiily. a Infrarcd missilcs do not rcquirc radar guidancc; tltcrcforc, visual nthek cuii bc IIIU~C n L Llrc cIk!LiG ntitgc of L l i c ' Thcrc arc fcw Fittcrs and no Fishbcds in thc PVO Strany; both aircraft, Iio\vcvcr, nrc clcploycul iii lnrgc iru~ulxrs iii Thcsc models, along wvitli thc Improvcd Tactical Figlttcr, nrc iiiciutlnl in tlic tablc Imausc of 8 NOTE: In addition, an advanccd all-\vveatlicr intcrccptor \ritli cruise spcwJs iii thc Macli S wgioii uiitl it 3GOo uthch inissile. Tactical Aviation units. their capabilities as interccptors. capability could bc opcrational in thc carly 19705. - - 17 COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED TABLE 2 SC)VZST S L X E?’STZ:.:S: EST: MATZI? CX.’. R:.STZZ!CT:S AND PERFORMANCE SA- 1 SA-2 SA-3 SYSTEM a 60 G 4 (dual) Launchcrs Per Site Maximum Operational Rnngc (nm) b 20-25 d About 25 About 12 Maximum Effective Altitude (It) GO, 000 ‘ 90,000 ‘ 25,000-35.000 Minimum Effective Altitude (It) a ’ 3,000 Simultaneous Target Handling Ca- 20 Rate of Simultaneous Fire Per Site 20 . Warhead 1,500 c 1,000h 1 1 3 4 pacity Per Site HE 1 HE 1 HE For discussion of the long-range SAM system, nee paras. 24-25 and the footnoted thereto. 0 Such factors as siting conditions and target speeds influence low altitude capabilities. d Recent information indicates that thc SA-1 range and altitude capabilities probably have bcen improved. Thus. the capabilities of thin eystcrn could be greater than shown above. This range is estimated for sites equipped with the “C” Band Fan Sang fire control radar. . b-Range will vary with sire, altitude, speed, and approaching directlon of target. -- For those sites equipped with “S“ Band mdnr, the range is 17 n.m. I The SA-2 hss some eflectiveness above this altitude. = Thls low-altitude capability is for sites equipped with the “C” Band radar or modified For those site equipped with the original “S” Band radar, the low- We have no evidence 88 to the minimum effective altitude capabilities of thia system. I The Soviets almost certainly will provide some of these missiles with nuclear warheads, “S’ Band radar. altitude capability is 3,000 feet. and may have begun to do BO. 18 . . . - - . .. , 4 . *.- . I I R I P I A C W . .. . i , I IC 0 0 2 7 8 4 2 U NC LASS1 F I ED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This document wos disseminoted by the Centrol Intelligence Agency. This copy is tor the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on o need to know bosis. Additional essentiol dissemination may be authorized by the following oficiols within their respective departments: a. Director of Intelligence and Reseorch, for the Deportment of Stote b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Offce of the Secretory of c. Assistant Chief of Staff far Intelligence, Deportment of the Army, for the d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Deportment of the e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Deportment of the Air f. Director of NSA, for the Notional Security Agency g. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission h. Asristont Director, FBI, for the Federol Bureau of Investigation Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Deportment of the Army Novy Force i. Director for Centrol Reference, CIA, for any other Oeporiment or Agency 2. This document moy be'retoined, or destroyed by burning in accordonce with opplicoble security regulotions, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by orrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 3. When this document is disseminated overseas, !he overseas recipients moy retain it for o period not in excess of one yeor. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned io the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwording ogency to retoin it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. Blitzer Dept of Jihad Chyron
EXCERPT:
Blitzer: CNN's 'Dept. Of Jihad' Chyron Was Offensive
Justin Elliott | March 5, 2010, 6:28PM10
CNN's Wolf Blitzer just expressed regrets for a graphic shown yesterday that read, "Dept. of Jihad?"
"CNN had no intention of suggesting that the Justice Department supports terrorism," he said. "Lawyers at the Justice Department are patriotic Americans, and we certainly regret any confusion that may have been caused by our graphic."
The graphic came before a segment yesterday on the ad by Liz Cheney's group that attacks DOJ officials who previously represented Guantanamo detainees.
This is my '8th' day of my hunger strike and first of all, I need to get this oughta the way............ on the 2nd day I fudged and ate french fries and a bite of a bacon cheese burger from Wendys... SO, I guess I'm not really into my 8th day. I'm in my 6th day. (I can't have any of this based on lies so that's why I'm clearing this up. The reason I ate the stuffs is my son-in-law is very fragile these days and I didn't wanna get him off track in his journey. He's doing real good; growing tomatoes and stuffs on the porch and trying to do all this within his own ways.)
I'm trying to hold down a couple of fronts here so wanted to keep straight, k? I still have anger management problems with my son-in-law and try to always simply be non judgemental. (It's asif I live in a parellel universe, eh?) He's a good loving man but this is the hardest thing I think I've ever gone thru as he never sees what his 'ways' does to the kids. (Did I see what I was doing to my own kids when I was a falling down drunk??? NO!) I know he would change in a heart beat if he could but it ain't that easy.) .........anyways past my transgressions and onto this blog.
God has informed me that he's 100% behind my hunger strike. Hey, you wanna know how I know he supports me? hmmmmmmmmm
Back in the day, I had a major drinking problem. I mean to tell you I thought I was a lifer and it scared the hell out of me but for the life of me, I couldn't stop. I'm a telling you I threw up, blacked out, shit myself and drove when I was blacked out................ anyways, it was not a pretty site and was the darkest period of my life............ worst of it all my kids saw me through all of this.
One day I woke up and said this is a done deal and I'm quitting. (Sounds pretty freakin brave, doesn't it?) I didn't know if I could do it or not but I did it. I said it out loud and it became a reality.
I guess I'm different from others that claim they can never drink again. I can on occasion have a drink or two and I'm NEVER tempted to continue until I'm falling down drunk in a pool of vomit.
I always feel it was a higher intervention and now with what I've experienced this last week realize I was right. God was behind it.
BTW, if God isn't from this earth, what does that make him? ALIEN, eh?
This week I haven't had an urge to eat after the little bacon, cheese, hamburger incident? (God or whoever did tell me that getting all that 'shit' stuffs completely out of my body was better than eating it.)
This morning I was wrestling with all the stuffs God has been trying to teach me the last few days and WOW, he came through again. I have had some wild and vivid dreams about space crafts and airplanes and it has simply been awesome.
While I lounged a bit in bed this morning it 'finally' dawned on me the next step in this journey....... studying and learning what the HELL the evils are doing in the 'spacewar' sector??? OMG!!!
If the bastards are doing what they are doing Right HERE on OUR world, what are they doing out in the universe in our names?
I wrestled a bit with it and then I fell off in a nap only to be in another dream. God, again??????????? YEP!!!! You Betcha!!! It's very funny cause I never know it's God as he simply talks to me and persuades me?????????? Go figure eh?
HeShe let me know that it's time to move onto the next part of this journey. It's time to put the 'EVILS' in holding cells and ship them off to the open universe on a vessel that will keep them in 'limbo' for the next hundred or so years.
It's time to get on!
I shared with him about my PR campaign I was working through with this hunger strike. He said that was all well and good but if others aren't paying attention, how did I expect that to work. (He knows of my fear of being in public.) hmmmmmmmmmmm I told Him/Her my own kids would simply say I was starving for attention and he gently let me know I had to let them travel on their journys at their own pace and I couldn't let what they thought of me stop or slow down my pace in mine.
I woke up. Of course HE/SHE was gone as HE/SHE only comes to me thata way. I hem hawed around for a while and came up with this to share with you guys.
Here's the deal............... we can schedule me on the Lopez Tonite Show and 'The View' and maybe even Steven Colbert.............. Here's the clencher........ I will be in hologram form????????? ...anyways, I'm still thinking on this as I don't even wanna be the person answering the questions, I want you guys to do this. (I'm gonna put 2 pictures of me on the this blog and you can use either one.) The curly one is me in the 70's and the other is me in the 90's.) your call.......... (Hey, you can even use me in cartoon form if you wanna........... I'll put my version of cal on the right as well.) maybe the cartoon version isn't such a good idea as that wouldn't really be a hologram, would it?
You are welcome to use my name as well. Dedra Lee Anderson Cipriani McCullough b/d 3/19/1848
Bill Gates holographic appearance
EXCERPT:
Bill Gates addressed a 400-person audience at the World Congress of Information 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, which is nothing unusual except for the way he did it: he appeared using a 15.1-foot holographic projection, probably starting his five-minute pre-recorded speech saying "I'M GOING TO EAT YOU ALL!!!" followed by a megalomaniacal laughter. Sadly, that didn't happen and he looked more like a giant-sized Yoda than an Oz-bound Palpatine.
The 15.1-foot projection is a lot bigger than the first holographic appearance by a public personality, a life-sized Prince Charles at Abu Dhabi's World Future Energy Summit
Should the United States
“Weaponize” Space?
Military and Commercial Implications
EXCERPT:
Control of space is at the crux of the debate
about the future of U.S. military space policy.
The question is not about militarizing space.
Clearly, we have been using and will continue to
use space for military purposes. But, whereas we
are currently using space assets to support terrestrial
(ground, sea, and air) military operations,
what Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.), the Space
Commission (which was chaired by current
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), and
others have proposed is that the United States
move toward “weaponizing” space for space control.
Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. military
policy for space argue that the United States is
more reliant on the use of space than is any other
nation, that space systems are vulnerable to
attack, and that U.S. space systems are thus an
attractive candidate for a “space Pearl Harbor.”
But as important and potentially vulnerable as
current U.S. space-based assets may be, deploying
actual weapons (whether defensive or offensive)
will likely be perceived by the rest of the
world as more threatening than the status quo.
Any move by the United States to introduce
weapons into space will surely lead to the development
and deployment of anti-satellite
weapons by potentially hostile nations. As the
dominant user of space for military and civilian
functions, the United States would have the
most to lose from such an arms race.
Although there are legitimate (and unique)
military requirements for space assets, virtually
all are “dual use.” Military requirements should
not necessarily dictate those other uses. In fact,
commercial efforts in space often lead those of
the government and the Department of Defense
and usually have lower costs, due to market
influences and competition.
National security must be one component of
total U.S. space policy, but it must certainly not
be the primary component. In the post–Cold
War environment—with no immediate threat
from a rival great power and none on the horizon—
the United States must not establish overstated
and costly military requirements for
space-based resources. The military must make
greater use of commercial space assets. Also, the
United States should strive to foster an environment
that allows commercial space activity to
grow and flourish rather than use it to create a
new area for costly military competition.
Should the United States
“Weaponize” Space?
Military and Commercial Implications
by Charles V. Peña and Edward L. Hudgins
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Charles V. Peña is senior defense policy analyst and Edward L. Hudgins is former director of regulatory studies at
the Cato Institute.
Executive Summary
No. 427 March 18, 2002
Introduction
Before becoming secretary of defense,
Donald Rumsfeld chaired two blue ribbon
commissions at the request of Congress. The
first—called the Rumsfeld Commission—
issued the “Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States.” The report received much
attention because it raised the specter of a
ballistic missile threat to the United States by
so-called “rogue states” and concluded that
the threat was more imminent than had been
predicted by an earlier National Intelligence
Estimate. The second—but probably lesser
known—commission chaired by Rumsfeld
was the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and
Organization, more commonly referred to as
the Space Commission. The report of this
second Rumsfeld commission (released in
January 2001) has received less attention, but
its conclusions are similarly foreboding:
• The United States is more dependent
than any other nation on the use of
space.1
• Space systems can be vulnerable to a
range of attacks.2
• Nations hostile to the United States
possess or can acquire the means to disrupt
or destroy U.S. space systems.3
• The United States is an attractive candidate
for a “space Pearl Harbor”4
As a result, the Space Commission recommended
“that U.S. national security space
interests be recognized as a top national security
priority”5 and that “the U.S. must develop
the means both to deter and to defend against
hostile acts in and from space.”6 Even though
the Space Commission report has received less
media attention than the first Rumsfeld
Commission report, its conclusions and recommendations
could have a greater and
broader impact now that Rumsfeld is secretary
of defense.7
Space is the new military “high ground,” as
highlighted in a January 2001 war game—the
first one that focused on space as the primary
theater of operations. That war game, conducted
at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, postulated
a conflict taking place in 2017 between
“Blue” and “Red” forces (resembling the United
States and China, respectively). Both sides possessed
space weapons as well as ground-based
lasers. The Blue side had a national missile
defense and the Red side had anti-satellite
weapons.8 For the first time, a war game actually
fought a war with weapons in space rather
than just using space systems to support
ground, sea, and air operations—seemingly taking
its cues from the Space Commission report
and the incoming Bush administration’s interest
in the military uses of space.
Given that space is likely to be a new
national security priority during the Bush
administration, it is worth examining
defense space policy in both its military and
its commercial implications. This study will
address the following issues:
• What are the military and civilian/
commercial uses of space?
• What are the threats (both near- and
long-term) to space assets?
• How can the United States best
respond to those threats?
• How do the military uses of space
affect (either adversely or positively)
civilian/commercial uses?
It is important to point out that the issue is
not whether the United States should militarize
space. The militarization of space has already
occurred and will continue. The more immediate
issue is whether we should weaponize space,
at least in the near- or mid-term, and more
important, whether military uses and requirements
in space should be the driving force
behind our national space policy.
Military Uses of Space
More than a decade ago, John M. Collins
at the Congressional Research Service wrote:
2
The militarization
of space has
already occurred.
The more immediate
issue is
whether we
should weaponize
space.
Space, the ultimate “high ground,”
overarches planet Earth, its occupants,
and all activities thereon.
Effective use of that medium for military
purposes therefore may be
needed to safeguard national interests
in survival, security, peace,
power, stability, and freedom of
action.
Every technologically advanced
land, sea, and air service already
depends on space satellites. . . .
Reliance continues to increase,
because systems in space offer strategic
and tactical advantages that are
otherwise unavailable. . . .
Military interests in space almost
surely will intensify and spread during
the next decade.9
In order to understand the debate over
weaponization of space, one must know the
military uses of space, which include integrated
tactical warning and attack assessment
(ITW&AA), weather and environmental monitoring,
satellite communications (satcom), surveillance
and reconnaissance, navigation and
positioning, space control, ballistic missile
defense (BMD), and force application (i.e.,
using weapons that travel through or are based
in space). For more detail, see the Appendix.
ITW&AA
ITW&AA is a unique military requirement
that cannot be met using nonmilitary
resources. It is essentially monitoring the signs
of attacking long-range aircraft and missiles,
either toward the United States or within a theater/
region of operations. The Defense Support
Program satellites, using infrared sensors, currently
provide early warning and assessment
capability for attacks by long-range intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Space
Based Infrared System (SBIR) high program is
the planned follow-on to DSP.
Weather and Environmental Monitoring
Weather and environmental satellites are
an example of dual-use space satellites.
According to the RAND report: “Weather
satellite information is crucial to mission
planning for all the armed services, as well as
vital to civilian public safety and scientific
research around the world.”10 Currently,
both the Department of Defense (DoD) and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration have separate weather satellite
programs, which use different orbital
paths and instruments but use the same
orbital vehicle or bus.
Satcom
Communications probably represents the
single biggest use of space for both the military
and civilian/commercial sectors.
According to former U.S. Air Force vice chief
of staff Gen. Thomas S. Moorman Jr. (ret.):
“Space-based communications is the giant in
space commerce. The giant clearly will be
even more dominant in the future, and the
information revolution will be the driver.”11
Although the DoD operates several communications
satellites (or payloads on other
military satellites to provide communications
services)—for example, the Defense Satellite
Communications System, Air Force Satellite
Communications System (AFSATCOM),
Leasat, UHF Follow-On (UFO), and Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR)—this
segment is largely commercially driven.
Indeed, according to the RAND report: “The
technology for new satellite communications,
especially high-speed mobile services, is evolving
so rapidly that the DoD is planning to
make greater use of commercial systems
rather than fielding its own systems.”12
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Space-based remote sensing for surveillance
and reconnaissance is essentially an
extension of aerial observation done previously
by balloons and aircraft. Clearly, this is an
area where the military might have some
unique requirements—for example, a legitimate
concern that remote-sensing data cannot
be accessed by other (potentially hostile)
users to reveal the disposition and movement
of U.S. forces in times of crisis and war. This is
3
less of a concern if the military uses dedicated
satellites, but more of a concern if the military
is relying on shared satellites. Despite this
legitimate concern, “commercial remote sensing
offers the U.S. military potential new
sources of remote-sensing data without
requiring it to pay for the development of the
space system.”13 General Moorman believes
“that these new commercial capabilities will
both complement and reduce the numbers of
military and intelligence systems required.
The resulting savings could be substantial.”14
Navigation and Positioning
The Department of Defense operates a
constellation of 24 satellites that make up
the space segment of the Global Positioning
System. These satellites transmit precise time
signals; and receivers in view of the satellites
can calculate their positions and velocities
anywhere in the world.15
Although GPS was originally developed
for the military, the commercial GPS equipment
industry (i.e., receiver sales) is growing
rapidly. According to RAND, “Civilian and
commercial sales are outstripping defense
procurement of ground equipment, and the
user equipment industry is being commercially
driven by fierce competition in electronics
packaging, manufacturing, and software
technology.”16 A background paper prepared
for the Space Commission by Linda J.
Haller and Melvin S. Sakazaki claims that the
location/navigation sector has been growing
at a yearly rate of about 20–25 percent and is
expected to continue that growth to become
a major revenue-producing part of the worldwide
commercial space industry within the
next five years.17
Space Control
The term “space control” is often used in
the context of ensuring free passage in and
through space. The most common analogy is
to guaranteeing maritime commerce on the
high seas. However, Hays and Mueller, on the
faculty at the School of Advanced Airpower
Studies, reject this analogy. They contend
that commercial space activities are fundamentally
different from maritime merchant
shipping and air transport. Whereas merchant
shipping and air transport involve the
movement of goods and passengers, space
commerce involves either the collection or
transmission of information. Therefore, they
contend, commercial space activities have
more in common with the telegraph and
radio than with steamships and airliners. 18
The real essence of space control is the
ability to deny the use of space to an enemy.
Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) has stated:
(1) America’s future security and
prosperity depend on our constant
supremacy in space; (2) although we
are ahead of any potential rival in
exploiting space, we are not unchallenged,
and our future dominance is
by no means assured; and (3) to
achieve true dominance, we must
combine expansive thinking with a
sustained and substantial commitment
of resources and vest them in a
dedicated, politically powerful, independent
advocate for space power.19
Furthermore, according to Senator Smith:
“With credible offensive and defensive space
control, we will deter and dissuade our adversaries,
reassure our allies, and guard our
nation’s growing reliance on global commerce.
Without it, we will become vulnerable
beyond our worst fears.”20
Space control is at the crux of the current
debate about the future of U.S. military space
policy. Currently, space is used by the military
to support ground, sea, and air operations.
The Space Commission argues:
Space is not simply a place from
which information is acquired and
transmitted or through which
objects pass. It is a medium much
the same as air, land, or sea. In the
coming period, the U.S. will conduct
operations to, from, in, and through
space in support of its national interests
both on earth and in space. As
4
Space-based
assets themselves
are not the most
likely or easiest
targets of attack.
with national capabilities in the air,
on land, and at sea, the U.S. must
have the capabilities to defend its
space assets against hostile acts and
to negate the hostile use of space
against U.S. interests.21
Instead of merely using space assets to support
terrestrial (ground, sea, and air) military
operations as is done now, the Space
Commission and others have proposed that
the United States move toward weaponizing
space for the purposes of controlling it—in
other words, establishing space control by
exerting force application in space.
The Costs of Weaponizing
Space Outweigh
the Benefits
There are those who feel the United States
is currently at risk and should act now to
seize the military high ground in space.
Senator Smith has stated:
I do see an opportunity for us to exploit
this period of unchallenged conventional
superiority on Earth to shift substantial
resources to space. I believe we
can and must do this, and, if we do, we
will buy generations of security that all
the ships, tanks and airplanes in the
world will not provide. . . .
Control of space is more than a
new mission area—it is our moral
legacy, our next Manifest Destiny,
our chance to create security for centuries
to come.22
Not surprisingly, Senator Smith was instrumental
in getting the Congress to charter the
Space Commission.
The chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force,
Gen. Michael E. Ryan, has endorsed the
deployment of space-based weapons to protect
the nation’s satellites and predicted that
the United States would develop the capacity
to shoot down other countries’ satellites and
spacecraft.23 According to General Ryan: “We
have to in some way be able to protect those
assets, at least defensively. . . . I would suggest
that sometime in the future here, we’re going
to have to come to a policy decision on
whether we’re going to use space for defensive
and offensive capabilities.”24
Critics of such a policy shift are concerned
that weaponizing space could trigger a dangerous
arms race. They are quick to point out that
no country currently has weapons in space and
that a U.S. move to deploy weapons (either
offensive or defensive) would only provide
unneeded impetus for other countries to follow
suit. Jonathan Pike of Globalsecurity.org states,
“It [weaponizing space] runs fundamentally
against the main theme of our space policy for
the last half century—to demonstrate America’s
power in space in a nonthreatening way.”25 And
U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Hays and Karl
Mueller (both faculty at the School of Advanced
Airpower Studies) argue that “it is no longer
clear that the relationship between space and
national security is, or should be, shaped primarily
by international military competition.”26
Is there a clear and present danger in
space? And is becoming more militarily
active (including deploying weapons, either
defensive or offensive) in space the next logical
step?
Does the United States Risk a Space Pearl
Harbor?
As noted above, the argument the Space
Commission makes about the vulnerability
of space and the need to “develop and deploy
the means to deter and defend against hostile
acts directed at U.S. space assets and against
the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests”27 is
relatively straightforward:
• The United States is more dependent
on space than any other nation.
• The U.S. military is increasingly dependent
on space systems.
• U.S. security and economic well-being
depend on the ability of the United
States to operate successfully in space.
• Nations hostile to the United States
5
Although U.S.
satellites might
be vulnerable to
ASATs, the threat
is more hypothetical
than real.
either possess or can acquire the means
to destroy U.S. space systems.
• U.S. space systems are vulnerable to a
range of attacks.
Thus, the Space Commission warns that the
United States has not paid sufficient attention to
the threat and, as a result, “the U.S. is an attractive
candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor.’”28
It is indeed true that the United States is
more dependent on space than are other
countries and that the U.S. military in particular
is becoming increasingly dependent on
space systems. Furthermore, space systems
are currently undefended and, therefore,
potentially vulnerable to attack. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the United
States will suffer a “Space Pearl Harbor.”
Ground Stations More Vulnerable
According to the Space Commission,
“Nations hostile to the U.S. possess or can
acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S.
space systems by attacking the satellites in
space, their communications nodes on the
ground and in space, or ground nodes that
command the satellites.”29 Much of the
Space Commission’s focus has been on the
vulnerability of and threat posed to satellites
in space. However, Hays and Mueller point
out, “Satellites . . . are likely to be a more difficult
and thus less attractive target set for
direct attack under most circumstances than
are other components of space systems, such
as launch facilities or ground-control stations,
and if they are attacked, it will most
likely be through indirect means such as
communications jamming.”30 A background
paper prepared for the Rumsfeld Commission
also states that “one of the easiest ways
to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy the utility
of space systems is to attack or sabotage
the associated ground segments.”31
Thus, the more immediate concern
should be the vulnerability of ground-based
components. Those elements could be susceptible
to a variety of threats, including
direct military attack (e.g., with aircraft or
missiles), terrorist attack, sabotage, and jamming.
Space-based assets themselves are not
the most likely or easiest targets of attack,
particularly for so-called poor rogue states.
Thus, there is a less pressing need to focus on
space itself and the potential threats to spacebased
assets.
Theater missile defense systems and air
defense systems could be used to protect
ground stations from short-range ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft.
Commando attacks are another potential
threat, which requires appropriate responses
and safeguards. Thus, perimeter security
around satellite ground stations should be
increased.
Jamming
Electronic jamming is already within the
technical competence of many countries,
including Russia, China, Iraq, North Korea,
Iran, and Cuba.32 Most commercial and civilian
satellites do not have anti-jamming capability
and are, therefore, susceptible to such attacks.
Electronic jamming is a legitimate concern
because it can be done relatively easily
and cheaply. For example, two rookie engineers
from the U.S. Air Force Research
Laboratory were able to build a homemade
jammer using a petrol-driven electricity generator,
wood, plastic piping, and copper tubing.
The total cost was only $7,500, and all of
the required parts were obtained at an electronics
enthusiasts’ swap meet.33 According
to Steve Blum, president of Tellus Venture
Associates, a satellite consulting firm, sending
a signal up to a given satellite and jamming
it is nothing new.34 Also, satellite jamming
is relatively easy to trace.35
But jamming can be greatly mitigated by the
use of encryption or the use of anti-jamming
equipment. For example, Raytheon in the
United Kingdom has developed an antijamming
antenna for GPS that recognizes
sources of interference and, by adjusting the
way in which it receives the satellite signals,
rejects the interference, thus allowing the navigation
equipment to function accurately.36
Another effective way to defeat jamming
is through “frequency hopping,” which
6
A less interventionist
U.S. foreign
policy vis-Ã vis
China could
ultimately be
more conducive
to reducing any
potential ASAT
threat.
avoids interference from jamming on a particular
frequency by switching to a new frequency
after transmitting or receiving a
packet of data.37 When this method is used,
the signal can be effectively jammed only if
the jammer knows the frequencies being
used, the time during which they are being
used, and the sequence of use38—not easy
information to come by. The signal is more
resistant to jamming the faster the hops
between frequencies and the shorter the
information packets.
Since electronic jamming is an easier and
less expensive alternative to direct attack,
efforts should be made to employ as many
anti-jamming techniques and technologies
as possible, such as encryption, anti-jamming
equipment, and frequency hopping.
No Anti-Satellite Threat
Although the Space Commission report
and more ardent “space hawks” might lead
one to believe otherwise, there is no current
anti-satellite (ASAT) threat. In fact, operational
ASATs are vestiges of the Cold War era.
Richard L. Garwin, a physicist and senior fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations,
writes, “In the Cold War era, it was perfectly
clear that deployment of space weapons by
the Soviet Union would have led to an effective
ASAT deployed by the United States;
conversely, the Soviet Union was fully capable
of providing the necessary ASAT to
counter U.S. space weapons.”39 But in the
post-Soviet era, neither the United States nor
Russia has dedicated space ASAT weapons
deployed.40 According to RAND, no other
“nation possesses an operational ASAT capability
that poses a significant threat to U.S.
national security space systems.”41
Thus, although U.S. satellites—both military
and commercial—might be vulnerable to
ASATs, the threat posed by ASATs is more
hypothetical than real. Space Commission
staff member Tom Wilson states:
The proliferation of ballistic missile
and space technology has made it
easier to develop direct ascent antisatellite
weapons and to obtain the
capability to deliver nuclear warheads
into space. Studies have shown
that the detonation of a low-yield
nuclear weapon in LEO [low earth
orbit] will not only fatally damage
nearby satellites but will also increase
the naturally occurring radiation
around the earth, reducing most
LEO satellites’ lifetimes from years
to months. Many countries such as
China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and
Russia have this capability.42
It is important to point out that “this capability”
to which Wilson refers does not mean
that those countries have operational ASATs.
It means, rather, that those countries have a
nuclear weapons capability or they have a
capability to launch a payload into a low
earth orbit. It does not mean that they have
mated those two capabilities to develop and
deploy an ASAT weapon.
Moreover, the ASAT threat that is postulated
is a nuclear threat. According to noted
defense analyst James Kitfield, “The U.S. military
has long worried that an adversary might
detonate a crude nuclear weapon in space, frying
the delicate electronics of all satellites, and disproportionately
hamstringing U.S. troops
who rely on satellites for missile and bomb
guidance and for communications.”43 If such
a detonation were to occur, even though not
directed at a terrestrial target, the nuclear
threshold would have been crossed. Even a socalled
“irrational” adversary would have to
think twice before using a nuclear weapon.
And, certainly, the United States would view
such an attack differently than if a conventional
weapon had been used and would
respond accordingly. During the Cold War, a
distinct demarcation between conventional
and nuclear weapons existed. Even if lower
yield battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons
had been used (e.g., in a scenario involving a
Warsaw Pact invasion of a NATO country),
escalation to a larger-scale retaliation using
the United States’ strategic nuclear arsenal
was a very real possibility. Although a “doc-
7
The best and least
expensive way to
increase survivability
against a
potential
microsatellite
ASAT threat is to
use decoys.
trine” may not be in place to respond to a lowyield
nuclear ASAT scenario, the United States
would probably go beyond the use of conventional
weapons to retaliate. Potential adversaries
know this. For example, the United
States made clear to Iraq that use of chemical
or biological weapons would trigger an appropriate
U.S. response, including the possibility
of nuclear weapons.44
Microsatellite ASATs
One nonnuclear ASAT threat comes in
the form of microsatellites, also known as
parasitic satellites. These are small, lightweight,
inexpensive, and highly capable systems
that could perform a variety of missions
(many of them legitimate peacetime operations).
According to Wilson, microsatellites
could be used for counterspace operations by
being flown alongside a target until commanded
to disrupt, and then disable or
destroy the target. Detecting and defending
against such an attack would be difficult.45
Stephen Cambone, former special assistant
to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and
current principal deputy under secretary of
defense for policy, notes, “There are any
number of companies, both in the United
States and abroad, that are preparing to
deploy micro-satellites.”46 And Wilson cites
Chinese plans to develop and deploy a
microsatellite ASAT:
The Sing Tao newspaper recently
quoted Chinese sources as indicating
that China is secretly developing a
nanosatellite ASAT weapon called
“parasitic satellite.” The sources
claim this ASAT recently completed
ground testing and that planning
was underway to conduct testing in
space. The Chinese ASAT system is
covertly deployed and attached to
the enemy’s satellite. During a conflict,
commands are sent to the
ASAT that will interfere with or
destroy the host satellite in less than
one minute.47
But historically, Chinese plans for high-technology
weapon systems have vastly exceeded
China’s ability to successfully develop and
field them. For example, China has not been
able to develop and deploy a modern fighter
aircraft that is even remotely on par with former
Soviet or current U.S. planes.
Michael Krepon, founding president of
the Henry L. Stimson Center, points out:
Even if Washington decides not
to put weapons in space, Moscow
and Beijing might still pursue antisatellite
technologies. Although neither
Russia nor China can compete
effectively with the United States in
conventional or nuclear weapons or
in missile defenses, either country
could respond “asymmetrically” to
American superiority by damaging
U.S. satellites. The Pentagon defines
asymmetrical warfare as “countering
an adversary’s strengths by focusing
on its weaknesses.” Asymmetrical
warfare allows a weaker opponent to
level the playing field by unorthodox
means. Antisatellite programs are a
good example of asymmetrical warfare:
they are less expensive and technically
challenging than engaging in
conventional or missile-defense arms
races but allow a weaker opponent to
gain an edge (at least temporarily)
over a stronger one.
Given U.S. military predominance,
it will be difficult to dissuade
Russia and China from developing
ASATs. But it will be well worth the effort
to try, and it can be accomplished only if
the United States does not take the lead in
pursuing ASATs.48
In fact, a less interventionist U.S. foreign
policy vis-Ã -vis China could ultimately be
more conducive to reducing any potential
ASAT threat than deploying weapons (either
defensive or offensive) in space would be. A
good example is current U.S. policy toward
Taiwan and how it affects America’s relations
8
Possession of a
technology by a
potentially hostile
power does not
mean that the
country will be
able to translate
the technology
into an effective
military system.
with China. The Cato Institute’s vice president
for defense and foreign policy studies,
Ted Galen Carpenter, has stated:
In addition to the balance of military
forces, three factors are especially
important in determining whether
deterrence is likely to succeed or fail:
the importance of the interests at
stake to the guarantor power, the
importance of those interests to the
challenging power, and the inclination
of the challenging power to
gamble. All three factors work
against the United States in the case
of Taiwan.49
Recognizing that Taiwan is not a vital
American national security interest,
Carpenter recommends that the United
States issue a firm statement that it will not
become involved in any armed struggle
between Taiwan and mainland China.50 By
reducing the likelihood of such armed conflict,
this would reduce the incentive for
China to directly challenge the United States
by developing and deploying ASATs.
Even if the United States adopted a more
restrained foreign policy toward China, however,
it would be imprudent to dismiss the
potential Chinese ASAT threat completely,
especially given the reported ground testing
by China of a microsatellite ASAT. But in the
two years since that news was initially reported,
there have been no apparent follow-on
events to indicate that the Chinese are indeed
moving forward with space testing and eventual
deployment of the microsatellite ASAT.
Even if such a threat were to evolve, the
question is: What is the appropriate response?
If the supposed microsatellite ASAT were nonnuclear,
then “hardening” satellites against
nuclear explosions or electromagnetic pulse
would not increase their survivability.
According to Tom Wilson, maneuverability
would allow a satellite to evade or dodge a
directed ASAT attack, but adding maneuverability
to a satellite system would increase the
total cost by between 10 and 20 percent,
depending on the satellite altitude (warning
time), nature of the threat, and threat detection
efficiency.51 Also, self-defense would be
problematic because a microsatellite ASAT
would be difficult to detect and would probably
reside in an otherwise nonthreatening
satellite. And, of course, the United States
should not adopt a policy of shooting down
every Chinese satellite launched on the presumption
that it might contain a microsatellite
ASAT. Perhaps the best and least expensive
way to increase survivability against a potential
microsatellite ASAT threat is to use decoys
that simulate the radar and optical signatures
of the target satellite. Jamming systems could
also be employed to confuse an ASAT’s homing
system. Analysts estimate that satellite
decoys would increase the total system cost by
between 1 and 10 percent.52
Other Potential ASAT Threats
Other potential ASAT weapons include
laser, radio frequency (RF), and particle beam
weapons.53 Laser weapons would generate
intense beams of light to inflict thermal
damage on the target satellite. RF weapons
would emit an intense burst of radio energy—
usually either high power microwave (HPM)
or ultrawideband (UWB)—to disable the
satellite’s electronic components. Particle
beam weapons use accelerated atomic particles
(such as negative hydrogen or deuterium
ions) to generate an intense beam that disables
electronic components. Again, it is
important to emphasize that these are postulated—
not operational—ASAT weapons.
Further, they are all very technologically
advanced, extremely expensive, and therefore
outside the capabilities of most—if not all—
potential adversaries, especially rogue states.
The Quality and Costs of Space Systems
When evaluating a threat to U.S. spacebased
military and commercial assets, it is
important to note that possession of a technology
by a potentially hostile power does
not mean that the country will be able to
translate the technology into an effective military
system. During the Cold War, the Soviet
9
A military
requirement to
protect satellites
may be a way to
pursue development
and deployment
of a global
NMD.
Union had scientists and engineers doing
cutting-edge work, but it often found it
extremely costly and difficult to produce in
quantity—or sometimes prototype—the most
cutting-edge systems, equipment, or devices.
The race to the moon was a case in point. The
Soviet Union produced many space firsts but
ultimately could not produce refined, quality
systems that could be launched successfully,
time after time. America had its major mistakes
as well, such as the fire on the launch
pad of Apollo 1 in 1967. But America learned
from its mistakes and constantly improved
its systems, even ones run by the American
government.
In the late-1960s, the Soviet Union built
what for some years was the world’s largest
telescope, the Bolschoi Teleskop Azimultalnyi.
The problem was that it rarely worked properly.
At a more basic and humble level, the Soviet
Union was not able to produce quality consumer
products in quantity.
China, the country often feared as threatening
U.S. space-based assets, has quality
problems similar to those of the old Soviet
Union. For example, it has never been able to
produce in quantity a quality fighter plane,
which would be far more important to its
military needs than exotic space weapons.
Thus, the fact that a country possesses a technology
that could be developed to threaten
U.S. space assets is a reason for attention and
concern, but it is not a reason for new, costly
programs to counter phantom threats.
More to Lose Than to Gain
As important and potentially vulnerable as
current U.S. space-based assets might be,
deploying actual weapons (whether defensive
or offensive) would likely be perceived as very
threatening to the status quo. Because of this,
any move to weaponize space would likely precipitate
a response to counter such capability.
And weapons in space would indeed be tempting
targets for a preemptive attack by an adversary.
To be sure, not deploying weapons in
space is no guarantee that potentially hostile
nations (such as China) will not develop and
deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain
that deploying U.S. weapons in space will lead
to the development and deployment of ASATs
to counter such weapons. The United States
should therefore not be the first to weaponize
space—either with defensive weapons or with
offensive ASATs. But deploying defensive
decoys—rather than weapons—would not
inevitably lead to such an arms race.
In the final analysis, any near-term moves
toward weaponizing space are premature. If
the U.S. government is concerned that some
nations may find its military and commercial
satellites tempting targets, then the United
States ought to look first to its foreign policy
and military posture as a factor in motivating
those nations to take hostile actions toward
the United States. According to Richard Betts
at the Council on Foreign Relations,
“American activism to guarantee international
stability is, paradoxically, the prime
source of American vulnerability.”54
To the extent that the U.S. government is
concerned that a potential enemy might try
to knock out satellite-provided military capability,
such as GPS, it needs to also understand
the consequences of such action to the
attacker. If an adversary were to jam or
destroy GPS satellites, it would deny such
capability not only to the United States but
also to itself (unless, of course, it was using
the Russian Global Navigation Satellite
System, or GLONASS). Furthermore, the
United States can switch the encrypted military
P-code back on if deemed necessary for
national security reasons; it is presumably
more jam resistant than the commercial C/Acode.
Even in a worst-case scenario where
U.S. forces might be denied GPS signals, our
military personnel are sufficiently trained to
be able to use a map and compass to navigate
and determine their location.
Space and National
Missile Defense
Although it can be considered part of the
space control mission, ballistic missile
defense (BMD) is usually treated separately.
10
U.S. security
could ultimately
be reduced if
hostile nations
are spurred to
develop and
deploy ASATs in
response to U.S.
deployment of
space-based
missile defense.
And distinctions are usually made between
theater missile defense (TMD) and national
missile defense (NMD). The whole subject of
NMD and the debate surrounding it is
beyond the scope and purpose of this
paper.55 However, in the Bush administration,
it is important to understand that there
is a relationship between NMD and space
defense policy.
The Bush administration has made clear
its intentions to build and deploy an NMD
system. Despite opposition and concerns
from many different sources—domestic,
allied, and foreign (notably Russia and
China)56—the administration intends to
build a missile defense test site in Alaska (presumably
as a precursor to a land-based
deployment) and begin development within
four years of a multilayered shield that will
include ship-launched missiles and lasers
mounted on airplanes.57
Although the Bush administration has yet
to lay out in detail an exact plan or architecture
for a national missile defense system,
during the presidential campaign Bush
argued forcefully that a U.S. missile defense
system must protect not only the United
States but also friends, allies, and forces
deployed overseas.58 Bush also repeatedly
made clear that to move forward on NMD,
he intended to abandon the ABM Treaty.59
He recently carried out this pledge by giving
Russia the requisite six months’ notice of
U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.60
Certainly, any NMD system will need to
rely on space systems—at a minimum for
launch detection and early warning (currently
provided by the DSP satellites, which are
supposed to be replaced by the SBIRS high
satellites).61 Even a ground-based system (i.e.,
interceptors and radars) might be supported
by space-based sensors for midcourse tracking
and discrimination (such as the proposed
SBIRS low satellites).62
The question the president has left open,
at least for now, is whether NMD will include
space-based weapons. Bush has not specifically
excluded space-based weapons as part
of NMD and has abandoned the ABM
Treaty—hints that space-based weapons
could eventually become a reality.
Perhaps more important, however, is the
fact the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is
viewed by many as the architect and moving
force behind both missile defense63 and space
policy in the Bush administration. If
Rumsfeld is indeed the architect, then it is
reasonable to conclude that the prescription
for space policy outlined in the Space
Commission report might represent a blueprint
for action.
Specifically, the report argues that the
United States needs space-based weapons (to
defend satellites) and implies that we should
employ them as part of national missile
defense.64 United States space policy and capabilities—
as they have been described in the
Space Commission report and discussed by
some in the military—are, by their very nature,
global. As such, they only serve to foster a global,
space-based NMD system. In other words,
the only way to defend the panoply of satellites
orbiting the earth is to have a constellation
of space-based weapons to provide “space
superiority.” And those space-based weapons
will have an inherent capability to shoot at ballistic
missiles (whether they threaten the satellites
or not). Thus, a military requirement to
protect satellites (even in the absence of a true
anti-satellite or ASAT threat) may be a way to
pursue development and deployment of a
global NMD in a potentially less visible and
publicly debated way.
Previous Cato Institute reports have
argued that a national missile defense system
should be a truly national defense to protect
the United States homeland and not a global
defense to provide worldwide protection.65
The reasons that NMD should be limited to
protecting the United States include the following:
• The technology for a limited landbased
system is the most mature and is
currently in its early stages of operational
testing.
• U.S. allies are wealthy enough to build
their own missile defenses.
11
A vibrant commercial
space
industry will support
and enhance
U.S. military
capabilities far
better than letting
military
requirements
dominate space
policy.
• Any defense expenditure must be commensurate
with the threat, and the limited
ballistic missile threat does not justify
the large expenditures required for
a global, layered defense system.
• If thicker and wider missile defenses
cause U.S. policymakers to feel more
secure against missile attacks, they may
be more tempted to engage in reckless
overseas military adventures, which
would actually reduce U.S. security.
The concern here is that—much as missile
defense advocates have used sea-based missile
defense as an attempt to open the door to
a larger, more expensive global missile
defense66—space defense policy will be used
as a way justify and achieve a global—as
opposed to national—missile defense.
Indeed, if space policy is implemented as outlined
in the Space Commission report, a
global missile defense may be inevitable.
And if there are any doubts about the
inextricable relationship between space policy
and NMD under Rumsfeld, consider the
following statement by Senator Smith:
With the completion of the Rumsfeld
national missile defense and space
commissions, followed by the choice
of Rumsfeld to serve as the first
Secretary of Defense for the 21st century,
we were already batting threefor-
three. . . . Now, if Rumsfeld is able
to weave space and missile defense
into our national defense posture in a
way that makes them absolutely
essential, which I’m convinced he is
determined to do, then the potential
is there for a historic grand slam.67
Yet building a global NMD system may
actually be counterproductive. Such a system
would be able to shoot down not only ballistic
missiles but also ASATs as well as orbiting
satellites and spacecraft. Nations that feel that
the United States is trying to hold their satellites
at risk or prevent them from launching
satellites will have incentives (that would be
nonexistant in the absence of such a threat) to
develop ASATs, regardless of the technological
hurdles, and will be more likely to expend the
necessary resources to acquire such a capability.
Those ASATs could put the whole constellation
of U.S. military and civilian satellites at
risk. With the greatest dependence of any
nation on space assets (both civilian and military),
U.S. security could ultimately be reduced
if hostile nations are spurred to develop and
deploy ASATs (which they currently do not
have) in response to U.S. deployment of spacebased
NMD.
Weaponizing Space Could
Harm the Civilian Space
Industry
It is also important to consider the chain
of events that is likely to occur if the United
States tries to dominate space militarily and
the effects that weaponizing space could
have on the commercial space sector. John
Newhouse, senior fellow at the Center for
Defense Information, states:
The [Space Commission] report does
not call for but implies a U.S. need to
accelerate development of antisatellite
weapons, some of them space-based.
But deploying such weapons will press
other countries to develop and deploy
countermeasures. And in any such tit
for tat, the United States has the most
to lose, since it is far more dependent
on satellites for commercial communications
and data-gathering operations
than any other country. Among the
effects could be a sharp rise in the cost
of insuring commercial satellites and
an outcry from industry.68
In other words, weaponizing space could be
costly to an American industry that has great
promise to grow and increase its contribution
to the U.S. (and world) economy.
Ultimately, a vibrant commercial space
industry will support and enhance U.S. mili-
12
Lower costs for
space activities—
produced by private-
sector
efforts—would
mean a greater
capacity for
defense.
tary capabilities far better than letting military
requirements dominate space policy.
Therefore, the government should avoid
overregulating commercial space activities
and imposing costly military requirements.
For example, the Heritage Foundation has
recommended designating the Global
Positioning System as critical national infrastructure,
making the Department of
Defense the lead agency responsible for GPS,
and deploying a more secure GPS satellite
network.69 Although GPS was originally
designed for and is operated by the U.S. military,
70 it is now interconnected with commercial
satellites, and civilian and commercial
use now dwarfs military use. More stringent
military requirements imposed on the GPS
system could have adverse effects on the
commercial sector, such as increased complexity
and higher cost of equipment.
The past decade has seen expanded commercial
use of sophisticated communications
satellites for the Internet, television,
and other broadband applications, but commercial
suppliers still struggle under tight
launch and export restrictions. Currently
there are major efforts afoot in Congress to
ease federal regulations imposed on private
commercial space ventures, to deal with
structural problems caused by activities of
the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and to promote private
space ventures.71 Space-related defense systems
and strategies, if not wisely structured,
could seriously hinder the development of
future commercial activities in space and, in
the long run, could harm America’s defense
capabilities. Conversely, the Pentagon’s ability
to defend the nation could benefit from a
flourishing of commercial activities.
The weaponization of space could ultimately
lead to the federal government regulating
commercial satellites for military purposes.
As a result, the growth of private-industry
ventures in space could be hindered by poorly
conceived specifications and regulations in
the name of national defense. There are unintended
consequences of military requirements
on certain kinds of dual-use technology.
Consider NASA’s experience with designing
the Space Shuttle.72 In order to garner political
support for the shuttle, NASA asked the
Pentagon what capabilities it would want in
such a vehicle. The Pentagon replied that it
wanted the shuttle to be able to maneuver in
the atmosphere so that it might land at any
number of bases in the United States. Thus,
the shuttle, which had to be designed with
large wings, heated up more on reentry than
would a nonmaneuverable craft with far
smaller wings. This design required 34,000
heat resistant tiles, which of course added cost
to the shuttle. A nonmaneuverable vehicle
might have been able to use a different heatresisting
system. Further, in the early years of
the shuttle project, these custom-made tiles
tended to fall off, requiring more time and
cost to maintain the vehicles. In addition, the
tiles altogether weighed some 25,000 pounds,
cutting the shuttle cargo capacity in half.73
Thus, it is no mystery why the shuttle cost
so much and never became a commercially
viable system. In this case, the Pentagon did
not mandate the design of the craft, but
instead NASA chose the design for political
reasons. This example shows how the unintended
consequences of technology mandates
can hinder the development of the very
technology that is the target of the mandates.
Another current example of a government
intervention that is hindering space commercialization
is export licensing. The Strom
Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Act, passed in 1998, transferred export licensing
from the Commerce Department to the State
Department. The State Department has been
much stricter on exports than Commerce, producing
serious delays for businesses.
Sometimes the consequences of the export
control process are truly destructive to private
space efforts. Take the case of the company
MirCorp, owned 40 percent by private
Western investors and 60 percent by the
mostly private Russian rocket company
Energia. MirCorp wanted to export from the
United States to Russia a tether that would be
launched from Russia up to the Mir space station,
which MirCorp was in the process of
13
The current
threat to U.S.
satellites does not
warrant the nearterm
weaponization
of space.
commercializing. That tether would have
been deployed outside of Mir to provide the
station with power. But the State Department
delayed approval, only granting export permission
the day after the Russian government
decided to de-orbit Mir.
Certainly there are security concerns
about space-related exports. But the current
system does not focus narrowly on keeping
dangerous technology out of the hands of
America’s enemies. Rather, its overbroad and
often arbitrary rules cause considerable collateral
damage to American entrepreneurs.
To further illustrate how Defense
Department requirements imposed on the
commercial sector could stunt innovation
and growth, consider an analogy with the
computer and information sector. Lower
launch costs could revolutionize satellites in
the same way that personal computers (PCs),
software, and the Internet—developed
together, free from regulations—created syngeries
that revolutionized the PC itself. PCs
in the early 1980s, like their large mainframe
brothers, were used principally for storing
data and crunching numbers. Now PCs are
tools for entertainment, communications,
and undreamed of potential applications.
The development of the PC also has been
characterized by unprecedented increases in
processing capacity, hard drive space, and
reductions in price. For example, Moore’s Law,
(named after Gordon Moore, one of the
founders of Intel) states that processor speed
doubles, while prices drop by half, every 18
months. Although it is conceivable that some
of the technologies incorporated into PCs—
for example, the mouse—could have been
devised in government defense labs, making
PCs at prices that anyone can afford was the
achievement of private entrepreneurs.
Farsighted defense planners have long recognized
the importance of commercial sector
innovation to defense. For example, a
December 1999 report issued by the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Globalization
and Security discussed how the Department of
Defense depends on the private sector in the
United States to move faster than its overseas
competitors in developing new products and
new applications of technology.74 The
Pentagon builds on such commercial progress.
The benefits of the free-market growth in
PCs and software to national defense can be
seen in flight simulator software. For example,
Mike Coligny, the CEO of Flyit Simulators of
San Diego, observed that “we developed a
[helicopter] simulator that the government
typically would pay millions of dollars for, and
ours cost $65,000. It’s been on the market
since late July [2000].”75 And Ensign Herb Lacy
at the Pensacola Naval Air Station purchased a
$50 Microsoft Flight Simulator game that he
modified to recreate the controls of a T-34C
Turbo Mentor, for a total cost of only $250.
Using the same software as Lacy, the Navy created
six makeshift simulators at a cost of
$6,000 each, compared to millions of dollars
for conventional simulators.76
But the Pentagon’s interest in space activities
could short-circuit this process. For
example, defense specialists foresee greater
defense use of the commercial communications
network currently in orbit and are concerned
that the network should not be compromised
or blinded by an adversary. This
concern could prompt the Pentagon to seek
authority to mandate certain specifications
for commercial satellites that would make
them less vulnerable to potential enemies.
But such mandates could have adverse unintended
consequences similar to those that
might have occurred had the Pentagon decided
to set specifications on PCs to protect
them from disabling electromagnetic pulses
caused by atomic blasts. Twenty years ago, the
Pentagon might have reasoned that such a
requirement would make PCs more appropriate
for defense uses. Yet we know after the fact
that such a requirement would have added
significantly to the cost of PCs and forced
manufacturers to take such requirements
into account in every new phase of PC development.
In the end, the PC revolution as we
now know it might have been stillborn.
The bottom line is that if the Pentagon
needs satellites that are more resistant to
attack, it would be better to commission
14
Farsighted
defense planners
have long
recognized the
importance of
commercial
sector innovation
to defense.
hardened satellites specifically for its needs.
Buying such specialized satellites would be a
legitimate defense expenditure. The Pentagon
would likely have to spend more money than
it would if the government forced manufacturers
to accept certain costly standards, but
the latter approach would simply shift costs
to the private sector. Such private, societal
costs would likely be higher than the government’s
budget expenditures dedicated to military
satellites. The Pentagon would need to
plan its strategies on the assumption that a
private space network would be more vulnerable
than it might find ideal. But the alternative,
in the long term, would be a weakened
overall private satellite network that would be
less useful for defense purposes.
In any case, commercialization of space,
which could lead to lower launch costs and
more versatile satellites, would make for a
more extensive, redundant, and secure satellite
system. This redundancy would be good
for the Pentagon as a hedge against technical
failure, as well as making it more difficult and
costly for a potential adversary to destroy.
Other private efforts could also be a boon
for America’s defense. For example, Nevada
businessman Robert Bigelow and his company
Bigelow Aerospace plan to devote as much
as $500 million to developing a private space
station based on light yet durable inflatable
structures that would, with three launches,
place into orbit the same volume of interior
station space that would take NASA dozens of
launches, thus radically cutting costs.77 And
the Space Island Group, a U.S. company developing
space transportation systems and destinations,
proposes that the 150-foot tall external
fuel tanks for the shuttle, which currently
are jettisoned and burn up in the atmosphere
just before the shuttle enters orbit, be placed
in orbit as well to serve as platforms for space
activities.78 (Using tanks for stations is not a
new idea. It was the second stage of a Saturn 5
rocket that served as Skylab in the mid-1970s.)
Further, the Space Island Group is discussing
with Boeing the possibility of developing a
Shuttle II that would cost only 10 percent of
what the current shuttle costs. The proposed
Shuttle II would simply ferry tanks, passengers,
or cargo to orbiting platforms, eliminating
the requirements—and high costs—associated
with the current Space Shuttle design for
long stays in orbit.79
The combination of a private Shuttle II
and cheap orbiting platforms (e.g., privately
owned space stations) could be used to transport
military equipment in only one hour to
any point on the planet (compared with several
hours for aircraft and days for ships).
Other military support technologies likely
would result from increased commercial
activity. For example, extensive private space
activity would result in an increasing
demand for satellites that repair or reengineer
other satellites while in orbit.
Moreover, the Pentagon might be able to
utilize such repair satellites or other commercial
advances in satellite technology to
frustrate or counter the use of microsatellite
ASATs by a potential enemy. Developing
microsatellites that can be used to disable
American satellites would be an expensive
and time-consuming enterprise in any case. If
American satellite technology advances to
the point of making countermeasures easier,
that would add further to the costs of
microsatellite systems and make their effectiveness
problematic. These factors might
cause an opponent such as China to abandon
development of such systems.
America’s defense has relied on space technologies
and will continue to do so. During
the Cold War, submarine-launched nuclear
missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles were considered the ultimate
insurance against a Soviet attack. Overflights
of Soviet territory by reconnaissance planes
gave way to orbiting surveillance satellites.
Today’s sophisticated imaging satellites
played a crucial role in military operations in
Afghanistan. Communications satellites
form an indispensable part of the defense
command-and-control infrastructure. And a
potential future missile defense system (even
one with only ground-based interceptors) by
its nature will rely on space-based technologies.
Therefore, lower costs for space activi-
15
The Department
of Defense
should make use
of commercial
assets rather than
spend needlessly
on unique military
assets.
ties—produced by private-sector efforts—
would mean a greater capacity for defense.
Conclusion
The current threat to U.S. satellites does
not warrant the near-term weaponization of
space. Civilian space assets (which the United
States depends on more and more in day-today
life) are relatively more vulnerable than
military systems; they are not hardened
against nuclear attack and do not have antijamming
capabilities. John Logsdon, director
of the Space Policy Institute at the George
Washington University has stated: “There
appears to be no demand from the operators
of commercial communication satellites for
defense of their multibillion-dollar assets. If
there were to be active military operations in space,
it could be difficult not to interfere with the functioning
of civilian space systems.”80
Just as important is the relationship
between military and commercial uses of
space. Certainly, there are some uses of space
that are unique to the military—such as
ITW&AA. This is an area where military needs
and requirements cannot be met by commercial
systems. That is, the military will be the
sole user for systems such as DSP satellites,
which monitor missile launches worldwide.81
But virtually all other applications of space
are “dual use.” To be sure, military needs and
requirements must be recognized. For example,
the military and intelligence agencies may
have unique requirements for surveillance and
reconnaissance that can be met only with their
own dedicated satellites—either for reasons of
security of data or technical requirements (e.g.,
resolution, processing time). A similar situation
exists with regard to communications.
For example, Milstar is a dedicated military
satellite communications system that provides
secure, jam-resistant, nuclear-hardened
communications for all U.S. forces.82 But in
general, the military should make greater use
of commercial space satellites.
First, wherever possible, the Department
of Defense should make use of commercial
assets rather than spend needlessly on unique
military assets. For example, the military
should use existing communications satellites
for its nonsecure communications capability.
Former vice chief of staff of the Air
Force General Moorman asserts that by making
maximum use of civilian satellites, “military
satellite communications will benefit in
terms of access to additional capacity
(tremendous increases in available bandwidth
and flexibility, as well as multiplicity of alternative
communications paths).”83 Also, the
military can make use of commercial imaging
satellites, such as Earth Watch’s EarlyBird 1,
Space Imaging’s EOSAT (which will initially
offer one-meter resolution, the highest resolution
of any commercially available system),
84 and Orbiting Image’s OrbView.
Second, wherever possible, the military
should consider using distributed and
redundant commercial satellite systems as a
means to reduce vulnerability to attack
rather than deploying unique military systems
that are likely to be more expensive and
take longer to deploy. For example, it may be
more cost-effective to develop and deploy
smaller satellites in a distributed system configuration
designed to operate at low earth
orbit and medium earth orbit than larger,
heavier satellites operating in geosynchronous
(stationary) orbit.85 That approach is
especially meritorious if there is a potential
shortage of heavy-lift launch capability.
Third, military requirements should not be
imposed on shared nonmilitary satellites. For
example, the military should not require hardening
against electromagnetic pulse on commercial
satellites that are also used by the military.
To the extent that such requirements are
absolute needs, the military should deploy its
own dedicated systems to meet those requirements.
Neither commercial satellite operators
nor the other users of commercial satellites
should shoulder any cost burdens imposed by
the military (and clearly, the military must be
more realistic about its requirements).
In short, in the future, the military will likely
have greater reliance on commercial space
systems. As General Moorman has stated:
16
Wherever possible,
the military
should consider
using distributed
and redundant
commercial satellite
systems as a
means to reduce
vulnerability to
attack.
On the one hand, commercialization
is not a total panacea. . . . On the other
hand, the commercial space industry
is expanding at such a rate and with
such marvelous capabilities that it
seems reasonable if not inevitable that
a number of missions—heretofore the
exclusive province of the government—
can be satisfied or augmented
commercially. We can also realize significant
efficiencies by taking advantage
of commercial space.86
However, even if commercial space is not a
panacea for the military, it should be the driving
force of space and shape space policy. In
other words, defense and national security
need to be one component of overall U.S.
space policy, but certainly not the primary
component. In the post–Cold War environment—
with no immediate threat from
another great power and none on the horizon
(at least in the near- to mid-term)—the
U.S. government must avoid establishing
inflated and costly military requirements for
space-based resources. U.S. space policy
should strive to foster an environment that
allows commercial space activity to grow and
flourish rather than create a new area for
costly military competition.
17
U.S. space policy
should strive to
foster an environment
that allows
commercial space
activity to grow
and flourish
rather than create
a new area for
costly military
competition.
18
19
20
21
Notes
1. Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization
(Washington: Government Printing Office, January
11, 2001), p. 18. Hereinafter Space Commission.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 22.
5. Ibid., p. 99.
6. Ibid., p. 100.
7. It is also worth noting that the staff director for
both Rumsfeld commissions was Stephen A.
Cambone, who then became a special assistant to
Rumsfeld and is currently principal deputy under
secretary of defense for policy. See Al Kamen,
“Senators Have a Cambone to Pick,” Washington Post,
June 27, 2001, p. A23.
8. See Thomas E. Ricks, “Space Is Playing Field
for Newest War Game,” Washington Post, January
29, 2001, p. A1; and Jonathan Broder, “Forward,
March . . . into Space,” MSNBC, http://www.
msnbc.com/news/546843.asp.
9. John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next
50 Years (McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International
Defense Publishers, 1989), pp. 43–44.
10. Dana J. Johnson, Scott Pace, and C. Bryan
Gabbard, Space: Emerging Options for National
Power, RAND MR-517, 1998, p. 33.
11. Thomas S. Moorman Jr., “The Explosion of
Commercial Space and the Implications for
National Security,” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring
1999, www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/
apj/apj99/spr99/moorman.htm.
12. Johnson, Pace, and Gabbard, p. 29.
13. Ibid., p. 32.
14. Moorman.
15. Johnson, Pace, and Gabbard, p. 35.
16. Ibid., p. 36.
17. Linda L. Haller and Melvin S. Sakazaki,
“Commercial Space and United States National
Security,” Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization,
www.space.gov/commission/support-docs/
aritcle06/aritcle06.html.
18. Peter Hays and Karl Mueller, “Going Boldly—
Where?” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2001,
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/
apj01/spr01/hays.htm.
19. Bob Smith, “The Challenge of Space Power,”
Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 1999, www.airpower.
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/spr99/
smith. html, [emphasis added].
20. Ibid.
21. Space Commission, p. 13.
22. Smith.
23. Vernon Loeb, “Air Force’s Chief Backs Space
Arms,” Washington Post, August 2, 2001, p. A17.
24. Quoted in ibid.
25. Quoted in ibid. See also Michael Krepon, “Lost in
Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite
Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001; and John M.
Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to Space Power,” Issues in
Science and Technology, Spring 2001.
26. Hays and Mueller.
27. Space Commission, p. 27.
28. Ibid., p. xiii.
29. Ibid., p. 19.
30. Hays and Mueller.
31. Tom Wilson, “Threats to United States Space
Capabilities,” Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization,
www.space.gov/commission/support-docs/
article05/article05.html.
32. Space Commission, p. 19.
33. “Backyard Satellite Jammers Concern US
Airforce,” News in Science, April 25, 2000, www.
abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s120537.htm.
34. Corey Grice, “Satellite Hack Raises Security Questions,”
CNET News.com, March 3, 1999, http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-339481. html.
35. Ibid.
36. “GPS Anti-Jam Technology,” Raytheon,
www.raytheon.co.uk/raytheonnoflash/sections/p
roducts/product_systems/navigation_system_de
fence/navigation_system_defence.htm.
22
23
37. “What’s the Advantage of Frequency-
Hopping?” Johnson Consulting, www.swedetrack.
com/images/bluet11.htm.
38. Jim Geier, “Spread Spectrum: Frequency
Hopping vs. Direct Sequence,” May 1999,
www.wireless-nets.com/whitepaper_spread.htm.
39. Richard L. Garwin, Toward National Security:
The Role of Space Weapons, Antisatellite Weapon Tests,
and National Missile Defense, October 21, 1999,
www.fas.org/rlg/102599-lakhdhir.htm.
40. According to Hays and Mueller: “‘Space weapons
such as the U.S. nuclear-tipped Program 505 and
427 antisatellite (ASAT) systems or the Soviet
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System and coorbital
ASAT systems were actually deployed to a
limited extent beginning in the 1960s but . . . no such
dedicated systems are deployed today.”
41. Johnson, Pace, and Gabbard, p. 41.
42. Wilson.
43. James Kitfield, “The Permanent Frontier,” Foreign
Affairs, March 17, 2001, p. 784. Emphasis added.
44. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that he
assumed Saddam Hussein knew “that if he were
to resort to chemical weapons, that would be an
escalation to weapons of mass destruction and
that the possibility would then exist, certainly
with respect to the Israelis, for example, that they
might retaliate with unconventional weapons as
well.” Quoted in Robert Toth, “American Support
Grows for Use of Nuclear Arms,” Los Angeles Times,
February 3, 1991, p 1. Also, according to Neil
Livingston, “The American government reportedly
used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq
that ‘in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass
destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the
right to use any form of retaliation (presumably
up to and including nuclear weapons).’” Sea
Power, June 1991, pp 29–30.
45. Wilson.
46. Quoted in Kitfield, p. 784.
47. Wilson. See also Cheng Ho, “China Eyes Anti-
Satellite System,” Dragon Space, January 8, 2000,
www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01c.html.
48. Krepon. Emphasis added.
49. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Going Too Far: Bush’s
Pledge to Defend Taiwan,” Cato Institute Foreign
Policy Briefing no. 66, May 30, 2001, p. 1.
50. Ibid., p. 5.
51. Wilson.
52. Ibid.
53. See Wilson for a more detailed technical discussion
of these weapons.
54. Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass
Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, January/February
1998, p. 28.
55. See Charles V. Peña and Barbara Conry,
“National Missile Defense: Examining the
Options,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 337,
March 16, 1999, and Charles V. Peña, “Arms
Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually
Exclusive,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 376,
July 26, 2000, as two examples of more detailed
analysis of national missile defense.
56. For example, see Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld
Defends Missile Shield to Apprehensive Allies in
Europe,” Washington Post, February 4, 2001, p. A24;
Roberto Suro, “Missile Defense Is Still Just a Pie in
the Sky,” Washington Post, February 12, 2001, pp.
A3–A4; Jack Ruina, “46 Years, No Winners. Aim
Elsewhere,” Washington Post, March 4, 2001, p. B3;
Steven Mufson, “Democrats Plot Strategy on Missile
Defense,” Washington Post, May 20, 2001, p. A14; Mark
K. Anderson, “Nuke Shield Can’t Stop Critics,”
Wired News, July 17, 2001, www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,45273,00.html; Charles
Aldinger, “Russia Rejects U.S. Argument for
Scrapping ABM,” Lycos News, August 13, 2001,
http://news.lycos.com/news/story.asp?section=
Politics&pitem=POLITICS-RUSSIA-USADC&
rev=20010813&pub_tag=REUTG; Charles
Aldinger, “Russia Rejects U.S. Reasoning ABM
Obsolete,” Lycos News, August 13, 2001, http://
news.lycos.com/news/story.asp?section=Breakin
g&pitem=NEWS-RUSSIA-USA-DC&rev=
20010813&pub_tag=REUTG; and Robert Burns,
“Russia Rejects ABM Withdrawal,” Lycos News,
August 13, 2001, http://news.lycos.com/news/
story.asp?section=World&pitem=AP-Rumsfeld-
Russia&rev=20010813&pub_ag=APONLINE.
57. Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, “Bush
Speeds Missile Defense Plans,” Washington Post,
July 12, 2001, p. A1.
58. Suro, “Missile Defense Is Still Just a Pie in the
Sky,” p. A3.
59. Carla Anne Robbins and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. May
Violate the ABM Treaty ‘Within Months,’” Wall
Street Journal, July 12, 2001, p. A4.
60. See Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM
Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” New York
Times, December 13, 2001, www.nytimes.com/
2001/12/13/international/13CND-BUSH.html.
61. Both the SBIRS high and low programs are
experiencing cost, technical, and schedule problems.
See Tony Cappacio, “Lockheed Missile
Defense Program Is over Cost and 3 Years Late,”
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2001, www.
bloomberg.com.
62. For a more detailed description of the SBIRS
program, see “SBIRS: Space-Based Infrared
System,” 1997 United States Air Force Issues Book,
www.af.mil/lib/afissues/1997/app_b_18. html.
63. See Mark Thompson, “The Secretary of
Missile Defense,” Time, May 14, 2001.
64. In fact, the report explicitly states that “the U.S.
Government should vigorously pursue the capabilities
called for in the National Space Policy to
ensure that the President will have the option to
deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary,
defend against attacks on U.S. interests.” Emphasis
added. Space Commission, p. 17.
65. Ivan Eland, “Let’s Make National Missile
Defense Truly ‘National,’” Cato Institute Foreign
Policy Briefing no. 58, June 27, 2000.
66. See Charles V. Peña, “From the Sea: National
Missile Defense Is Neither Cheap Nor Easy,” Cato
Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 60,
September 6, 2000.
67. Quoted in Kitfield, pp. 781–82.
68. John Newhouse, “The Missile Defense
Debate,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, p. 105.
69. Heritage Foundation, Defending the American
Homeland, January 8, 2002, pp. 19–21.
70. For a detailed discussion on GPS, see Peter H.
Dana, “Global Positioning System Overview,”
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/note
s/gps/gps_f.html.
71. Among space-related reform bills under consideration
by Congress are the following: The
Invest in Space Now Act (H.R. 2177), introduced
by Rep. Ken Calvert (R-Calif.), offers tax credits
for investments in commercial space activities;
the Spaceport Equity Act (H.R. 1931, S. 1243)
would allow spaceports to raise construction and
renovation funds through tax-exempt bonds; the
Zero Gravity, Zero Tax Act (H.R. 2504), sponsored
by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), would
exclude from federal taxes income derived from
certain products and services produced in space;
and the Space Tourism Promotion Act (H.R.
2443), offered by Rep. Nick Lampson (D-Tex.),
would give loan guarantees and capital gains tax
exclusions for investments in space tourism.
72. David Gump, Space Enterprise: Beyond NASA
(New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 17–18.
73. Ibid.
74. “Final Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on Globalization and Security,” Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, December 1999,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/globalization.pdf.
75. Quoted in Sandra I. Erwin, “$65K Flight
Simulator Draws Skepticism from Military
Buyers,” National Defense Magazine, November
2000, www.national defensemagazine.org/article.
cfm?Id-354.
76. Harold Kennedy, “Simulation Reshaping Military
Training: Technology Jumping from Teenagers’
Computers to Pilots’ Cockpits,” National Defense
Magazine, November, 1999, www.nationaldefense
magazine.org/article.cfm?Id=113.
77. Robert Bigalow, National Institute for Discovery
Science, comments at Space Privatization Leadership
Summit, June 11–12, 2001, Las Vegas, Nevada.
78. For a detailed discussion, see the Space Island
Group website, www.spaceislandgroup.com/
homepage.html.
79. Ibid.
80. John M. Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to Space
Power,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring
2001, p. 36. Emphasis added.
81. For a thorough history of the DSP program,
see Jeffrey Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP
Satellites and National Security (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1999).
82. “Milstar Satellite Communications System,”
U.S. Air Force fact sheet, www.af.mil/news/factsheets/
Milstar_Satellite_Communicati.html.
83. Moorman.
84. Ibid.
85. Low earth orbit is at an altitude of 60 to 300
miles, medium earth orbit is at an altitude of
5,000 to 10,000 miles, and geosynchronous orbit
is at an altitude of 22,300 miles. Collins, p. 138.
86. Moorman.
24
25
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FOIA
EXCERPT:
18 November 1965
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses ‘
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleof
18 NOVEMBER 1965
Authenticated:
@+B EXECUTIVE SECRE
400
COO2784 69 UNCLASSIFIED
Tho following intelligence organizations participated in the preporation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency ond the intelligence orgonizotions of the Deportments
of Stote, Defense, NSA, and AEC.
Concurring:
Mr. Richord Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas 1. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence ond Reseorch, Department of
Lieutenont General Joseph F. Corroll, USAF, Director, Defense lnfelligence Agency
Lieutenont General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Director of the Nationol Security
Mr. Howard Brown, Assistant General Manager for Administrotion, Atomic Energy
Stote
Agency
Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
. .
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I E D
. . .
c
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM .................................................... 1
CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ....................................................... 4
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES . . . . . . 4
11. AIR DEFENSES ............................ .‘. .................... 5
Warning and Control ............................................. 5
Interceptors ..................................................... 6
Surface-to-Air Mi+Ies ............................................. 8
111. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES ................................ 10 a
-c
Defense of Moscow .............................................. 11
Other Possible Deployment ....................................... 12
Prospects for Missile Defenses ..................................... 12
IV. ‘ANTISATELLITE DEFENSES ... ...................... .... .. .. .. 13
V. CIVIL DEFENSE ............................................... 14
ANNEX: TABLES .................................................. 15
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED
SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR
AND MISSILE DEFENSES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and limitations of Soviet strategic air
and missile defense forces through mid-1967, and general trends in
these forces through 1975.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Confronted by powerful Western strategic attack forces, the
USSR is sustaining its vigorous effort to strengthen its defenses. We
believe that the Soviets are responding to those chdenges to. theirsecurity
that they can now see or foresee from aircraft, ballistic misdes,
and earth satellites. (Paras. 1 5 )
Air Defenses ~
I . _ _
B. The Soviets have achieved a formidable-capability against aircraft
attacking at medium and high altitudes, but their air defense
system probably is still susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons
and low-altitude tactics. The Soviets probably foresee little reduction
in the bomber threat over the next ten years. To meet this
challenge, they are improving their warning and control svstems and
are changing the character of their interceptor force through the
introduction of new high-performance, all-weather aircraft. In addition,
there are recent indications that the Soviets are now employing
light AAA in some areas for low-aItitude defense. (Parus. 3,4, 8-19)
C. The Soviets probably wiIl c o n ~ u e to improve and to rely on
the SA-2 as the principal SAM system. We believe that they will
develop an improved or new SAM system for low altitude defense;
such a system would probably be deployed more extensively &an the
SA-3. Deployment of a long-range SAM system probably is now
.
.
COO2784 69
. .
UNCLASSIFIED
underway in tlic northwestern USSR and probably will bc cxtended
to other petiplieral areas and to sonic key urban locations iu the
interior.' ' ( PUNZS. 20-26)
Ballistic Missile Defenses
D. For nearly ten years, the Soviets have given high priority to
research and development of antimissile defenses. We estimate that
they have now begun to deploy such defenses at Moscow. These
defenses could probably achieve some capability as early as 1967, but
we think a more likely date for an initial operational capability is
1968. We do not yet know the performance characteristics of this
system, or how it will function.
The Soviets will almost certainly continue with their extensive
effort to develop ballistic missile defenses to counter the increasingly
sophisticated threat that will be posed by US strategic missile forces.
We cannot now estimate with confidence the scale or timing of future
Soviet ABM deploymcnt. We believe, however, that the Soviets will
deploy ABM defenses for major urban-industrial areas. By 'I975, -
they could deploy defenses for some 20 to 30 areas containing a quarter
of the Soviet population and more than half of Soviet industry.
(Paras. 3637)
(Paras. 2734)
E.
- _.
Antisatelli te Defenses
The Soviets cou!d already have developed a limited antisatellite
capability based on an operational missile with a nuclear warhead and
existing electronic capabilities. We have no evidence that they have
F.
' Lieutenant Ceneral Joseph F. Carroll. USAF Director, Defense Intelligena Agcncy, Major
Ceneral John J. Davis, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. US Amiy, and Major Ceneral
Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligen=..US Air Force. believe that the nirny
uncertainties stemming from analysis of available evidence doer not permit a confident judgment
as to the specific mission of the new defensive system king deployd in northwest
USSR. They acknowledge that available evidence does support a conclusion that the sites
in the northwest may be intended for defense against the aerodynamic threat. However.
on balance. considering all the evidence, they believe it is more likely that the -tea being
deployed at these sites are primarily for defense against ballistic missiles.
'Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Assistant Chief of Naval Oprations (Intelligene). Department
of the Navy, and Lieutenant Ceneral Marshall s. Carter, USA, Diredor, National Security
Agency, do not concur in the degree of confidence reflected in this judgment Although
they concur that the deployment activity is more likely a long range SAhf systcni than an
ABM system, they believe that the evidence at this tinic is such that a confident judgment is
premature.
2
I
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED I ,
-
done so. In any event, we believe that the Soviets would prefer to
have a system which could track foreign satellites more accurately and
permit the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms. We estimatc that ttie
Soviets will have an operational capability with such a system within
the next few years. We believe, however, that the Soviets would
attack a US satellite in peacetime only if, along with a strong desire
for secrecy, they were willing for other reasons to greatly disrupt
East-West relations." (Paras. 3841 )
* Mr. Thomas L. Hughes. the Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State. bclieves
that thc Soviets would conclude that the adverse consequenm of destroying or damaging
US satellites in peacetime woutd ouhvcigh the advantages of such an action. Hc therefore
believes it highly unlikely that they would attack US satellita in peacetime.
3
_.
COO278469 U NCLASS I F I ED
rrrnrr
JLLl\L I
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES
1. Confrontcd by large and powcrfril Wcstcrn st~atcgic attack form, the
Sovicts have madc a sustaincd and vigorous cffort to improve their defcilscs.
111 thc past several ycars, siirfacc-to-air missiles and iicw gcncrations of intcrccptor
aircraft have been widely deployed. Wariiiiig and control systems have
been cxpandcd and sophisticated. At thc sainc tirnc, tlic Sovicts have pursued
I{ and D on more advanced air defense systems. And for nearly a decade they
liave continued a large-scalc. high-priority program to develop antimissile
defenses.
2. Soviet expenditures for strategic defciise have grown steadily sincc 1950.
In recent years, these expenditures have roughly equaled those for strategic
attack, when the major buildup of strategic missile forces was in proas. The
IXSR devoted a much larger share of its military expenditures tL strategic
defense during the 1961-1964 period than did the US. Manpower allocated to
the strategic defense mission has also increased markedly-from about E0,OOO
in 1950 to almost 500,OOO men at present This increase occurred during a
period of large scale reductions in military manpower.
3. Despite impressive improvements, however, Soviet strategic defense capabilities
have not overtaken incrwingly sophisticated US attack capabilities.
Thus, while the USSR has achieved a formidable capability against aircraft
attacking at medium and high altitudes, its air defense system probably is still
susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons and to low-altitude tactics.
Finally, the Soviets must realize that their surface-to-air (SAM) and interceptor
forces and the supporting warning and control elements of their air defense system
would be highly vulnerable to attack by missile strikes which they would
expect to be coordinated with an air attack against the USSR
4. While the bulk of Soviet expenditures for strategic defense in the past few
years has gone to air defense, the character of the US threat has changed. In
assessing the future threat, the Soviets undoubtedly consider the most pressing
problem to be the threat posed by massive and growing US ballistic missile
forces, because this threat cannot now be met adequately by either pre-emptive
attack or active defense. In addition, the threat posed by bombers has probably
not diminished in Soviet eyes. Considering the forthcoming introduction of
advanced aircraft by the US, the Soviets probably foresee little reduction in the
bomber threat into the 1970s. Thc Soviets are no doubt also cancerned with
US activities in space which have military applications.
5. The Soviets must feel pressed to respond to these US capabilities. Following
a basically deterrent strategy, they are now strengthening their forces for
strategic attack, but they are not. we believe, attempting to achieve a counter-
-- ’
COO2784 69 UNCLASSIFIED
h c c capability.'
IIC rcspondiirg to the cllallcngcs to their security that they caii now scc atld
fol-cscc-aircraft, ballistic missilcs, and cart11 sntellitcs. Tlic licavy Soviet ex-
Iiciitliturcs for air dcfcnse in the past scrvc as a strong indicator that tlic Soviets
\vi11 accept tlic continuing high costs for strategic dcfcnsc in the coming years.
In building tlicir forces for strategic dcfcnsc, they appear E
11. AIR DEFENSES
6. Tlic Sovict air defcnsc mission is the. responsibility of the PVO Strany
( Anti-Air Defense of the Country). wliosc commander-in-chief, a Dcputy Ministcr
of Dcfcnsc. is ranked with the licads of the ground, naval, air, and strategic
missile forces. The PVO Strany includes three major components, each of
which performs one of the key functions'of the air defense mission, i.c. early
warning and control, interceptor, and SAM operations. The commander of tlic
PVO Strany probably is also assigned the mission of ballistic missile defense.
In addition to forces directly assigned to the PVO Strany, other Soviet forces
which can contribute to the air defense mission are also operationally available
to this command.
7. The air defenses of the East European countries of the Warsaw Pact,
although separate national systems, are coordinated with each other and with
the Soviet air defense organization. For most practical purposes, they constilute
an extension of the Soviet system. The East European air defense forces are
cquipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel, and the USSR will continue -
its policy of improving their capabilities. Although the Chinese Communist air
defense system still maintains some contact with the Soviet organization, cooperation
between them is minimal.
Warning and Control
8. There are now more than 5,OOO radars depIoyed at well over 1,OOO sites in
the USSR. These sites have at least two radars and many are equipped with
five to seven sets. This deployment provides overlapping radar coverage of
most of the nation; coverage is particularly dense west of the UraL and in
peripheral areas. The density of coverage heightens the probability of detection,
and frequency diversification provides some defense against elecbonic
countermeasures (ECM). But, at the same time, the redundancy of radar
coverage increases the load on communications and filter centers.
9. Early Warning. The altitude coverage of the Soviet early w h h g (EW)
system exceeds the combat ceiling of any US aircraft. Under optimum conditions,
the Soviet EW system could detect and track aircraft fl*g at medium
or high altitudes at least 200 n.m. away from Soviet territory, and under normal
'Major General Jack E. Thomu, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, woultl
reword the sentence as fokws: "We believe they will continue to adhere to the concept of
deterrent force so long as they remain in a position of strategic inferiority, but the intenrive
Soviet Military R and D effort raises the possibility that Soviet leaders almdy am focusing
on achievement of a strategic superiority which would enable more Pararive p-it of
their political aims, perhaps within the time frame of this ectimate."
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I ED -
cotiditions dctcctioii a i d tracking of cncmy aircraft flyiiig nt such altitttdcs is
vircunlly assured at about 135 n.m. I~lowcvcl-, a11 attack I)y supersonic aircraft
niid criiisc missilcs. Lccausc of tlicir vcry high spccds. \vorild reduce tlic wariiitig
tiinc provided by tliis system. l'lic detection rnngc of the E\V system is progrcssivcly
rcdticcd against aircraft ptrnctrating at lo\wr altitudes. Moreover.
cvcti wlicci dctcctioii of low altitrldc pcnctrators occurs. tlic systcrn is unlikcly
to be able to :iccoinplish continuous tracking ol iiii iircruding ciicniy aircraft
bclow 3,000 feet, mid it Ins virtually 110 capability below about 1.ooO fert.
-
LO. C,.oriticf-Cor~r.olIcd Ititcrccpt. About otic-third of the Soviet . radar sitcs
:?I'C c?.;?,?b!c S! CCt.d:::i.lg gXXind-CGE:i;%c! ~6liCl~cclJt (Cerj ulwsaliolls. Tiic
effectiveness of the CCI systcm varies with altitudc, rnrigc, and, spccd of tlic
target. Against medium and liigli altitudc targets, we estimate that CCI rangc
capabilities vary from about 85 n.m. to UM nm. depending on the radar employed
at the site. We belicvc that most CCI radars employ moving tar$ indicators
or anticlutter techniques in order to improve low-altitude covcrage. However,
law altitude CCI capability probably drops off sharply below +ooO feet and
would be almost iion-existent below. 1,ooO feet.
11. Communications. The Soviet air defense warning and weapons control
structure employs a communications network which has a high degree .of rcdundancy
and flexibility. The most important development in air defense
communications in reccnt years has been the spread of a semiautomat+data
transmission system. The ground-to-ground link of this system has ' probably
been deployed extensively in the USSR and in parts of Eastern Europe. Origii
d l y believed to be associated only with early warning and interceptor control,
the system probably is now being used to support SAM operations in some instances.
We believe that the ground-to-air link has been deployed extensively
in the USSR and is being used by Soviet forces in East Cermany, Poland, and
Hungary. It is also probably being employed by one or two oE the East European-
air forces.
12. Outlook. During the next ten years, the number of radar sites probably
will remain steady or decline slightly. We estimate that the number of radar
sets, however, depending on their age and serviceability, will be reduced
from the present level, perhaps by as much as one-half. The Soviets will
probably deploy new radars designed to enhance low altitude and antijamming
capabilities. We estimate that deployment of the ground-to-ground link of
the semiautomatic data transmission system will be extended, and SAM units will
be fully incorporated in the system; the ground-to-air link will be standard equipment
on all new interceptors. We believe that the Soviets are developing more
fully automated systems for interceptor control which could become operational
iii the next year or two.
Interceptors
most .of them deployed, in western USSR.
13. There now are about 3,800 operational interceptors in the PVO Strany,
Rouglily half of the interceptor
6 -
. ,
A C C I T I T R . . , .. . , . . . . -. . . .. . . . . .. .. .' . . , i , - ., . .. . . . . . ,..
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I ED
forcc is made up of all-weatlicr rnodcls.” Only iibout onc-fourth OF tlic Kterceptors
arc capable of Mach 2, thc rcmnindcr arc older models, wl>icli elitered
scrvicc bcforc 1959. Tlie Soviets could also WIIIII OII employing in tlic :iir
dcfcnsc mission many of the figliters assigned to Tactical Aviation. Tlicrc iirc
about 2,400 figliters iii Tactical Aviation. tlic I,iilk of \vliicli arc dcployctl iir
wcstcrii USSH itnd ill tliosc Warsaw Pact countries wlicrc Soviet forces :ire
stationed.‘
14. New Atodels. The Soviets arc now in [lie early stages of what iqq)c;irs
to bc a large-scale program to modernize tlic interceptor forcc. W e bclicvc
that they now have two new interceptors in production; tho I%ebnr. \vhicli
entcrcd service in 199 and the Fiddler, which probably will enter servicx in
191% or 1967. The Firebar probably is bcing used for low-altitttdz interwllts.
and the Fiddler is best suited for long-range intercepts. A third new model,
probably an improved all-weather interceptor of short or medium range, may
go into production in the near future; this aircraft will probably have a maximum
speed approaching Mach 3. About 1,OOO of thesc three interceptors will probably
be in service by the early 1970s..
15. In addition to the interceptors now in production or likely soon to be,
* we believe that the Soviets are conducting an extensive development program
for very high performance aircraft. An advanced all-weather interceptor with
cruise speeds in the Mach 3 region could be operational in the early 1970s.
Virtually all of the older Soviet intercep& and some of
current models are equipped with guns and rockets. Less than half of the
currently operational Soviet interceptors are equipped with air-to-air missiles
( AAMs). For the most part these aircraft are limited to effective attack ranges
of less than five n.m., and all are restricted to tail chase attack tactics. We
believe that the Firebar, Fiddler, and other new interceptors will be armed with
improved MMs and radars which will allow these interceptors to employ ndditional
attack tactics at effective ranges of more than ten n.m.
16. Armament.
17. Cupabilities. The Soviet interceptor force has good capabilities against
subsonic, and to a lesser extent against supersonic aircraft attacking at medium
and high altitudes, in daylight or under clear air mass conditions. The force
has, however, limited all-weather capabilities and poor low altitude capabilities.
Despite increased training in low altitude intercepts and attempts to employ
the Firebar in this role, the problems of lead pursuit and taiI chase attack at
altitudes below 3,000 feet, and particularly below 1,OOO feet, remain severe.
The Soviets probably also plan to use their interceptors against air-to-surface
missiles, at least as an interim measure.
18. Force LeoeLs. The old model Soviet interceptors (Fresco, Farmer, and
Flashliglit) are now being retired at a fairly rapid rate. We believe that replacement
by newer aircraft is on a slightly less than one-for-one basis, and we
~~
For perfomann characteristics of Soviet interceptors and fighters, see Annex, Table 1.
‘For a discussion of fighter aircraft not in PVO Sh-any units. see NIE 11-144, -Capabilities
of Soviet General Purpose Forces” (Semt, 21 October 1965).
7
I
COO278469 U NC LASS1 F I ED
expect this trcnd to continue for the next few ycars.
gradual reduction in the size of tlic forcc tlirougli mid-19G7. as shown in the
f o I I owing tabu In t ion :
Thus, wc look for
ESTIMATED JNTEI~CEI'I'OR I,'OItCE Ll3LI.S
OGIOUEII 1 9 6 Miu-ISGG hlio-1967
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Old Models 2.840 2.450-2.G50 2.o00-2.250
975-1.075 1,090-1.225 . . . . Currciit n i ~ l h'cw Motlcls 950 -
Total 3,800 3.4254725 3.100-3.475 .....................
We believe that the size of thc force will decline further over the next ten
years; by 1970 tlic forcc probably will have been rcduccd to about two-thirds
of tlic current Icvel. After 1970;tlie force may level off or it mxy be reduced
further, perhaps to about one-lialf the present force level by 1975.'
19. Outlook. As the number of newer aircraft in the force grows; its capabilities
will increase significantly, particularly under all-weather conditions and
against attacks by supersonic vehicles. The newer aircraft will be equipped
with improved airborne intercept radars and missiles and Soviet'EW and CCI
capabilities will also grow, but low altitude intercept capabilities probably will
remain limited throughout the period.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
- 20. SA-2 System. We estimate that as of mid-1965, there were about'5,ood
SA-2 sites in the USSR. We believe that some 800-900 of these sites are occupied
by operational units, and that the remainder are not manned or equipped
on a permanent basis. These sites probably are intended to augment existing
defenses or to defend lower-priority targets. The Soviets will probably activate
them in threatening situations, but we cannot determine which of these sites
will be occupied at any given time. Although we expect the Soviets to construct
additional sites of this type, we do not believe that they plan to increase SA-2
operational units above the present force level.
21. The Soviets have continued to improve the SA-2 system; both the missile
and the guidance radar have either been modified or replaced several times.'
These improvements increase the range of the system from 17 to about 25 n.m.,
raise the maximum intercept altitude from 80,OOO to W,OOO fcet, and lower the
minimum intercept altitude from 3,000 to about 1,500 feet.O They have im-
' Major General Jack E. Thomas, hrtistant Chief of Staff. Intelligcn~e. WAF. bel- the
reduction in IA PVO fighter forces wiIl not be as great as is estimated. He would substitute
the following for the final two renten-: "We believe that the size of the fom will ddinc
further over the next ten years; by 1970 the fore probably will have been redud to appmxitnately
3,000 aircraft. After 1970, the fore may level off, but if a long-range intemptor L
introduced in significant numbers, the total size of the IA PVO may mntinue to dedine
somewhat."
.
'For performance characteristics of SAM systens, see Annex, Table 2.
'Most SA-2s exported by the Soviets to counties outside the Warsaw Pad arc mdier
niodek, and thus have performance characteristics which equate to the system's original
capabilities.
.I
'i
I W F I F n , . . . . . . . . . . rf. I - . . . .
I
U NCLASS IF I ED COO278469
proved tile accuracy and thc detection capability of the systcm and its pcrfomacl'y
in an ECM cnvironmcnt. Modifications are still bcirig made and operational
tinits contintic to bc rccquippcd with advanced modcls of tlrc missile alid
guidnncc radar. SA-2s dcploycd in peripheral nrcns in tlic USSR, and probably
most of tliosc in tlic interior, cmploy improved versions of tlic missiles and
guidance radars.
Wc bclicvo that dcployiiiuit of tlic SA-3 systcm ltas also
cciinc to n virtual Iinlt, and that oiily n fcw new sites wcrc colistructcd in 1965.
Wc cstitnatc that total dcploymcnt of this system now stands at abolit I10 sites.
Ilcployincnt, usually in conjunction with SA-2 sites, is largely restricted to the
pcripliwal areas of thc USSR and the cities of Leningrad and Moscow. Tlac
slow hiid small deployment of tlic SA-3 strongly suggests that it docs not provide
n much better lo\v altitude capability than that of the modified SA-2 or of existing
ntrtiaircraft artillcry (AAA). In addition, there arc recent indications that the
Soviets may be employing light AAA in some areas for low-altitude defense.
Such crnployment would serve as an interim measure until development of improved
or more advanced systems.
23. SA-1 System. The SA-1 system, deployed only at Moscow, remains operational.
There are no indications that the Soviets intend to phqe out the system
in the near future. The SA-1, deployed during .the 1950s at 56 large sites in
two rings around Moscow, was designed as a dkfense agaitt mass bomber"'
attacks.
high altitude capabilities. In addition to the SA-1, Moscow's air defenses include
some SA-2 and SA3 sites, and the Soviets may provide additional SAM defenses
for Moscow. In any event, we believe that the SA-1 system will not be phased
out during the next few years and possibly not until the 1970's.
24. Long-Range System. The Soviets are deploying a new defensive system
in northwestern USSR. It.is probably a SAM system with a range several tinies
that of the SA-2. We cannot, however, discount the possibility that this deployment
is intended for ballistic missile defense.Ia lL
22. SA-3 Sysleri~.
The Sovietr have since modified it, probably improving its range and -
Lieutenant Ceneral Joseph F. Carr~ll. USAF, Director. Defense Intelligence Agency. Major
Ceneral John J. Davis, Assistant Chief of St&, Intelligence, US Amy. and Major Ccneml
Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Sa, Intelligence, US Air Force. believe that the niany
uncertainties stemming from analysis of available evidence does not pennit a confident judgment
as to the specific mission of the new defensive systems being dcployed in northwat
USSR. They acknowledge that available evidence does support a condusion that the siin
the northwest may be intended for defense against the aerodynamic threat. However,
on balance, mnsidering all the evidence, they believe it is more likely that the syrtems king
deployed at these sites are primarily for defense against ballistic missiles.
"Rear Admiral Rufus L. Taylor. hrritant Chief of Naval Operatiom (Intelligence),
Department of the Navy and Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter. USA. Diractor. National
Security Agency, do not concur in the degree of confidence reflected in this judgment.
Although they concur that the deployment activity is mom likely a long mige SAM systenl
that an ABM system, they believe that the evidence at this time ic wrdi that a contident
judgment is premature.
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED
25. We believe that tlie system is a change from an carlicr system wliicli the
Soviets began to deploy at Leningrad iii 1960; tlic carlicr system probably war
intended to liave a capability apinst a small unsopliisticntcd ballistic misrilc
tlirent and against ncrodynninic vehicles as well. This concept apparently was
nlxuidoncd prior to completion of the tlircc Leningrad complexes, and dcploymerit
of tlic new system was undertaken."' Allliough we tliiiik that tlic Crilfoii
missile was intenclcd for iisc witti tlie original Leningrad systcin, wc miinot
dctcriniiie wlictlicr this new system will crnploy ii Criffon-type missile or soinc
otlicr which we liavc not as yet identified. We belicvc that deployment of tlic
siiiie system is underway at a few otlier locations in tlic Soviet nortliwcst, e-6..
1 n l l i i i on tlic C-!:ic 222s: 2r.d CI:ery::.ctr nL.2::: I?Ci! 5!c:-x::h of >.!3scow.
'!'wo of the Leningrad complexes could be opcrational by early 1966. The third
Leningrad complex and the otlicr deployments in northwestern USSR could
become operational during 1966 and the following year.
Although the present Soviet SAM defenses provide good allweather,
medium- and high-altitude protection against aircraft and air-to-surface
missiles, they are deficient in long-range and low-altitude capabiktier Over
thc next few years the Soviets will attempt to overcome these deficiencies. They
will probably expand the deployment of their new long-range SAM system tu
provide a barrier defense against bombers and long-range air-to-surface missilcs
in the peripheral areas of the USSR and at some key urban locations.I0 It Such
. deployment would probably involvc a total 6f 2545 complexes and couidebe
completed before 1970. The Soviets may seek to meet their requirement for
very low-altitude capabilities with improved AAA We believe it more likely.
however, that they will develop an improved SA-3 or a new SAM system,
although we have no evidence of such development. Deployment of a new
system could begin as early as 1968 and would probably be more extensive than
that for the SA-3 system.
.C
26. Outlook.
.
I l l . BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
27. For the past decade, the Soviets have been assiduously working to develup
defenses against ballistic missiles. The R and D activities associated with the
Soviet program continue to be conducted at the large Sary Shagan missile test
center in central Asia. A number of missiles, radars and other system components
have been developed and tested over the years for both tactical and
skategic systems. We believe that the Soviets have conducted an atmospheric
intercept test program, and they have probably investigated exoatmospheric intercept
techniques as well. It seems likely that they have studied both point
and area defenses and examined the feasibility of precision and barrage type
intercepts. In the field of eIecbonics, they have explored the advantages of
using relatively low frequencies as well as those higher in the spectrum; they
have worked with large dish-type and phased-array radars. Thus, the scope
and diversity of the program have been impressive, but the Soviets linve evidently
experienced many failures and frustrations.
10
CO 02 7 8 469 UNCLASSIFIED
26. Despite thc limitations of our collection, wc bclicvc tIiat tIic Soviets mu=
not Itavc conducted more than a few antimissile missilc (AMM ) firings to ao-
:i tmosplicric nltitudcs witliout our knowledge. Tlicy probably liave not attctnptcd
full system tests involving intercepts at tlicse altititdcs. Furthermore,
tvc' cstitnatc that tlic Sovicts nrc likely to carry out full antiballistic missile (ABM)
syatctn tcsts (perhaps cxcluditig use of nuclear warlicnds) against targets having
or sitnulntiiig ICBM clinrxtcristics. Although the Soviets could conduct sotnc
sitcli tcsts without ow knowlcdge, we believe thnt tlic clinticcs iirc good t h t
we would ncquirc sitfficicnt evidence to identify sucli testing ici ;idv:iiicT of tlic
:icIiicvctncnt of an operational capability.
. 29. Tlic Soviets almost certainly have not as yet tcstcd AhlMs with iiuclcar
warlieads. Although the nuclear tests conducted at Sary Sliagan in late 19G1
and 1962 wcrc not of this nature, the Soviets may have derived some data on
thc dcstructivc effects of exoatmospheric nuclear bursts from them. We know
of no tests that they have conducted specifically for tliis purpose. but they could
have acquired some information on, these effects without our kiiowlcdgc from
underground tests.
Defense of Moscow
30. We estimate that the Soviets are now deploying a11 ABM system for tlic
defense of M o s y . ~ . We do not yet know thc characteristics of this system, or
how it will function. We believe, however,'that we have ibentitied some OF
its key elements. There are several large radars in the northwestern USSR and -
facilities in the Moscow area which probably serve the functions of early warnitig,
target acquisition and tracking, and missile guidance. In addition, it is
possible that the Galosh missile. which the Soviets displayed in 1964, is associated
with the system.
31. The Soviets are constructing very large radars in the northwest,
which probably are intended to function as part of a ballistic missile defense.
These dual Hen House radars are being installed at Olenegorsk on the Kola
Peninsula and at S h n d a on the Baltic coast, and could be operational in 1966.
These radars, developed at Sary Shagan, probably are phased-arrays transmitting
at a relatively low frequency, ia, in the VHF Land. They arc oriented in
such a fashion as to be able to detect ICBMs launched from the YS toward most
targets in western USSR: they will probably also be capable of detecting ballistic
missiles launched by submarines in the Norwegian Sea and the NO* Atlantic
at targets in the Soviet northwest We believe that these radars will serve a
ballistic missile early warning function, and may provide some tmcking and
prediction data for use by AMM launch units. They will probably have ;I
secondary task of satellite detection and tracking.
32. The Soviets are constructing a huge radar (Dog House) of a different
configuration about 30 miles southwest of MOCOW. Although we know of no
prototype for this radar, we think it evolved from developmental. work at Saty
Shagan and that it too is a phased-may. It is situated so that the northern
- . . . . , . .. . ..... .. .I .. . .. . . , . -:. ..I PI AC!QLELKn I
COO2784 69 UNCLASSIFIED
face could scan tlic ICBM tlircnt corridor to Moscow; n southern fam may be
itddcd rvliich could scan thc Polaris threat from southern launch points. We
tliink that this radar is intcndcd to scrvc as A long-range acquisition and early
tiirgct tracking facility for any ballistic missile dcfcnscs in the Moscow area. and
c:ould I x operational in 1961. As with tlic Hen I-Iouscs. tlic Moscow radar may
linvc A sccondnry function as part of a satcllitc detection and tracking system.
33. In addition to the Dog House, the Soviets arc continuing to work on a series
of "triads" locatcd at somc of the outer ring SA-1 sites in Moscow. A triad
consists of onc large building and two smaller ones, each probably having a
disli-type radar atop. We believe that the triads will provide final target trackiiig
and missile guidancc for thc Moscow ABM system.
34. If Calosh or a similar missile is to be uscd, the system is likely to bc
intended to perform exoatmospheric intercepts at ranges up to some 300 miles.
On thc other hand, the Moscow system may be designed to use another type of
missile and to achieve atmospheric intercepts of incoming warheads. It is even
possible that both types of missiles and intercepts are planned for the,system.
Regardless of the system's characteristics, we estimate that ballistic missile
defenses at Moscow could achieve some capabiIity as early as 1967, but we
think a more likely date for an initial operational capability is 1968.
Other Possible Deployment
. -35. We have previously discussed defekive deployments'at Leningrad whYich
may have originally been intended as a dual-purpose system to defend against
both aerodynamic vehicles and ballistic missiles (see paras. 25 and 26). We
presently estimate that the system now under deployment at the Leningrad
complexes and the other similar complexes in the northwestern USSR is intended
for air defense, but we cannot exclude the possibility that its purpose is ballistic
niissile defense.l2 Considering the locations of these complexes, such an ABM
system would be designed for area defense using a barrage-type, exoatmospheric
intercept.
Prospects for Missile Defenses
36. The USSR will almost certainly continue its extensive R and D effort
on antimissile defense. This effort will be directed generally toward countering
the increasingty sophisticated threat that will be posed by US strategic missile
forces. Whatever the present characteristics of the Moscow system, we believe
that future defenses will provide for hth long-range exoatmospheric intercept
and short-range intercept within the atmosphere.
37. We believe that over the next ten years the USSR will extend its antimissile
defenses beyond the Moscow area The evidence is insufficient for us
to estimate with confidence the scale or timing of such deployment or to determine
whether point or area defenses will be emphasized. We believe, however,
that the Soviets will deploy ABM defenses for major urban-industrial areas.
.
"For dissenting views to this judgment, see fmtnater 10 and 11 to paragraph 24.
Uy 1975, they could deploy dcfcnscs for sornc to 30 n r c ~ coirtaining :I clu;lrtcr -
of tlic Soviet population and morc than half of Soviet industry.
IV. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSES
38. Tlic Soviets continuc to RC'L'IISC thc US of cniploying its spacc vcliicles
iii;liiily for reconnaissancc and cspionagc purposes, and their traditional concern
tor military secrecy gives tlrc Soviets an inccntivc to dcvclop defenses apinst
US satellites. In addition, the Soviets arc probably concerned that the US will
cvcntually develop space weapon systems. They could already havc developed
x limited antisatellite capability based on ail operational missile (c.x.. tlic SS-41
with a nuclear warhead and on existing electronic facilities. Wc have iro cvidcnce
that they liave done so. In any cvcnt, we believe that tlic Soviets would
prefer to have a system which could track foreign satellites morc accurately ?nd
permit the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms.1s
/
39. The Soviets are constructing a series of large Hen Iiouse radars, most of
which will probably be completed in the next year or two. Thc locations and
orientations of these radars indicate that they are intended for a space surveillance
system. The Hen House radars at Olenegorsk and S h n d a and the Dog
House radar associated with ABM deployment at Moscow probably have a
secondary role of space surveillance, and they are likely to be linked together
with the other Hen Houses to form a satellite detection and tracking system.
Such a system would enable the Soviets to observe and tr&k satellites during
most of the passes over the USSR. It probably would allow the Soviets to
predict the orbits and positions of non-Soviet satellites and space vehicles with
a high degree of accuracy after a few crossings over the USSR, and thus could -.
' provide the information required by an antisatellite system.
40. An antisatellite system employing these radars could use an existing missilc
with a nuclear warhead. Non-nuclear kill, on the other hand, would require n
homing missile capable of exoatmospheric maneuver which could be developed
in about two years after a decision to do SO. Although we have no evidence of
such development, it could be well under way without our knowledge. We
believe, therefore, that at about the time the Hen Houses become operational
the Soviets could have an antisatellite capability with either nuclear or nonnucIear
kill. We consider the latter more likely because the capabilities of the
Hen House radars appear to exceed that required for a nuclear kill.
41.. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we estimate that the Soviets
will have an operational antisatellite capability with a sophisticated system
"Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligenrr and RcKarcli. Dcliarttiicnt of Stntc.
believes that the rationale presented in this paragraph for a Soviet nntuttellitc prugrniii
places undue emphasis on the Soviet conccrn over US peacetime satellite operations. Hc
believes that the Soviets have been concerned more generally with the future of spare as
a military environment Moscow would wish to develop a contingency clpability for wartitile
use against the broad spectrum of possible rndibry space missions. T h e would include
systems for military support, such as reconnaissance, communications, and navigation utrIIites,
ac well as the possibility of spaceborne wwpons systems.
-.
within thc ncxt few ycars. Tlic dccision to usc this capability in peacctime
would, howcvcr, confront tlic Soviet lcaders with vcry serious problems. AItliorigh
they Iiavc displaycd growing mnccrn ovcr US satcllitc opcrations,
tlw Soviets would rccognizc that damaging or dcstroying a US satellite
could stirnulatc Wcstcrn military programs and cxpose thcir own satcllites
to attack. Attacking a manncd US satcllitc would carry wcii graver consc-
(ILICI~CCS. iticliiding thc risk of US rctaliatory action against any manncd Soviet
satcllitc. Wc thcreforc bclicvc that thc USSR would attack a US satcllitc
in peacetime only if, along with a strong desire for sccrecy, the Soviets werc
willing for other reasons to grcatly disrupt East-West rclation~.~'
!
V. CIVIL DEFENSE
42. Military control of Soviet civil defense has increased steadily since 1960.
when the program was shifted to the Ministry of Defense. The ranks of the
military officers assigned to civil defense staffs have also been upgraded, and
the curent head of the program is a Marshal and a Deputy Minister of Defense.
During the same period, the Soviets have continued to implemenl compulsory
training courses for the general public; we estimate that as many as one hundred
million Soviets have been exposed to inshction, and that many have been highly
trained in basic civil defense procedures. In their training, the Soviets.have
been emphasizing ways to conduct strategic urban evacuation and construction
. of simyle homemade. fallout shelters. They have also created mobile units, or
rescue-columns, to provide post-attack assistance both in urban and rural areas.
The effectiveness of these procedures depends on strategic warning. Furthermore,
apathy on the part of the public has tended to reduce the planned effectiveness
of this training.
43. We calculate that there are about 25 million fallout shelter spaces available
for the urban population, or roughly one space for every five city-dwellers.
Most of these shelters were built during the 195Os, when new public buildings
and apartment houses were constructed with special basements for civil defense
purposes. Since the late 1950s the Soviets have severely curtailed their urban
shelter construction program, and we have no evidence to indicate that they are
planning a resumption of a major shelter construction program. They have, however,
probably made some provisions for including shelters in certain public facilities
now under construction. In view of the program's emphasis on urban evacuation
and rural self-reliance, we believe that the Soviet leadership does not expect
the present civil defense program to provide significant protection for more
than a small portion of the population. Although the Soviets might during the
decade resume large-scale shelter construction, we think that other demands of
Soviet resources, particularly those for advanced weapon systems, will prevent
such a development
" Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State,
believes that the Soviets would conclude that the adverse consequences of destroying or
damaging US.sate1lites in peacetime would outweigh the advantage of such an action. He
therefore believes it highly unlikely that they would attack US satellites in pucctime.
I
I
.
COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED
. ..
ANNEX
TABLE I: SOVIET INTERCEPTORS AND F~CHTERS:
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE IN AN
. AIR DEFENSE ROLE
TABLE 2: SOVIET SAM SYSTEMS:
. ..
ESTIMATED CHARACTERIST[CS AND PERFORMANCE
15
CO 0 2 7 8 4 6 9 U NCLASSI F I ED -
TABLE 1*
SOVI 6'1' I NTllRCEPTOIZS ANI) FICIITERS: ESTIMATED CI1AILACTEILISTICS ANU 1'Eltl~OI~h.IANCE
IN AN A I R DEFENSE ItOLE
I'ICESCO A (MIG-17)
FLtESCO I3 (MIC-17)
FRESCO C (MIC-17)
FRESCO 1) (MIC-17)
FRESCO E (MIG-17)
FLASHLIGHT (YAK-25)
FARMER A (MIG-19)
FARMER. E (MIC-19)
1953
1953
1954
1955
1954
1955
1955
1957
FARMER C (MiC-19) 1957
FARMER D (MIG-19) 1957
FARMER E (MIC-19) 1959
FITTER (SU-7) ' 1959
FISHPOT (SU-9) 1959
FISHBED C (MIC-21) I 1960
FISHBED D (MIC-21) I 1962
FISHEED E (MIC-21) ' 1961
FIRE BAR 1964
. See I O o t n O k s at end or h b l c .
16
EN- .IT COLlB.\T
TEflED Ol7ILIUY CEILING
SERV- ALTlTUDE (FEET)
hlODEL I C E (KNOTS)
GO5
GO5
620
620
605
610
755
755
755
755
74 5
I , 205
1,205
1,150
I , 150
1,150
1,100
53,400
53,4w
54,500
54,500
53,400
49,400
54,500
54,500
54,500
'54,500
54,900
57,600
58.000
61,500
61,500
61,500
56,100
).(A XI Ll U LI
EFFEC-
11.4 DI us
(K. u.)
540 ,
540
510
510
540
575
520
520
520
520
520
580
540
450
450
450
500
. < En SEARCHI L'ITACK Al7ACK RANGE cArA- cAr.\- TnAcK MAIS DILITY (N.M.) .tRLIALIEI;T (N.U.) BILITP No No No Yes YeS YeS No Yes No No YCS No YeS No YeS No YeS . . . tiuils/RockcLs 0.5 Tail Attack CunsIRockcG 0.5 Cuns/Rockcts 0.5 Cuns/Ilockcts 0.5 AAbfs 2-3 Cuns/Roc$ets 0.5 AAMs 2-3 Guns 0.5 CunelRockets 0.5 Guns 0.5 CuoslRockets 0.5 Cuns/Rockets 0.5 AAMs 3-4 GuosIRockets 0.5 AAMs 5-6. AAMs 3-4 AAhls 5-6 -c AAMs 5-6 AAMs 5-6. AAMs 10-12 Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack - Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack Tail Attack' .- COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED ENTEIIEII 5 C IIVLIOUCI, ICE L'1I)IJLEIL I'JGGI9G7 I hI I' It 0 V E U \VISATIIBI: INTLlt- I!IGS CEI'TOIL ' A L 1,- I'JG7- [All'lL~\'ElJ TACTICAL IW7- FIC'HTEIL f 1 'JGS ll.\U.\ IC ll.\ SUE *E.\lICII/ fll.\CK XI.\iS (5. XI .) 40/3U AAhIs W I G AAhls .\ i i ~ i .\ &I t x r Attnch Maximum ~ p m l s and combat ceilings havc k n calculatcd indcpciidcittly and caitiiot bc acliicvcd oii lbc aaiitc Ilight profile. Soviet bfacli 2 iittcrccptom cquippcd witli ecarch/lrack radars haw tlic capability to iliakc iiitcrccpb, \ V i l l i liiititccl cffcctivciicss, in dynamic cliinb against subsoiiic targcfs at altitudcs oti the unlcr of i ( I , o W fwt ~-1icn ucidw closc GCI direction. With cxtcriial fuel. -c + - d Scarclr and track pcrforinaiiccs dcnotc raiigu: oiily. a Infrarcd missilcs do not rcquirc radar guidancc; tltcrcforc, visual nthek cuii bc IIIU~C n L Llrc cIk!LiG ntitgc of L l i c ' Thcrc arc fcw Fittcrs and no Fishbcds in thc PVO Strany; both aircraft, Iio\vcvcr, nrc clcploycul iii lnrgc iru~ulxrs iii Thcsc models, along wvitli thc Improvcd Tactical Figlttcr, nrc iiiciutlnl in tlic tablc Imausc of 8 NOTE: In addition, an advanccd all-\vveatlicr intcrccptor \ritli cruise spcwJs iii thc Macli S wgioii uiitl it 3GOo uthch inissile. Tactical Aviation units. their capabilities as interccptors. capability could bc opcrational in thc carly 19705. - - 17 COO278469 UNCLASSIFIED TABLE 2 SC)VZST S L X E?’STZ:.:S: EST: MATZI? CX.’. R:.STZZ!CT:S AND PERFORMANCE SA- 1 SA-2 SA-3 SYSTEM a 60 G 4 (dual) Launchcrs Per Site Maximum Operational Rnngc (nm) b 20-25 d About 25 About 12 Maximum Effective Altitude (It) GO, 000 ‘ 90,000 ‘ 25,000-35.000 Minimum Effective Altitude (It) a ’ 3,000 Simultaneous Target Handling Ca- 20 Rate of Simultaneous Fire Per Site 20 . Warhead 1,500 c 1,000h 1 1 3 4 pacity Per Site HE 1 HE 1 HE For discussion of the long-range SAM system, nee paras. 24-25 and the footnoted thereto. 0 Such factors as siting conditions and target speeds influence low altitude capabilities. d Recent information indicates that thc SA-1 range and altitude capabilities probably have bcen improved. Thus. the capabilities of thin eystcrn could be greater than shown above. This range is estimated for sites equipped with the “C” Band Fan Sang fire control radar. . b-Range will vary with sire, altitude, speed, and approaching directlon of target. -- For those sites equipped with “S“ Band mdnr, the range is 17 n.m. I The SA-2 hss some eflectiveness above this altitude. = Thls low-altitude capability is for sites equipped with the “C” Band radar or modified For those site equipped with the original “S” Band radar, the low- We have no evidence 88 to the minimum effective altitude capabilities of thia system. I The Soviets almost certainly will provide some of these missiles with nuclear warheads, “S’ Band radar. altitude capability is 3,000 feet. and may have begun to do BO. 18 . . . - - . .. , 4 . *.- . I I R I P I A C W . .. . i , I IC 0 0 2 7 8 4 2 U NC LASS1 F I ED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This document wos disseminoted by the Centrol Intelligence Agency. This copy is tor the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on o need to know bosis. Additional essentiol dissemination may be authorized by the following oficiols within their respective departments: a. Director of Intelligence and Reseorch, for the Deportment of Stote b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Offce of the Secretory of c. Assistant Chief of Staff far Intelligence, Deportment of the Army, for the d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Deportment of the e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Deportment of the Air f. Director of NSA, for the Notional Security Agency g. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission h. Asristont Director, FBI, for the Federol Bureau of Investigation Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Deportment of the Army Novy Force i. Director for Centrol Reference, CIA, for any other Oeporiment or Agency 2. This document moy be'retoined, or destroyed by burning in accordonce with opplicoble security regulotions, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by orrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 3. When this document is disseminated overseas, !he overseas recipients moy retain it for o period not in excess of one yeor. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned io the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwording ogency to retoin it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. Blitzer Dept of Jihad Chyron
EXCERPT:
Blitzer: CNN's 'Dept. Of Jihad' Chyron Was Offensive
Justin Elliott | March 5, 2010, 6:28PM10
CNN's Wolf Blitzer just expressed regrets for a graphic shown yesterday that read, "Dept. of Jihad?"
"CNN had no intention of suggesting that the Justice Department supports terrorism," he said. "Lawyers at the Justice Department are patriotic Americans, and we certainly regret any confusion that may have been caused by our graphic."
The graphic came before a segment yesterday on the ad by Liz Cheney's group that attacks DOJ officials who previously represented Guantanamo detainees.
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